FED. ELECTION COM'N v. HALEY CONG. COMMITTEE, C85-1185TB.
| Decision Date | 24 February 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. C85-1185TB.,C85-1185TB. |
| Citation | 654 F. Supp. 1120 |
| Parties | FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. TED HALEY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE and Theodore R. Haley, Joanne Alger, Sallie Baine-Zimmer, Dona Carlson, George W. Edman, Frederick T. Haley and Richard G. Haley, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
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Eric F. Kleinfeld, Federal Election Commission, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
Jeffrey T. Haley, Simburg, Ketter, Haley, Sheppard & Purdy, Seattle, Wash., for defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; ORDER OF DISMISSAL
THESE MATTERS come before the court on:
(1) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); and
(2) Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Claims for Declaratory Judgment and Civil Penalties Against the Defendants, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The court has reviewed the Motions, documents filed in support and opposition, and the file, and now concludes that plaintiff's motion should be denied, defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be granted and this action should be dismissed.
The following facts are not controverted:
This is a case filed by the Federal Election Commission in October of 1985, requesting declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief for alleged violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended. The defendants are the Ted Haley Congressional Committee, which was formed to run Theodore R. Haley's campaign for the Sixth District Congressional seat in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1982, as well as the former candidate, Ted Haley, and six other individuals who served as guarantors on a loan made to Ted Haley by Puget Sound National Bank for the purpose of retiring campaign debts of the Haley Committee.
Ted Haley lost the 1982 election and when the campaign was over, he had debts outstanding to printers, campaign consultants, campaign staff, and others. Several months after the election, when the committee was still unable to pay off its debts, Ted Haley obtained a personal loan for $50,000 from Puget Sound National Bank. The bank requested security for the loan and guarantees were provided by the six other defendants in the case. All six of these defendants have submitted affidavits stating they agree with the document entitled "Defendants' Statement of Material Facts," which states that prior to the 1982 general election none of them offered to guarantee loans to the Committee after the election, and that prior to the election no one connected with the campaign had any discussions with any of the defendants regarding loan guarantees. None of the defendants was approached regarding a loan guarantee until more than three months after the election was over, and none of them expected or intended that their loan guarantees would influence any election for federal office. Haley has clearly indicated that he has no plans or intent to ever run for public office again. The defendants, as close friends and/or relatives of Mr. Haley, believed he would repay the loan out of his income as a surgeon and that there was no meaningful possibility that their guarantees would be called by the bank. The plaintiff has offered no evidence to controvert these assertions, and the court takes them as facts.
Four of the defendants (Fred Haley, Dona Carlson, Richard Haley and Joanne Alger) provided guarantees of $10,000; and two of the defendants (Sallie Baine-Zimmer and George Edman) provided guarantees of $5,000. The treasurer of the Haley Campaign Committee during the campaign and the time when the loan guarantees were made was one L.T. Murray, Jr. However, Ted Haley asserts Murray was treasurer in name only and that Haley fulfilled all duties of the treasurer both during the campaign and to date. (See first affidavit of Theodore R. Haley, Exhibit 1, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.)
The loan from Puget Sound National Bank was made on March 11, 1983. Upon receiving it, Haley transferred the entire amount to the Haley Committee which used the funds to pay the campaign debts. The loan and the guarantees were reported to the Federal Election Commission by the Haley Congressional Committee in its 1983 mid-year report. Ted Haley repaid the loan in full from personal funds in four payments between March 31 and December 31, 1983.
On October 30, 1984 the Commission found reason to believe that the Haley Committee and its treasurer violated 2 U.S.C. § 441a(f) by accepting excessive contributions from defendants Joanne Alger, Sallie Baine-Zimmer, Dona Carlson, George W. Edman, Frederick T. Haley and Richard G. Haley. The Commission also found reason to believe that defendants Alger, Baine-Zimmer, Carlson, Edman, Frederick T. Haley and Richard G. Haley violated 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) by making excessive contributions to the Haley Committee. On July 30, 1985 the Commission authorized the initiation of this civil suit for relief in Federal District Court.
Summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 769 (9th Cir.1981); Lew v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985). When a district court is reviewing a decision of an administrative agency which is itself a finder of fact, summary judgment is an appropriate mechanism for deciding the legal question of whether the agency could reasonably have found the facts as it did. Occidental Engineering Company v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir.1985). After adequate time for discovery, summary judgment will be granted against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
In reviewing the Federal Election Commission's interpretation of 2 U.S.C. § 441a, the district court must give deference to the interpretation put on the statute by the agency. However, the courts are the final authority on issues of statutory construction, and they must reject administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by adjudication or rule making, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement. In this regard, the thoroughness, validity and consistency of an agency's reasoning are factors that bear upon the amount of deference to be given an agency's ruling. In determining whether the Commission's interpretation of § 441a was contrary to law, the task for the court is not to interpret such a provision as it thinks best, but rather to make a more narrow inquiry into whether the Commission's construction is sufficiently reasonable to be accepted by the reviewing court. To satisfy this standard it is not necessary for the court to find that agency's construction to be the only reasonable one or the same construction the court would have reached if the question had initially arisen in judicial proceeding. Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 102 S.Ct. 38, 70 L.Ed.2d 23 (D.Colo.1981). A reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside an agency's action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity, (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right, (4) without observance of procedure required by law, (5) unsupported by substantial evidence or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(6)(B) requires a de novo hearing by the district court on the issue of whether the Commission has established that the person involved in such civil action has committed a violation of the Act. See also Federal Election Commission v. California Medical Assoc., et al., 502 F.Supp. 196 (D.C.N.D.Calif.1980), in which a civil enforcement action instituted by the Federal Election Commission for alleged violation of 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C), was tried to the court upon stipulated facts as well as supplementary testimonial and documentary evidence.
Plaintiffs assert that defendants are clearly in violation of the law set forth in 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A), which provides:
Plaintiff also asserts that Ted Haley and his political committee are clearly in violation of 2 U.S.C. § 441a(f), which provides:
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