Fayad v. Keller

Decision Date14 March 2011
Docket NumberCase No.: 10-CV-03372-LHK
PartiesHAMDAN FAYAD, Plaintiff, v. CAROL KELLER, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (re: Dkt. #13 and #17)

Plaintiff Hamdan Fayad ("Plaintiff) brings suit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and various officials (collectively "Defendants") in connection with USCIS's denial of his application for naturalization. Presently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court held a hearing on this matter on March 9, 2011. The parties agree that the key dispute is a legal one: whether Plaintiff satisfies the relevant three-year residency requirement for naturalization of lawful permanent residents. Because Plaintiff does not yet satisfy the residency requirement, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

The parties agree on the basic factual background. Plaintiff is a 37-year old native of Lebanon. See First Am. Compl. (FAC) ¶ 5. Plaintiff entered the United States on December 5, 1998 in F-1 student status. See Pl.'s Cross-Mot. for Sum. J. at 2. Plaintiff married Amal Ibrahim Ramlaoui ("Ms. Ibrahim"), a United States citizen, on February 13, 1999. Id. On March 23, 1999, Ms. Ibrahim filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative ("I-130 Petition"), and Plaintiff concurrently filed an I-485 Adjustment of Status application ("I-485 Application") to adjust his status to that of a Lawful Permanent Resident ("LPR"). See Exh. A and B to Defs.' Mot. for Sum. J. On December 15, 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") approved the I-130 Petition and I-485 Application, and granted Plaintiff conditional permanent residence.1

On December 7, 2001, Plaintiff was convicted of a felony offense in violation of California Penal Code §273.5(a) (domestic violence). See Exh. D to Defs.' Mot. for Sum. J. Plaintiff was sentenced to 90 days imprisonment, imposed a fine, ordered 80 hours of community service, ordered mandatory domestic violence counseling, and sentenced to a three-year period of probation. Id. On May 7, 2003, the Santa Clara County Superior Court reduced plaintiff's felony conviction to a misdemeanor. Id. According to Plaintiff, in June 2003, his conviction was expunged pursuant to California statute. See Exh. I to Defs.' Mot. for Sum. J at 12 ("Addendum to Form N-400 [plaintiff's first naturalization application]").

B. Removal Proceedings and Application for Naturalization

On May 19, 2006, DHS commenced removal proceedings against Plaintiff and served him with a Notice to Appear in immigration court in San Francisco, California. See Exh. E to Defs. Mot. for Sum. J. Plaintiff was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for his conviction for domestic violence. During the removal proceedings, plaintiff's spouse (Ms. Ibrahim) submitted a second I-130 Petition on November 3, 2006, and Plaintiff submitted a second I-485 Application on March 3, 2007. See Exh. G and H to Defs. Mot. for Sum. J. On May 2, 2007, USCIS approved the second I-130 Petition submitted on behalf of Plaintiff. On September 6, 2007, while in removal proceedings, Plaintiff also applied for naturalization via a "N-400 Application" as the spouse of a U.S. citizen. See Exh. I to Defs. Mot. for Sum. J. In order to naturalize as a spouse of a U.S. citizen, Plaintiff was required to establish that he resided continuously in the U.S. as a LPR during the three years immediately preceding his application for naturalization. See 8 U.S.C. §1430(a).

On July 9, 2008, the immigration judge (IJ) approved plaintiff's second I-485 Application in a summary one-page order. See Exh. F. to Defs.' Mot. for Sum. J. The USCIS issued Plaintiff a new I-551 Permanent Resident Card ("green card"), which indicated that Plaintiff became an LPR on July 9, 2008. See Exh. J. to Defs.' Mot. for Sum. J. The parties agree that the IJ's July 9, 2008 order granted Plaintiff LPR status as of July 9, 2008. However, the parties dispute whether the IJ's order also found Plaintiff removable. That dispute is analyzed below.

On May 20, 2009, USCIS interviewed Plaintiff in connection with his application for naturalization. On July 29, 2009, USCIS denied plaintiff's naturalization application on the ground that Plaintiff did not satisfy the relevant three-year continuous residency requirement. See Exh. K to Defs.' Mot. for Sum. J. USCIS reasoned that Plaintiff LPR's status re-started on July 9, 2008, the day the IJ approved his second I-485 Petition. Id. Thus, Plaintiff would not satisfy the residency requirement until July 2011. Plaintiff appealed USCIS's denial of his application for naturalization. See Exh. L to Defs.' Mot. for Sum. J. On June 10, 2010, USCIS upheld the denial of Plaintiff's application for naturalization for failure to satisfy the three-year continuous residency requirement. See Exh. M to Defs. Mot for Sum. J.

C. Procedural History before this Court

On July 30, 2010, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, seeking relief from the USCIS decision. See Compl. [dkt. #1]. Pursuant to the District's Immigration Mandamus Cases Order (General Order 61), Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and Defendants opposed. On November 12, 2010, the Court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment for failure to plead proper subject matter jurisdiction. See November 12, 2010 Order [dkt. #11]. The Court, however, grantedPlaintiff leave to amend to plead proper jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (regarding a district court's authority to review denials of applications for naturalization). See id. at 3.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 17, 2010 remedying the jurisdictional deficiency. See Am. Compl. [dkt. #12]. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on December 1, 2010, and Plaintiff then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on January 18, 2011. The hearing on those motions was originally scheduled for February 24, 2011. Pursuant to the parties' joint stipulation requesting a continuance due to counsel's personal matter, the Court continued the hearing on the motions to March 10, 2011. See Dkt. #21. Counsel for both parties appeared at the March 10, 2011 motion hearing.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

This Court is authorized to conduct a de novo review of plaintiff's application for naturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). In its review, the Court "has the final word" and need not defer to any of USCIS's findings or conclusions. See United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). However, if the Court concludes that there are no "disputed issues of material fact, " it need not engage in its own fact-finding and may grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See, e.g., Alenazi v. USCIS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108458 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010); see also Abghari v. Gonzales, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1343 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ("The Court need not proceed with an evidentiary hearing or otherwise conduct new fact finding where the Court believes that the legal question it has identified... is a threshold matter.").

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and... the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue as to a material fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.). In a motion for summary judgment, the Court draws all reasonable inferences that may be taken from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). "When a motion forsummary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must-by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule-set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. If the opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against that party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that Plaintiff is not yet eligible for naturalization as a matter of law because: (1) he does not meet the statutory continuous residency requirement; and (2) he has not demonstrated good moral character. Because the Court finds that summary judgment appropriate based on plaintiff's ineligibility for naturalization under the continuous residency requirement, the Court does not reach Defendants' argument concerning Plaintiff's moral character.

A. The Dispute over plaintiff's Continuing LPR Status

In order to be naturalized, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence each of the requirements enumerated in the relevant section of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. §1427(a); C.F.R. § 316.2(b). Generally, in order to be eligible for naturalization, an alien must continuously reside in the U.S. for five years after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence. See 8 U.S.C. §1427; 8 C.F.R. §316.5. However, the five-year period is reduced to three years if the alien is applying for naturalization as the spouse of a U.S. citizen and lived in marital union with the spouse for three years prior to applying for naturalization. See 8 U.S.C. §1430(a); 8 C.F.R. §319.1. In addition, the applicant must satisfy the continuous residence requirement from the time the naturalization application is filed up to the time of admission to citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. §1427(a...

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