Feathers v. Miranda
| Decision Date | 27 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:15-cv-00090-DAD-SKO (PC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | MARK SHAWN FEATHERS, Plaintiff, v. MIRANDA, et al., Defendants. |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
(Doc. 24)
Plaintiff, Mark Shawn Feathers, is a prisoner in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR"). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On November 20, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendant filed a reply. (Docs. 30, 31.) The motion is deemed submitted. L.R. 230(l).
A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure1 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Dismissal is proper if there is a lack of a cognizable legal theory, or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1762 (2012). Inresolving a 12(b)(6) motion, a court's review is generally limited to the operative pleading. Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007); Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2006); Schneider v. California Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998).
In limited circumstances, however, documents outside of the operative pleading may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003), see also, Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987) (), United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno County, 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008) (judicial notice), Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987) (), Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986) (). Under the doctrine of incorporation by reference, a court may consider a document that was not attached to the pleading if the plaintiff refers to the document extensively or if it forms the basis for plaintiff's claim. Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908; Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); Conservation Force, 646 F.3d at 1242; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court must accept well-pled factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998; Sanders, 504 F.3d at 910; Huynh, 465 F.3d at 996-97; Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000). Pleadings of prisoners proceeding pro se are liberally construed and any doubt is resolved in the inmate's favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).
/ / / Further, "[i]f there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both of which are plausible, plaintiff's complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216-17. Id. (emphasis in original). "Rule 8(a) 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' to support the allegations." Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added in Starr).
Defendant contends that Plaintiff is not entitled to monetary relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because he cannot seek monetary damages against Defendant Sherman in his official capacity. Defendant also contends that Plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act (RA) because he was transferred from the prison where the alleged discrimination took place, thereby rendering the claims moot. Defendant avers that Plaintiff's injunctive relief claims are further mooted because Plaintiff is no longer housed at SATF and SATF has revised the caregiver position to allow inmates with TABE reading scores of less than 9.0 to become caregivers. Finally, to the extent Plaintiff can seek compensatory relief under the RA, Defendant contends Plaintiff fails to properly allege that he was otherwise qualified for the caregiver position. Thus, Defendant requests that Plaintiff's SAC be dismissed.
Plaintiff is classified as DD2 in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") Developmentally Disabled Program, which means he requires occasional prompts by correctional staff to perform or complete activities of daily living, such as showering or cleaning his housing unit. (Doc. 16, SAC, pp. 6, 15.) Aside from daily prompts,Plaintiff's other adaptive supports include being provided more time to adjust to new routines and environments, being given extra coaching to learn new tasks, and being monitored for undue influence from other inmates because Plaintiff is at risk for being victimized by other inmates. (Id.)
Plaintiff's claims are based on his desire to become an ADA caregiver when he was housed at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison ("SATF"). (Doc. 16.) Specifically, Plaintiff initially asked his Unit Classification Committee ("UCC") to work in the caregiver Program on May 8, 2012. (Id., p. 6.) At that time, Plaintiff had obtained his GED and his TABE reading score was 8.1. (Id., pp. 29-30.) The UCC denied Plaintiff's request on the basis that he would not be able to complete all the job expectations of that position. (Id., pp. 6, 28-30.) Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal on this issue in early 2013. (Id. 32-34.)
Plaintiff again requested assignment as a caregiver at his 2013 and 2014 UCC annual reviews, but was repeatedly denied. (Id. pp. 6-7, 36, 38-39.) Plaintiff filed a second inmate appeal on this issue which was granted in June of 2014. (Id., pp. 7, 41-50.) It was not until a mid-year 2014 UCC program review, that Plaintiff's inmate appeal on this issue, which had been granted, was recognized and Plaintiff was placed on the caregiver waiting list. (Id., 7, 61-62.) Despite having had normal examinations with his primary care provider in the two preceding months, Plaintiff was noted as "recently designated high risk medical" and the UCC elected to give Plaintiff a "non-Adverse transfer." (Id.) On February 4, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred to the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, California ("CMF-Vac"). (Id.)
Plaintiff is proceeding against Defendant for violation of his rights under the ADA and the RA.
Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the RA prohibit discrimination based on disability. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). The ADA applies only to public entities, whereas the RA proscribes discrimination in all federally-funded programs. Id. Title II of the ADA provides:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Similarly, the RA provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public entity's services, programs, or activities, and (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of a disability. See Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.1997). To establish a violation of § 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is handicapped within the meaning of the RA; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the benefit or services sought; (3) he was denied the benefit or services solely by reason of a handicap; and (4) the program providing the benefit or services receives federal financial assistance. See id.
At the pleading stage, Plaintiff's allegation that he was excluded from a job position for which he was otherwise qualified, solely because of his disability, was deemed sufficient to state cognizable claims under the ADA and the RA. However, as noted in the screening order, ADA and RA claims are brought against a public entity or the appropriate state official in his or her official capacity rather than against individuals in their personal capacities. A.W....
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