Feathers v. Aey

Decision Date27 March 2002
Docket NumberNo. 5:01-CV-2081.,5:01-CV-2081.
Citation196 F.Supp.2d 530
PartiesThomas L. FEATHERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. William AEY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

Paul J. Pusateri, Paul R. Reiners, Howes, Daane, Milligan, Kyhos & Erwin, Canton, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Bruce H. Christensen, Jr., John C. Reece, City of Akron, Department of Law, Akron, OH, for Defendants.

ORDER

GWIN, District Judge.

On January 23, 2001, Defendants William Aey, J.P. Donohue, and the City of Akron filed for summary judgment [Doc. 19]. Plaintiffs Thomas and Kathleen Feathers oppose the motion. Because there is an issue of material fact as to what happened on the Feathers' front porch, the Court denies the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Thomas Feathers' constitutional claim. The Court also denies Aey and Donohue qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

The Court, however, finds that Kathleen Feathers shows insufficient evidence to make out a claim of constitutional deprivation and therefore grants judgment as to her claims. The Court further finds that the plaintiffs show insufficient evidence to make out their state law claims and gives judgment as to those claims. Finally, the plaintiffs show insufficient evidence to make out a claim against the City of Akron. For that reason, the Court grants judgment to the City of Akron with regard to this claim.

I. Background

The plaintiffs claim that City of Akron Police Officers William Aey and J.P. Donohue deprived them of rights given by the U.S. Constitution when, on August 31, 2000, Officers Aey and Donohue stopped, arrested, and used force on Thomas Feathers. They make claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under various state law theories.

The events giving rise to the Feathers's claims began on August 31, 2000, when an anonymous caller reported to police that a white male with a beard shouted at him from a porch of a house on North Howard Street in North Akron. In his 911 call, the unidentified caller stated:

CALLER: Yes maam, I was just walking down North Howard Street and some guy on his porch, I don't know him, he looked at me and said Shut the fuck up and he pointed something at me.

OPERATOR: OK, how long ago?

CALLER: Just right now, I'm on the corner of North Howard and Cuyahoga Falls Avenue.

OPERATOR: And which way did he go?

CALLER: He is still on the porch. I don't know what he pointed I don'[t] even know this guy. He looks like his is pretty drunk though.

* * * * * *

OPERATOR: Ok, do you wish to leave your name?

CALLER: Um, not really but you can have somebody come by here.

(Defs.' Ex. A-2).

After receiving the call, the Akron Police Department directed Akron Police Officers Orrand and Yurick to check the call. Before Orrand and Yurick could respond, Defendants Aey and Donohue went to the location, apparently because they were closer. Aey and Donohue were the first officers to arrive on the scene.

The parties' versions of what occurred at the Feathers home differ significantly. According to the defendants, they came onto the plaintiffs' porch and ordered Thomas Feathers to remove his hands from his pockets. After repeated requests, the defendants acknowledge that he removed at least one hand but claim he then returned his hand to his pockets. They also claim that Feathers headed toward the door leading to his home. The defendants acknowledge that Thomas Feathers went to the door of his house to ask his father to film the encounter with a video camera in the living room.

Officers Aey and Donohue claim they were justified to stop Thomas Feathers and pat him down. After tackling him, they say they had probable cause to arrest him when they found a work knife in one of this pockets.

The Feathers' version of the events differs significantly from the version given by Officers Aey and Donohue. At his deposition, Thomas Feathers testified:

Q. Okay. What was your reaction when you saw the police, what were you thinking?

A. I had no idea why they were there.

Q. Did the police officer get out immediately or did they sit in the cruiser for a time?

A. Immediately.

Q. Did both officers get out?

A. Yes.

Q. Were both officers in uniform?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the first thing you remember when they got out of the cruiser?

A. Officer Aey demanding us to get to the other end of the porch.

Q. And who is "us"?

A. My wife and I.

Q. Was your father outside at the time?

A. No, sir.

Q. If I'm looking at the house from the street, which side of the porch were you and your wife on to begin with, the right side or the left side?

A. The left side.

Q. If I'm looking at the house?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you understand that Officer Aey was telling you and your wife to move over to the right side of the house?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall the words that he used?

A. Get to the other end of the porch.

Q. And what did you do?

A. Walked toward the other end of the porch.

Q. And what happened next?

A. My wife was asking the whole time what's up, why are you here.

.... A. My wife continued to ask why they were there, what we could — what's up, and he would then holler orders, take your hands out of your pockets.

Q. Did you understand he was talking to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have your hands in your pockets?

A. Yes. And a second later he asked again, take you — or demanded with real abrasive take your hands out of your pockets.

Q. Did you hear him say it a second time?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take them out of your pockets?

A. Yes, like — took my hands out and by habit just put them back in.

....

Q. What happened after your put your hands back in the pocket, your pockets?

A. He screamed again take your hands out of your pockets, and I then turned and looked at my wife like, you know, this guy is not going to talk to us. I then took my hands out of my pockets as I turned, opened the door with my right hand and leaned on the door jamb with my left hand and leaned in — leaned my head in standing on one leg and told my dad come out here quick, bring the cam corder.

(Thomas Feathers Dep. at 62-66).

Consistent with her husband's testimony, Kathleen Feathers says that Officers Aey and Donohue came onto the porch shouting and demanding they move to an opposite end of the porch. Like her husband, she testifies that her husband removed his hands from his pocket prior to the police officers use of force upon him.

Thomas Feathers was arrested and taken to the Summit County Jail. Before he was transported to the jail, Thomas Feathers was searched. The police officers found a multi-purpose knife on his person.

On September 11, 2000, the Summit County Grand Jury indicted Thomas Feathers for assault against a police officer, carrying a concealed weapon and resisting arrest based on the events of August 31, 2000. On January 31, 2001, the matter was tried to a jury in Summit County Common Pleas Court. During trial, the prosecution moved to dismiss the concealed weapon and resisting arrest charges. The jury acquitted Thomas Feathers of the assault charge.

On August 30, 2001, the plaintiffs filed their complaint. In Count 1, the plaintiffs say the Defendants Aey and Donohue deprived them of their Constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count 2, the plaintiffs say Defendant City of Akron deprived them of their Constitutional rights by failing to adequately train and discipline Aey and Donohue. In Counts 3, 4, and 5, the plaintiffs assert state law claims for malicious prosecution, unlawful arrest, and intentional infliction for emotional distress.

The Court considers the defendants' motion below.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence submitted shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Waters v. City of Morristown, Tenn., 242 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir.2001). A fact is material if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin, Ohio, 150 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir.1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). It is not sufficient for the non-moving party merely to show that there is some existence of doubt as to the material facts. Id.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. National Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 114 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir.1997). Ultimately the Court must decide "whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc. v. All-Lock Co., 96 F.3d 174, 178 (6th Cir.1996) (internal quotations omitted).

III. Analysis
A. Kathleen Feathers

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses Kathleen Feathers involvement as a plaintiff. The plaintiffs failed to respond to the defendants' motion for summary judgment against her. The undisputed evidence shows that she was never arrested, searched, or constrained. The plaintiffs' do not allege she was threatened by the defendants or present evidence indicating she suffered any damages. Therefore, the Court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims with respect to Kathleen Feathers.

B. Thomas Feathers's § 1983 claim

Thomas Feathers sues Officers Aey and Donohue under § 1983. This statute provides recovery for...

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