Febbi v. Board of Review, Division of Employment Sec., Dept. of Labor and Industry

• Decision Date: 23 October 1961
• Docket Number: A--11,BRL--1017--407--C,Nos. A--10,BRL--1017--1--C,s. A--10
• Citation: 174 A.2d 481,35 N.J. 601
• Parties: Dominick G. FEBBI et al. (to, inclusive), Appellants-Respondents, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, State of New Jersey, and Ford Motor Company, Respondents-Appellants.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 601

35 N.J. 601

174 A.2d 481

Dominick G. FEBBI et al. (BRL--1017--1--C to BRL--1017--407--C, inclusive), Appellants-Respondents, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, State of New Jersey, and Ford Motor Company, Respondents-Appellants.

Nos. A--10, A--11.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Sept. 14, 1961.

Decided Oct. 23, 1961.

Alfred C. Clapp, Newark, for appellants-respondents (Peter C. Cammelieri, Fair Lawn, attorney; Robert P. Gorman, Upper Montclair, of counsel).

Edward A. Kaplan, Jersey City, for respondent-appellant Board of Review (Clarence F. McGovern, Medford Lakes, attorney).

Benjamin Gross, Jersey City, for respondent-appellant Ford Motor Co. (Lynch & Milstein, Jersey City, attorneys; George R. Milstein, Jersey City, of counsel).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

HANEMAN, J.

This case involves a construction of section 5(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Law. (N.J.S.A. 43:21--5(d)).

Claimants are employees of Ford Motor Company (Ford), at its Mahwah plant. Ford suspended manufacturing operations on August 22, 1958 in order to retool for the production of its 1959 models. Claimants were laid off on this date and did not return to work until they were recalled on Monday, September 15. They worked on Monday, September 15, Tuesday, September 16, and until 10 A.M. Wednesday, September 17, when they ceased work pursuant to a strike order issued in a labor dispute with Ford. On Thursday, September 18, the dispute was settled and the strike was terminated but, because of a lack of work, claimants were not recalled to work until the following week.

Claimants applied for and received benefits for total unemployment for the period of August 25 to September 14, inclusive. They chose to have these benefits computed on the basis of a benefit week beginning on Monday and extending through Sunday. Regulation 22.02(c) of the Division of Employment Security (Division) which was adopted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21--19(q) gives employees claiming total unemployment benefits the right to so choose.

Claimants also applied for partial unemployment benefits for the benefit week beginning Monday, September 15. No choice, however, as to the days comprising that benefit week was available because Regulation 22.02(a) requires that in applications by weekly employees for benefits for partial unemployment the benefit week must correspond to the payroll week which, in the case of Ford, was Monday through Sunday. Claimants were disqualified by the Bureau of Unemployment Benefits from any payments due to unemployment on September 17 on the grounds that the loss of work on that day was due to a labor dispute. N.J.S.A. 43:21--5(d).

On appeal by the claimants and Ford, the Appeal Tribunal of the Division held that claimants were not entitled to any benefits for the entire week in which the strike occurred. This decision resulted from its view that N.J.S.A. 43:21--5 forbids the payment of unemployment benefits in any week during which there has been a loss of work due to a labor dispute.

The Board of Review of the Division affirmed the Appeal Tribunal and ruled further that claimants were not entitled to the benefits already paid for the benefit week ending September 14. It based this conclusion on the fact that Regulation 23.01 provides that once it is determined that a disqualification exists in any week the disqualification applies to the entire Calendar week. Thus it is seen that the disqualification, due to the labor dispute, for the benefit week beginning Monday, September 15, resulted in disqualification for the Calendar week in which that labor stoppage occurred. The outgrowth of that reasoning made Sunday, September 14, the first day of the Calendar week, a day of disqualification. This day was also part of the benefit week for which total unemployment benefits had been awarded claimants and since an individual is not entitled to benefits for that part of a week preceding a day of disqualification the benefits paid were ordered to be repaid.

Claimants appealed to the Appellate Division which court remanded the matter In limine to the Board of Review for a resolution of a factual issue as to which there arose a dispute, I.e., the cause of the unemployment on September 18 and 19. The Board of Review found that the stoppage of work on September 18 was caused by a labor dispute and that the stoppage of work on September 19 was due to a lack of work. This determination is not now questioned by any of the parties. The Appellate Division reversed the conclusion of the Board of Review disqualifying claimants, holding that they were entitled to receive total unemployment benefit for the benefit week ended September 14 as well as partial benefit for the week ended September 21. Febbi v. Board of Review, Div. Empl. Sec., 65 N.J.Super. 57, 167 A.2d 33 (1961). Petition for certification was granted by this court, 34 N.J. 323, 168 A.2d 694 (1961).

Upon oral argument all parties agreed that claimants are entitled to benefits for the week of September 8 to 14. The problem before this court is therefore reduced to a construction of the Unemployment Compensation Law in order to ascertain whether claimants are entitled to benefits for a week in which their partial unemployment was caused for two days by a labor dispute (September 17, 18) and for one day by a lack of work (September 19).

All parties argue for an interpretation of the statute on an 'all or nothing' basis. Claimants contend that an employee is disqualified only where he is unemployed for an entire week as the result of a labor dispute. Ford and the Division argue that an employee is disqualified for the entire week in which any time was lost as a result of a labor dispute. We do not agree with either theory.

At the outset it is well to repeat certain basic principles and conclusions. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that the intention of the Legislature is to be derived from a view of the entire statute and that all sections must be read together in the light of the general intent of the act so that the auxiliary effect of each individual part of a section is made consistent with the whole. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3d ed. 4812, §§ 4702, 4704 (1943); Trugman v. Reichenstein, 27 N.J. 280, 288, 142 A.2d 618 (1958); Petition of Sheffield Farms Co., 22 N.J. 548, 554, 126 A.2d 886 (1956).

When the Legislature has clearly defined a term, the courts are bound by that definition. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §§ 3002, 4814 (3d ed. 1943); Eagle Truck Transport, Inc. v. Board of Review, etc., 29 N.J. 280, 289, 148 A.2d 822 (1959).

In Gerber v. Board of Review, etc., 20 N.J. 561 at page 566, 120 A.2d 436, at page 438 (1956), this court said:

'We cannot concern ourselves either with the wisdom or the limitations expressly set forth in the disqualification specifically defined in N.J.S.A. 43:21--5(d). Specific conditions under which unemployment compensation can or should be paid where there is a work stoppage as a result of a labor dispute is clearly within the legislative province. This particular section deals with a sensitive area of policy on which there can be a reasonable difference of opinion and our province is merely to interpret and apply it to particular situations as they are presented, keeping in mind the general policy of the act.

We are not permitted by construction to lessen or broaden the scope of a statute when the intention of the Legislature in a particular instance is clearly and plainly expressed.'

The legislative policy underlying the enactment of section 5(d) has been said to be 'to place the State in a completely...