Featherston v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 27 February 1970
• Docket Number: No. 27379.,27379.
• Citation: 418 F.2d 582
• Parties: Floyd FEATHERSTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John MITCHELL, Attorney General of the United States, et al., Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

418 F.2d 582 (1969)

Floyd FEATHERSTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John MITCHELL, Attorney General of the United States, et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 27379.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

November 10, 1969.

Certiorari Denied February 27, 1970.

Alan Sam Glast, Ben F. Foster, Ralph Langley, San Antonio, Tex., for petitioner-appellant; Foster, Lewis, Langley, Gardner & Hawn, San Antonio Tex., of counsel.

Ted Butler, U. S. Atty., Reese L. Harrison, Asst. U. S. Atty., Ernest Morgan, Special Asst. U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for respondents-appellees.

Before GEWIN, THORNBERRY and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges.

Certiorari Denied February 27, 1970. See 90 S.Ct. 945.

AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:

Floyd Featherston, while in federal custody and subject to the District Judge's order committing him for psychiatric observation to the federal hospital in Springfield, Missouri, petitioned the same District Judge for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he was being detained in violation of his federal constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1964); see U. S.Const. amend. V.

The United States charged Featherston with having knowingly and wilfully attempted to evade and defeat part of the income tax due and owing from him and his wife for the taxable years 1961, 1962, and 1963, in violation of Int.Rev. Code of 1954, § 7201, by filing a false and fraudulent income tax return for each of those years. A jury trial on this charge began on September 17, 1968, in Del Rio, Texas. On October 8, 1968, the District Judge ordered Featherston's commitment for psychiatric observation to the Springfield hospital, see 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1964), discharged the jury, and declared a mistrial. Featherston contends that no legal basis exists for his present detention because the declaration of a mistrial operates to bar the Government from commencing a new trial on the tax evasion charge. Finding this contention unsound, we affirm the District Court's order denying Featherston's petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1964).

The purpose of the constitutional prohibition against "double jeopardy," applicable to the federal government and the states, is to prevent these governments from making repeated attempts to convict an individual of an alleged offense, "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 187-188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L. Ed.2d 199 (1957). See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-796, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 2063, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1194, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896). Occasions will arise, however, when a second trial constitutionally may be had on the same charge against a defendant notwithstanding that the jury impaneled for the first trial was discharged without reaching a verdict and over the defendant's objection. E. g., United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). Federal district judges are empowered to declare mistrials in criminal cases without causing a subsequent trial to be barred "whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." Id.; see Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 1034, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963). Exercising the discretion of declaring a mistrial does not bar a second trial if there is an "imperious necessity" for so doing, Downum v. United States, supra. Such a need will arise "only in very extraordinary and striking circumstances," United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed.Cas. 622, 623 (No. 14,858) (C.C.D.Mass.1815), and each case will turn upon its own particular facts. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 1035 (1963). Mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the liberty of the individual, in order to prevent the exercise of "an unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary judicial discretion," id. at 738, 83 S.Ct. at 1035-1036, quoting United States v. Watson, 28 Fed.Cas. 499, 501 (No. 16,651) (D.C.N.Y.1868), we have no doubt that a mistrial was manifestly necessary in this case to protect the rights of the accused and, by so doing, to serve the ends of public justice. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). We have considered and rejected Featherston's arguments on this appeal as follows.

A mistrial was declared in this case because the District Judge determined that Featherston's commitment for psychiatric observation was necessary to the determination he had ordered of Featherston's mental competency to stand trial. Featherston contends that the District Judge erred in ordering such a determination of his competency. The record of the trial refutes this contention, for it shows that a serious question regarding the defendant's mental competency was raised in open court during the fourth week of that proceeding. Consequently, in making this order the District Judge was merely complying with the mandate of 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1964). Section 4244 provides in part:

"Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence * * * the United States Attorney has reasonable cause to believe that a person charged with an offense against the United States may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense, he shall file a motion for a judicial determination of such mental competency of the accused, setting forth the ground for such belief with the trial court in which proceedings are pending. Upon such a motion or upon a similar motion in behalf of the accused, or upon its own motion, the court shall cause the accused * * * to be examined as to his mental condition * * *."

In this case the United States Attorney made an oral motion for a section 4244 determination. Therefore, the District Judge was required to order such a determination unless the motion was made in bad faith or was based upon a frivolous ground. Caster v. United States, 5 Cir., 1963, 319 F.2d 850, 852, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 953, 84 S.Ct. 972, 11 L. Ed.2d 973 (1964). See also Krupnick v. United States, 8 Cir., 1959, 264 F.2d 213, 216. That Featherston might have been competent to stand trial is irrelevant to the question whether a determination of this fact was necessary.

The test of mental competency under section 4244 is whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U. S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed. 2d 824 (1960); Blake v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 407 F.2d 908, 910 (en banc). Once the United States Attorney has reasonable cause to believe that the accused does not possess this ability and understanding, he must move for a determination according to the terms of section 4244, and the trial court must grant the motion. We agree with Featherston that the relevant inquiry under this section is not whether a defendant can be held criminally responsible for the acts with which he is charged, see Blake v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 407 F.2d 908 (en banc), but whether he understands the nature of the proceedings against him and is able to assist in his own defense. See Shale v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 388 F.2d 616, 618, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867, 89 S.Ct. 456, 21 L.Ed.2d 445 (1968); Floyd v. United States, 5 Cir., 1966, 365 F.2d 368, 374 n. 9. We cannot accept Featherston's contention, however, that no question regarding his competency was raised during the course of his trial.

The trial had progressed into its fourth week and the Government had presented its case when Featherston's counsel called Dr. George H. Hermann, the defendant's physician, as a witness for the defense....