Fay v. Warren Hosp. Suites

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: Hon. F. Kay Behm, United States District Judge
• Docket Number: 2:19-cv-10902
• Decision Date: 09 January 2026
• Citation: Fay v. Warren Hosp. Suites, 2:19-cv-10902 (E.D. Mich. Jan 09, 2026)
• Parties: JOHN FAY and JANICE FAY, Plaintiffs, v. WARREN HOSPITALITY SUITES, INC., a Michigan Corporation, et al., Defendants.

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JOHN FAY and JANICE FAY, Plaintiffs, v. WARREN HOSPITALITY SUITES, INC., a Michigan Corporation, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-10902

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

January 9, 2026

OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 124) AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NOS. 123, 125, 126)

Hon F. Kay Behm, United States District Judge

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter is before the court on the parties' competing Motions for Summary Judgment. See Defendant's Motion (ECF No. 124); Plaintiff Janice Fay's Motion (ECF No. 123); Plaintiff John Fay's Motion (ECF No 126).^[1]Plaintiffs filed this civil action in March 2019. ECF No. 1. Although this case began with a number of defendants, Warren Hospitality is the sole remaining Defendant. See ECF 23; ECF 60; ECF 71; see also ECF No. 47 (denying motions to intervene). This case was originally assigned to the Honorable George Caram Steeh and was reassigned to the undersigned in August 2023. ECF No. 87.

This matter was scheduled for trial in July 2024. ECF No. 91. However, for a number of reasons that are ultimately not critical to understanding this motion, the original attorneys for Plaintiffs withdrew; Plaintiffs now proceed with different attorneys for each of them individually. See ECF No. 99. This case was further delayed while Defendant sought clarity on their insurance coverage; their state court declaratory judgment action remains pending, however. See ECF No. 107. Given this breathing room, a review of the history of this case revealed that no summary judgment motions were ever filed. Thus, during the delay caused by the appearance of new attorneys on Plaintiffs' behalf and awaiting news from Defendant's state court matter, and upon the request of counsel after they familiarized themselves with the case, the undersigned allowed both sets of counsel to file dispositive motions in an effort to determine if trial is necessary in this matter. ECF 121.

Because the court finds that material disputes of fact remain that preclude judgment as a matter of law as to premises liability, the court DENIES both Defendant's and Plaintiffs' motions; Defendant's motion is granted in part, and only to the extent that Plaintiffs may not proceed with ordinary negligence claims.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from an incident of carbon monoxide poisoning which occurred at Hawthorne Suites in Warren Michigan on July 25, 2015. ECF No. 127, PageID.3578. Plaintiffs checked into Hawthorne Suites on or about July 22, 2016 (several days before the incident). ECF No. 106-2, PageID.3061 (John Fay Deposition); ECF No. 106-3, PageID.3158 (Janice Fay Deposition). They stayed in Room 138. ECF No. 124-7, PageID.3511-12. On July 25, 2016, John Fay turned on the heat before they went to bed. ECF No. 106-2, PageID.3062. The Fays were found unresponsive in their room by a housekeeper. ECF No. 1246, PageID.3477 (police report); ECF No. 124-7, PageID.3489 (hotel GM deposition). Upon the arrival of emergency services, Warren Fire Department personnel's carbon monoxide detectors recorded readings of 349 ppm. ECF No. 123, PageID.3331 (fire department report). According to the police report, the Fire Department advised personnel at the scene that a reading over 200 ppm is potentially lethal.

ECF No. 124-6, PageID.3477. The wing of the hotel was deemed unsafe and evacuated. ECF No. 124-6, PageID.3477. The Fays were taken to the hospital. ECF No. 124-6, PageID.3477.^[2]Both John and Janice Fay allege that they required emergency treatment at Detroit Receiving Hospital, including hyperbaric oxygen treatment. They allege that they suffered permanent brain damage and are now permanently disabled as a result of severe carbon monoxide poisoning. ECF No. 123, PageID.3270.

Although Defendant disputes that the cause of the carbon monoxide is known, the police report at the time stated that a faulty thermostat caused the AC to run continuously with the heating element, which contributed to a quicker buildup of carbon monoxide and that, along with “faulty duct work,” caused their injuries. ECF No. 123, PageID.3336. Plaintiffs largely adopt this theory via an expert report. See ECF No. 123, PageID.3259-60. As they put it: “This ‘competition' between the AC and the furnace allowed the furnace to fire for longer intervals than one would expect during a warm summer night. Of course, longer furnace firing intervals would generate more carbon monoxide than the very short firing interval that would be necessary to bring the hotel room to comfortable temperatures if the furnace were not in competition with the AC.” ECF No. 123, PageID.3297.

The Fays allege that “Defendants failed to repair and maintain the furnace in accordance with the Michigan Mechanical Code.” ECF No. 123, PageID.3274. Specifically, “Defendants merely changed the filters on the furnaces and occasionally changed the battery on the thermostat.” ECF No. 123, PageID.3278. In their view, proper inspection of the furnaces would have been annual and would include “inspection of the burner and flue for signs of water and corrosion, inspection of the heat exchanger for signs of corrosion, and performance of a combustion analysis test.” ECF No. 123, PageID.3277. They argue that “a licensed HVAC contractor, Dhia Sawa, inspected the furnace in Plaintiff's hotel room after the exposure event and testified that he saw rust on the burners and heat exchanger, and concluded that the heat exchanger was ‘bad.' . . . [S]uch signs of corrosion on the burners and heat exchangers ‘are a red flag for any qualified HVAC technician,' which would have been identified prior to the subject event had inspection and maintenance been performed as required ....” ECF No. 123, PageID.3278 (record citations omitted).

They also allege that although “[t]he International Fire Code, as adopted by the City of Warren and the State of Michigan (via incorporation into the Michigan Building Code) requires installation of single-station carbon monoxide alarms in rooms when there is a fuelburning appliance[,]” “there were no carbon monoxide alarms or detectors in Plaintiff's room[.]” ECF No. 123, PageID.3280.

Janice and John Fay now sue based on negligence and premises liability theories under Michigan law. Warren Hospitality moves for summary judgment as to all of their claims; both Fays move for judgment as to liability.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a party files a motion for summary judgment, it must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . .; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan, 421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 25152 (1986)). Furthermore, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The court's role is limited to determining whether there is a genuine dispute about a material fact, that is, if the evidence in the case “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Where the movant establishes the lack of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden of demonstrating the existence of such an issue shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

That is, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence and to do so must “designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing ‘evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.'” Brown v. Scott, 329 F.Supp.2d 905, 910 (6th Cir. 2004). In order to fulfill this burden, the non-moving party only needs to demonstrate the minimal standard that a jury could ostensibly find in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). However, mere allegations or denials in the non-movant's pleadings will not satisfy this burden, nor will a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 251.

IV. ANALYSIS

This case is before the court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and Plaintiffs' claims are based entirely on state law. The task of this court, sitting in diversity, is to apply the same law as would be applied by the Michigan state courts. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Where a state's highest court has spoken to an issue, this court is bound by that decision unless it is convinced that the high court would overrule it if confronted with facts similar to those before it. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956). Moreover, where a state appellate court has resolved an issue to which the high court has not spoken, federal courts should “treat [those] decisions . . . as authoritative absent a strong...