Favro v. State

• Citation: 46 S.W. 932
• Parties: FAVRO v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 15 June 1898
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Page 932

46 S.W. 932

FAVRO v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 15, 1898.

Appeal from district court, Frio county; M. F. Lowe, Judge.

Levi Favro was convicted of burglary, and appeals. Affirmed.

W. W. Walling and Mann Trice, for the State.

DAVIDSON, J.

Appellant was convicted of burglary, and appeals.

There is no bill of exceptions in the record. The building burglarized is thus described: "It was made of a wagon sheet and boards, about as follows: I put two forked mesquite poles, about seven feet high, in the ground, and then put a pole from one to the other, and then stretched a wagon sheet over the pole, and brought the ends down to the ground, and nailed them to planks on each side, which planks were nailed to stakes driven in the ground. Then I boxed up the east end of this tent with boards, and, the evening I left, I picked up an old door, and set it sideways in front of the west opening, leaving it up against the end pole. But, as this did not fill up the west end entirely, I also put some boxes at one end of this old door, and then tied the wagon sheet together about this old door. I did this to prevent a hog from getting in, and to prevent anything from entering. I knew there was a hog in that neighborhood, and fixed my place to prevent it getting in. When I came back from Pearsall to my place on Monday, after I left on Saturday, I found that the door had been moved aside sufficient to allow one to pass into this house; and I missed a pair of blankets, a quilt, and a vest. The blankets belonged to Sanders & Peel, the quilt to Bud Pruitt, and the vest to me. I afterwards saw the same blankets in the possession of the sheriff of Frio county." This is the testimony of Walter Ryman, the alleged owner. The proof shows that the land upon which this domicile was located belonged to Henry Maney; was rented to Sanders & Peel; but the house or structure was in the exclusive possession of Ryman. He resided in it. It was his castle or home. It is contended that this is not a "house," within the meaning of the statute, and that the possession of the property was not properly alleged.

Under the burglary statute, a house is defined to be: "Any building or structure erected for public or private use, whether the property of the United States, of this state, or of any public or private corporation or association, or of any individual, of whatever material it may be constructed." Pen. Code 1895, art. 843. The word "building" means "a fabric built or constructed; a structure; an edifice. As commonly understood, a house for residence, business, or public use, or for shelter of animals or storage of goods." Cent. Dict. "Structure" is defined to be "that which is built or constructed; an edifice or a building of any kind. In the widest sense, any production or piece of work artificially built up, or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner; any construction." "To erect" means "to raise and set up in an upright or perpendicular position; set up; raise up. To raise; as a building; built or constructed." Id. In Willis v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 168, 25 S. W. 1119, it was held that a fruit stand built in the shape of a piano box, but large enough for the proprietor to stand in while making sales, would be a "house," within the contemplation of this statute. Now, in this particular case, under the description given by the witness Ryman, this structure comes within the definition of the...