Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Taves
| Citation | 2016 MT 109 N |
| Decision Date | 10 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | DA 15-0527 |
| Parties | FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. GEE GEE TAVES, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV 15-091A Honorable Ted O. Lympus, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Gee Gee Taves, Self-Represented, Kalispell, Montana
For Appellee:
Danielle A.R. Coffman, Crowley Fleck PLLP, Kalispell, Montana
Cassie R. Dellwo, Mackoff Kellogg Law Firm, Dickinson, North Dakota
Filed:
/s/_________
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Gee Gee Taves (Taves) appeals an order from the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, which granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). The Court's order also dismissed Taves' counterclaim and related discovery requests. We affirm.
¶3 This matter involves two lawsuits. The first—cause number DV-10-1166A (2010 Lawsuit)—involved Gee Gee Taves and his wife Ilse Taves, who attempted to revoke the foreclosure and subsequent Trustee's sale of their Kalispell property. The second lawsuit involved the property's current owner—Fannie Mae—suing to evict Taves. Taves is appealing from the District Court's order in the second lawsuit.
¶4 In 2010, Taves sued Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. and Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Company (collectively Wells Fargo) to prevent them from foreclosing on the property and selling it in a Trustee's sale. On August 11, 2011, the Court denied Taves' motion to revoke the Trustee's sale. The Court denied all of Taves' claims, which included: (1) Wells Fargo failed to provide him legal notice of the Trustee's sale; (2) Wells Fargo failed to record notice of the sale; (3) Taves was in bankruptcy; and (4) because Taves filed the 2010 Lawsuit, the foreclosure became contested and thereforefell outside the scope of nonjudical foreclosure. The Court entered summary judgment and final judgment against Taves in July 2013, holding:
A review of the memoranda and documents of record reveals that the June 17, 2011, Trustee's Sale of [the Taves'] former residence was properly noticed in conformity with the Montana Small Tract Financing Act, Sections 71-1-301 MCA, et seq. The Bankruptcy Court granted a discharge and the automatic stay expired on June 8, 2011, and therefore, did not preclude the Trustees sale on June 17, 2011. Plaintiff's filing of this action did not prevent the Trustee's Sale. Section 71-1-304(3), MCA, provides that the decision to foreclose nonjudicially belonged to the beneficiary, Wells Fargo. Further, the filing of a document requesting a temporary stay of foreclosure did not prevent the Trustee from proceeding with the sale.
¶5 After Fannie Mae purchased the property at the Trustee's sale, it rented the property to tenants. On November 3, 2014, those tenants moved out. After the tenants moved out, Taves moved back in, triggering the eviction action he is currently appealing.
¶6 On February 2, 2015, Fannie Mae sued Taves to evict him and all other occupants from the property. Taves counterclaimed that Fannie Mae abandoned the property and that he had re-gained the property through adverse possession. Taves also argues that Fannie Mae does not own the property because the Trustee's sale was void.
¶7 On June 1, 2015, Fannie Mae moved the District Court to grant summary judgment dismissing Taves' counterclaim. On June 22, 2015, Taves moved the Court for an extension of time to oppose summary judgment and an authorization to issue subpoenas duces tecum. On the same date, Taves also filed a Motion for Discovery. On July 22, 2015, the District Court: (1) granted Fannie Mae's Motion for Summary Judgment on Counterclaim/Request for TRO; and (2) denied Taves' Motion forExtension of Time to Oppose Summary Judgment and Authorization to Issue Subpoena Duces Tecum. The Court did not rule on Taves' Motion for Discovery.
¶8 The District Court held: (1) claim preclusion barred Taves' claim of alleged defects in the Trustee's sale; (2) issue preclusion barred relitigation of alleged improper notice of the Trustee's sale; and (3) Taves did not satisfy adverse possession's time or tax elements. Taves appeals the first two holdings.
