Favela v. Boyd
| Decision Date | 02 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-4028-JES-JEH |
| Parties | ANDREA FAVELA, Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY BOYD, ROCK ISLAND COUNTY, and the SHERIFF OF ROCK ISLAND COUNTY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff Andrea Favela's Petition (Doc. 172) for Attorneys' Fees, Defendants Rock Island County and Sheriff of Rock Island County's (collectively, "RICSO") Motion (Doc. 174) for Clarification of Plaintiff's Fee Petition, and Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 175) to RICSO's Motion. RICSO's Motion (Doc. 174) is GRANTED and the Court will consider Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 175) in ruling on her Petition (Doc. 172). For the reasons below, Plaintiff's Petition (Doc. 172) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court awards Plaintiff $81,766.50 in attorneys' fees.
This case began in early 2015 and the facts of it are described in greater detail in earlier opinions. However, there have been multiple rounds of motions to dismiss, motions for judgment, and amended pleadings, so the Court will briefly describe the relevant procedural background. On November 2, 2017, after multiple rounds of substantive briefing, Plaintiff Andrea Favela filed her second Amended Complaint against Defendant Jeffrey Boyd ("Boyd") and Defendant RICSO. Doc. 77. Plaintiff alleged two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") claims for violations of her rights to substantive due process and equal protection and state law claims for: willful and wanton conduct; intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"); respondeat superior; and indemnification.
This Court granted RICSO's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's respondeat superior claim and Plaintiff's personal capacity indemnification claim based on Plaintiff's willful and wanton claim. Doc. 85. Plaintiff withdrew her willful and wanton claim prior to trial. Plaintiff eventually proceeded to trial on a theory of Monell liability against RICSO regarding her § 1983 claims. This Court granted RICSO's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law as to Monell liability and ruled against Plaintiff on her substantive due process claim. However, the Court left the issue of indemnification based on "scope of employment" to the jury. On October 9, 2020, after a five-day trial, a jury returned a verdict in the favor of Plaintiff and against Boyd on her equal protection - class of one and state law IIED claims. The jury found in favor of RICSO and against Plaintiff on the issue of scope of employment. Additionally, the jury awarded Plaintiff $75,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress and $225,000 in punitive damages against Boyd. Doc. 154. This Court denied Plaintiff's subsequent Motion for Partial Judgment as a Matter of Law or a Partial New Trial as well as Boyd's post-trial motions. Docs. 167; 168. No party to this litigation has appealed the Court's rulings or denial of the post-trial motions.
On January 25, 2021, after the Court granted Plaintiff's two motions for extensions of time, Plaintiff filed a Petition (Doc. 172) for an award of attorneys' fees1 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plaintiff requests $373,735 in total fees, representing 648.9 hours of Amanda Yarusso's ("Yarusso") time at a rate of $450.00 per hour, 79.4 hours of Larry Jackowiak's ("Jackowiak") time at a rate of $450 per hour, and 115 hours of Sara Garber's ("Garber") time at a rate of $400.00 per hour. Due to the ambiguity in Plaintiff's Petition, RICSO filed a Motion (Doc. 174)for Clarification because Plaintiff's did not identify whom the fee petition is to be levied against yet included work completed on her claims against RICSO. Plaintiff promptly filed a Response (Doc. 175) to RICSO's Motion.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), a district court "in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee" in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. "[A] prevailing party should ordinarily recover [attorneys' fees] unless special circumstances would render such award unjust." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). However, a determination of fees "should not result in a second major litigation." Id. at 437. When afforded the opportunity to clarify her Petition, Plaintiff conceded that "Plaintiff was the prevailing party against Defendant Jeffrey Boyd and Plaintiff's fee petition, to the extent it is granted, is enforceable and collectable as to Defendant Boyd." Doc. 175, at 1. However, rather than explicitly admitting Plaintiff did not prevail against RICSO, Plaintiff argues that her "fees incurred responding to Defendant RICSO's motions were necessarily incurred to proceed to trial and persist in her claims against Defendant Boyd." Id. Plaintiff's Petition and Response confirm that she requests attorneys' fees based on work relating to RICSO. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to recover anything from RICSO directly, her motion is denied. Based on the Court's prior rulings and the jury's verdict, Plaintiff only prevailed against Boyd, not RICSO. Despite Plaintiff's burden of proof and two opportunities to explain, she omits any legal basis for awarding her fees against Boyd for work performed litigating her claims against RICSO. See Docs. 172; 175. Therefore, the Court cannot grant this Petition for the amount Plaintiff requests.
