Fay v. Douds, No. 100
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) |
Writing for the Court | L. HAND, , and SWAN and CHASE, Circuit |
Citation | 172 F.2d 720 |
Parties | FAY v. DOUDS, Regional Director. |
Decision Date | 11 February 1949 |
Docket Number | Docket 21137.,No. 100 |
172 F.2d 720 (1949)
FAY
v.
DOUDS, Regional Director.
No. 100, Docket 21137.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
February 11, 1949.
Charles T. Douds, Regional Director, Mozart G. Ratner, Atty., David P. Findling, Associate General Counsel, A. Norman Somers, Asst. General Counsel, and Norton J. Come, Atty., National Labor Relations Board, all of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before L. HAND, Chief Judge, and SWAN and CHASE, Circuit Judges.
L. HAND, Chief Judge.
The plaintiff, who is president of Local 475, of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, CIO, appeals from a judgment of the District Court, denying a temporary injunction, and dismissing the complaint in an action against a regional director of the Labor Board. The complaint prayed (1) that the defendant be ordered to grant a hearing at which the Local might appear and put in evidence; (2) that he be enjoined from holding any election based only upon the consent of a rival union and the employer; and (3) that he be also enjoined from holding any election without placing the Local's name on the ballot. The undisputed facts as they appear in the complaint and in accompanying affidavits were as follows: Local 475 and the employer executed a contract on May 1, 1947, by which the Local was made the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees and in which the employer agreed to a union shop and a "check-off." The agreement was to continue in effect for a year, "and from year to year thereafter until terminated by either party giving to the other written notice by registered mail of termination sixty days prior to the expiration date." Neither party gave such a notice before March 1, 1948; but on February 20 the Local wrote to the employer as follows: "Under the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. * * * Local 475 hereby notifies you of its desire to modify our existing collective bargaining agreement * * * Will you please advise us when you are prepared to meet with the union for the purpose of a collective bargaining conference?" On the 26th the employer answered: "In compliance with the provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, we hereby notify you that we desire to modify our existing agreement. * * * We propose to arrange for a meeting for the purpose of negotiating a new agreement." On March 4 the Local replied: "In order to expedite matters and give the Company an opportunity to acquaint itself with the requests being made by the union, we are attaching herewith a copy of our proposals. We should appreciate being advised when the Company would be prepared to meet with us to discuss them." The Local enclosed in this letter what it called "Proposals for a New Contract," nine in number, constituting variants from the corresponding terms of the existing contract.
On April 8, 1948, the United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, filed a petition with the Labor Board for certification as exclusive bargaining representative with the employer; and on April 12 the defendant, who was the regional director, notified the Local of this petition and stated that it had been named as an intervenor. On April 26 he set May 11 as the date for a hearing; but on May 4 he withdrew the notice of hearing, and on the next day he wrote advising the Local that it had not "complied with the provisions of Section 9 (f), (g) and (h) of the Act and therefore does not have status to object to the holding of a Consent Election, except if it is a party to a contract which, under Board policy, would be a bar to an election." He then mentioned the exchange of letters between the Local and the employer, and concluded: "Since the contract has been opened up for negotiation in this manner, under principles announced in prior Board cases, it is not a bar to the
The first question is as to the jurisdiction of the District Court which the defendant disputes, invoking our decision in Fitzgerald v. Douds.1 We there held that, since the only review of a "certification" proceeding under § 9 was as an incident to a...
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Lipscomb v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, No. Civ.A. 401CV158LN.
...1016, 89 S.Ct. 618, 21 L.Ed.2d 560 (1969); Greensboro Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Johnston, 377 F.2d 28, 32 (4th Cir.1967). Cf. Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.1949) (alleged constitutional violation that is not transparently frivolous sufficient to invoke district court's subject matter juri......
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NLRB v. Air Control Products of St. Petersburg, Inc., No. 21017.
...one. If there is nothing to hear, then a hearing is a senseless and useless formality. As the Court said in Fay v. Douds, 2 Cir., 1949, 172 F.2d 720, 725, "the Constitution protects procedural regularity, not as an end in itself, but as a means of defending substantive Taken most favorably ......
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Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, No. F025641
...exception to the rule against direct judicial review of certification orders. It cites Fay v. Douds (2nd [48 Cal.App.4th 1508] Cir.1949) 172 F.2d 720 as "establish[ing] a right to immediate review of NLRB decisions where the NLRB fails to afford due process." Gallo contends that it was deni......
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J. R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., AFL-CI
...(See, e. g., U. S. v. Storer Broadcasting Co., supra, 351 U.S. 192, 205, 76 S.Ct. 763, 100 L.Ed. 1081; Fay v. Dowds (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F.2d 720, 725.) 26 Cal.3d 19 B Having concluded that the ALRA's administrative regulation is valid, we next examine whether the executive secretary and the ......
-
Lipscomb v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, No. Civ.A. 401CV158LN.
...1016, 89 S.Ct. 618, 21 L.Ed.2d 560 (1969); Greensboro Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Johnston, 377 F.2d 28, 32 (4th Cir.1967). Cf. Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.1949) (alleged constitutional violation that is not transparently frivolous sufficient to invoke district court's subject matter juri......
-
NLRB v. Air Control Products of St. Petersburg, Inc., No. 21017.
...one. If there is nothing to hear, then a hearing is a senseless and useless formality. As the Court said in Fay v. Douds, 2 Cir., 1949, 172 F.2d 720, 725, "the Constitution protects procedural regularity, not as an end in itself, but as a means of defending substantive Taken most favorably ......
-
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, No. F025641
...exception to the rule against direct judicial review of certification orders. It cites Fay v. Douds (2nd [48 Cal.App.4th 1508] Cir.1949) 172 F.2d 720 as "establish[ing] a right to immediate review of NLRB decisions where the NLRB fails to afford due process." Gallo contends that it was deni......
-
J. R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., AFL-CI
...(See, e. g., U. S. v. Storer Broadcasting Co., supra, 351 U.S. 192, 205, 76 S.Ct. 763, 100 L.Ed. 1081; Fay v. Dowds (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F.2d 720, 725.) 26 Cal.3d 19 B Having concluded that the ALRA's administrative regulation is valid, we next examine whether the executive secretary and the ......