¶9 We review a district court's summary judgment de novo, applying the same M. R. Civ. P. 56(c) criteria as the district court. Lorang v. Fortis Ins. Co., 2008 MT 252, ¶ 36, 345 Mont. 12, 192 P.3d 186. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Estate of Willison v. Addison, 2011 MT 179, ¶ 13, 361 Mont. 269, 258 P.3d 410. A district court's application of claim preclusion presents an issue of law that we review de novo for correctness. Brilz v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 2012 MT 184, ¶ 13, 366 Mont. 78, 285 P.3d 494. We review a district court's denial of a M. R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion—requesting to continue a summary judgment motion for further discovery—for abuse of discretion. Rosenthal v. Cnty. of Madison, 2007 MT 277, ¶ 23, 339 Mont. 419, 170 P.3d 493. "This Court's review of constitutional questions is plenary." Williams v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2013 MT 243, ¶ 23, 371 Mont. 356, 308 P.3d 88 (citing Walters v. Flathead Concrete Prods., 2011 MT 45, ¶ 9, 359 Mont. 346, 249 P.3d 913).
¶10 Taves contends that the District Court erred in several respects. First, Taves asserts that the Court improperly granted Fannie Mae summary judgment because itfailed to address the Trustee's sale's deficiencies. Second, Taves argues that the Court failed to issue subpoenas and allow him to conduct discovery relating to his counterclaim. Finally, Taves claims the Court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, in addition to violating his right to a jury by his peers.
¶11 Claim preclusion applies to all issues relating to the alleged deficiencies in the property's Trustee's sale. Claim preclusion bars a party from "relitigating claims that were or could have been raised" in a previous action in which a final judgment was reached. Brilz, ¶ 18. The doctrine embodies "a judicial policy that favors a definite end to litigation." Baltrusch v. Baltrusch, 2006 MT 51, ¶ 15, 331 Mont. 281, 130 P.3d 1267 (citations omitted). Claim preclusion deters "plaintiffs from splitting a single cause of action into more than one lawsuit, thereby conserving judicial resources and encouraging reliance on adjudication by preventing inconsistent judgments." Baltrusch, ¶ 15 (citations omitted). Claim preclusion applies if the following elements are met:
(1) the parties or their privies are the same in the first and second actions; (2) the subject matter of the actions is the same; (3) the issues are the same in both actions, or are ones that could have been raised in the first action, and they relate to the same subject matter; (4) the capacities of the parties are the same in reference to the subject matter and the issues between them; and (5) a valid final judgment has been entered on the merits in the first action by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Brilz, ¶ 22. Here, it is undisputed that the subject matter is the same, the issues are the same, the parties' capacities are the same, and the District Court entered final judgment in the 2010 Lawsuit, on the merits. Taves contends that the privity element is not met because the parties from this litigation and the 2010 Lawsuit differ.
¶12 The first claim preclusion element is met if the parties' "privies are the same in the first and second actions." Brilz, ¶ 22. To determine whether a party to a second action is in privity with the first action's party, we focus on "whether a defendant's legal right or interest has been represented by the previous litigant to determine whether the two are privies." Holtman v. 4-G's Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 264 Mont. 432, 437, 872 P.2d 318, 321 (1994). In Holtman, we defined privies "as those who are so connected in . . . law as to be identified with the same interest and, consequently, affected with each other by litigation." Holtman, 264 Mont. at 437, 872 P.2d at 321. In this case, Wells Fargo—which participated in the 2010 Lawsuit—and Fannie Mae are "privies." Both parties shared the same interest in advocating for the validity of the property's Trustee's sale through persuading the District Court that they met all the statutory requirements. All claim preclusion elements are met, and the District Court correctly applied the doctrine to dismiss Taves' counterclaim on summary judgment. Any issue preclusion analysis does not change the outcome of our claim preclusion analysis; we therefore decline to address the issue preclusion doctrine.
¶13 Taves also asserts that the District Court erred by not issuing subpoenas or allowing discovery. Taves requested subpoenas in response to Fannie Mae's Motion for Summary Judgment on Counterclaim/Request for TRO. Though Taves did not invoke M. R. Civ. P. 56(f) in making his request, we analyze it in that context because of Taves' pro se status.
¶14 M. R. Civ. P. 56(f) allows a district court to continue a summary judgment motion if the opposing party needs further discovery. "A district court does not abuse itsdiscretion in denying a M. R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion where the party opposing a motion for summary judgment does not establish how the proposed discovery could preclude summary judgment." Rosenthal, ¶ 38 (citations omitted). In Taves' response to Fannie Mae's motion for...
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