Further, this case and extensive briefing has gone on long enough. The Court sees no reason to allow Plaintiff a third opportunity to explain why she is entitled to more fees based onRICSO's presence in the lawsuit. Rather than dismissing Plaintiff's request outright, the Court has made every effort to arrive at a just result for awarded attorneys' fees. Had Plaintiff removed excessive time entries or adequately explained the basis for her recovery, the Court would not be in this position. As discussed below, the driving factor in the Court's decision to reduce Plaintiff's recovery is based on her limited success in this litigation and that this litigation has primarily been a (losing) battle between Plaintiff and RICSO.
Because there is no precise formula for awarding fees, district courts have discretion in making this determination, such as identifying specific hours that should be eliminated, or reducing the award due to limited success. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37. Typically, courts start by "using the lodestar method (multiplying the attorney's reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended) and then adjusting that figure to account for various factors, including the complexity of the legal issues involved, the degree of success obtained, and the public interest advanced by the litigation." Paz v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 924 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Schlacher v. Law Offices of Phillip J. Rotche & Assocs., P.C., 574 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 2009); Connolly v. Nat'l Sch. Bus Serv., Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1999)). Although the lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable, it "may be excessive when 'a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success[.]'" Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC v. Mick, 886 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436). Here, Plaintiff's proposed lodestar figures are "excessive" for a number of reasons.
Plaintiff spent the majority of her Petition arguing for the respective hourly rates that should be attributed to counsel, so the Court begins with those rates. Notably, when it comes to counsel's fees, this is one of the most thorough submissions from counsel in this case. Yet, theCourt finds Plaintiff did not met her burden to establish the requested hourly rates. If the fee applicant seeking an award fails to carry her burden of establishing the market rate for counsel's work, then the district court can independently determine the appropriate rate. Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 553 (7th Cir. 2014). While this litigation spanned several years, most of the billing occurred from 2015-2017, with 2016 being the year Yarusso and Jackowiak billed the most. However, Boyd has not objected to the calculation of applicable rates for counsel. Therefore, the Court will apply counsel's current market rate. Smith v. Vill. of Maywood, 17 F.3d 219, 221 (7th Cir. 1994) (). See also Duran v. Town of Cicero, No. 01 C 6858, 2012 WL 1279903, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2012) (). In determining the market rate, an "attorney's actual billing rate for comparable work is presumptively appropriate to use as the market rate." Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 555 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). The next best evidence in determining any market rate is "evidence of rates similarly experienced attorneys in the community charge paying clients for similar work and evidence of fee awards the attorney has received in similar cases." Id. (emphasis added).
Plaintiff has not provided evidence of the rates that Yarusso, Jackowiak, and Garber have billed paying clients for similar cases. Instead, Plaintiff relies on the category of "next best evidence" by providing affidavits from other attorneys and citing to previous fee awards. For Yarusso's purported market rate, Plaintiff compares Yarusso to attorney Louis Meyer, a partner with Meyer & Kiss, LLC, who has litigated numerous civil rights cases in the Central District ofIllinois for years. Plaintiff cites to a 2019 case where a court found a rate of $400/hour was a reasonable hourly fee for Meyer. However, Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $450 for Yarusso because her last established § 1988 fee award2...
To continue reading
Request your trial