Feaster v. Beshears, CIV. HNM-95-2897.

• Decision Date: 22 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. CIV. HNM-95-2897.,CIV. HNM-95-2897.
• Citation: 56 F.Supp.2d 600
• Parties: Isaiah T. FEASTER Petitioner, v. Earl BESHEARS, Warden, et al. Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

56 F.Supp.2d 600

Isaiah T. FEASTER Petitioner, v. Earl BESHEARS, Warden, et al. Respondents.

No. CIV. HNM-95-2897.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

July 22, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender for the District of Maryland and Beth M. Farber, Chief Assistant Federal Public Defender for the District of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, for petitioner.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland and Ann N. Bosse, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Baltimore, MD, for respondents.

MEMORANDUM

MALETZ, Senior District Judge.¹

Isaiah Feaster has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1995), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (herein AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, Title I, § 104, 110 Stat. 1218. He alleges a multitude of claims stemming from his 1978 convictions for rape and assault and battery. The government argues that this petition, the fifth of its kind, is abusive and should be dismissed as such. The court agrees, and for the following reasons denies the petition.

I. Procedural History

The history of this case is long and convoluted; however, a clear understanding of the procedural history is essential to an abuse of the writ determination. Thus, the history must be told.

On August 8, 1978, in the course of one day, in the state of Maryland, Isaiah Feaster was tried in a non-jury trial, convicted and sentenced to a term of life plus twenty years concurrent for the rape and assault and battery of a 76 year old woman. Shortly thereafter, in April of 1979 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. Likewise, in March of 1980, the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, prompting the beginning of a long string of post conviction petitions.

The first state post conviction petition was filed in June of 1980 in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. However, by letter dated December 10, 1980, Feaster, through fellow inmate Aaron Holsey, advised the court that he wished to withdraw his petition, and was permitted to do so by order dated January 31, 1981. Despite the fact that he had withdrawn his petition, Feaster sought leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals alleging, among other things, that the circuit court should have allowed Aaron Holsey to represent him at his post conviction hearing. He was denied leave to appeal due to the fact that his petition had been withdrawn.

Next, Feaster sought relief from this court. He filed his first of five habeas petitions in January of 1982 alleging errors in his state post conviction hearing.² By memorandum and order dated April 28, 1992, this court denied Feaster's petition stating:

The short answer to each of petitioner's claims is that "it occurred in a state court habeas corpus proceeding, and federal habeas corpus is not available to challenge error which occurred in such a collateral proceeding." Petitioner has not challenged the criminal proceeding that led to his current custody by the state....

Under these circumstances alone, petitioner's request for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus must be denied.

Even if the matters contested were in fact cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitioner has not exhausted all state court remedies. Petitioner must exhaust all remedies available in state courts before an application for a writ of habeas corpus will be granted.

Feaster v. Gluckstern, R-82-445 (April 20, 1982) (citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit denied his certificate of probable cause to appeal and dismissed his appeal based on the district court's reasoning.

Feaster again sought state post conviction relief in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, alleging a host of errors relating to all aspects of his arrest, trial, sentencing and appeal. Counsel filed an amended petition which was the subject of a hearing before Judge Howard S. Chasanow. Judge Chasanow denied post conviction relief on October 25, 1983. Thereafter, Feaster sought leave to appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but such leave was denied. Feaster attempted to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, but the Clerk of the court returned the petition noting that certiorari review was not available from the denial of leave to appeal in a post conviction proceeding.

Feaster then filed his second federal habeas petition with this court. This petition was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust his state remedies. However, Judge Ramsey included the following footnote in his memorandum and order:

The Court also notes that the petition contains claims arising from prior state habeas corpus proceedings. As noted in the petitioner's earlier case, Feaster v. Gluckstern, R-82-445 (April 20, 1982), these claims are not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Cornell v. Maryland, 396 F.Supp. 1092, 1094 n. 3 (D.Md.1975).

Feaster v. Gluckstern, R-84-1272 (March 3, 1984). Feaster filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this decision, but that too was denied.

On August 27, 1984 a third federal habeas petition was filed in which Feaster alleged that 1) Judge Chasanow had failed to rule on all of his claims; 2) many of petitioner's witnesses were not summoned to the second post conviction hearing; 3) Judge Chasanow misinterpreted important facts and improperly ruled on crucial issues; 4) his assigned public defender was inadequate; and 5) there existed a conflict of interest in his representation by the state public defender's office. This petition was denied for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Judge Ramsey wrote as follows:

While petitioner has now apparently exhausted state remedies available to attack his conviction, the instant petition nowhere alleges that petitioner's original criminal conviction was in violation of any federal right. Instead, the instant petition addresses only alleged deficiencies in the state post-conviction proceedings.

The Court agrees with respondent that allegations of infirmities in the state post-conviction hearing do not provide the petitioner with sufficient grounds for relief under the federal habeas corpus statute....

[A]llegations of error in the state post-conviction proceedings do not by themselves serve as a basis for setting aside an otherwise valid conviction.

Relief is available under § 2254 only on the ground that the person seeking relief "is in custody in violation of the Constitution of laws or treaties of the United States." Because the instant petition does not allege that petitioner's conviction or sentence, pursuant to which he is presently in custody, violated his federal rights, there is no basis for this Court to grant relief.

Feaster v. Gluckstern, R-84-3388 (January 15, 1985) (citations omitted).

Feaster's fourth federal habeas petition was filed on March 21, 1985. However, this new petition contained a very different set of allegations. For the first time in a federal habeas petition, Feaster alleged errors occurring during his trial.³ Judge Ramsey, adopting the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Goetz, dismissed this fourth petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust. Magistrate Judge Goetz noted that the petition contained both exhausted and unexhausted claims and found that pursuant to Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), the Court could no longer entertain such "mixed petitions." Judge Goetz instructed that the petitioner could either resubmit the petition with only the exhausted claims, or exhaust the remainder of his claims.

Feaster chose to return to the state courts to exhaust the remainder of his claims. He filed a third state post-conviction petition which was denied and subsequently sought leave to appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which was also denied. Thereafter, his petitions for writ of certiorari was denied by the Maryland Court of Appeals.

Finally, in September of 1995, Feaster filed the instant petition.

II. Exhaustion

A state prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus relief must first present each of his claims to the state courts having jurisdiction over them. See e.g. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). This doctrine of exhaustion is grounded in principles of comity, and provides states with the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's rights. See id. Therefore, if a petitioner fails to exhaust each of his claims, the petition should be dismissed, and the petitioner may either return to state court to exhaust the claims, or resubmit the petition with only the exhausted claims presented. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198.

However, the government, in its responsive pleadings, unconditionally waived any issue of exhaustion. The state stipulated that:

[F]easter's petition ought not be dismissed for failure to satisfy Section 2254's exhaustion requirement, because, whether or not Feaster has presented each of his instant claims to all appropriate state courts, Feaster no longer has any state direct review or collateral review remedies available to him with respect to the claims raised in this Court.

Supplemental Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order to Show Cause (herein Supplemental Answer) p. 55. Such a stipulation, even if erroneous, constitutes an unconditional waiver of the government's right to object to the petition on that ground. See Praylow v. Martin, 761 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir.1985) n. 2, cert.denied, 474 U.S. 1009, 106 S.Ct. 535, 88 L.Ed.2d 466 (1985); Sweezy v. Garrison, 694 F.2d 331, 331 (4th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908, 103 S.Ct. 1882, 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983); cf. Harding v....