Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Newhart
Decision Date | 17 February 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 87-6078-CV-SJ-8.,87-6078-CV-SJ-8. |
Citation | 713 F. Supp. 320 |
Parties | FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, in its corporate capacity, et al., Plaintiffs, v. John W. NEWHART, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Steven M. Leigh, Martin, Leigh & Laws, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiffs.
John W. Newhart, St. Joseph, Mo., pro se.
Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to recover the unpaid balance on seven promissory notes. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) acquired all of these notes in its capacity as appointed receiver for Farmers State Bank (Bank). The FDIC, in its corporate capacity, later purchased the notes from the receiver. After the suit was filed defendant Merchants Asset Management Corporation (Merchants) purchased the notes in Counts I through VI of plaintiffs' complaint and, consequently, was substituted as a party plaintiff in those counts. The FDIC remains the holder of the note at issue in Count VII. The case is currently before the court on the FDIC's motion for summary judgment on Count VII of the complaint and on Merchants' motion for summary judgment as to Counts IV, V and VI of the complaint.1 In addition, defendant Newhart has filed a motion for default judgment2 alleging that plaintiffs have failed to answer the counterclaim contained in his answer filed on August 17, 1987. The court will address plaintiffs' summary judgment motions together as the issues involved in those motions are similar. The court will then address defendant's motion.
In his answer to plaintiffs' complaint Newhart admits that he executed the notes at issue in Counts IV through VII of the complaint but he denies that value or consideration was received for the notes since he did not receive any of the proceeds of the notes. Each of the notes, however, stated that they were executed "for value received." See Exhibits 4 through 7 to Plaintiffs' Complaint. Newhart also alleges that he is not liable because the Bank extended the notes without his consent and, therefore, discharged him from liability. Finally, he alleges that the Bank, through its officers, knew that he was signing the notes only as a surety and not with any liability.
Id. See also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) () (footnote and citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Osborn v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 853 F.2d 616, 618 (8th Cir.1988) (). Suits brought "to enforce promissory notes are among the most suitable classes of cases for summary judgment, especially when the moving party shows execution, delivery and amount of the note." FDIC v. Willis, 497 F.Supp. 272, 276 (S.D.Ga.1980).
Newhart argues that summary judgment is inappropriate in this case because material issues of fact exist on the viability of his defenses of lack of consideration, discharge, and the effect of an alleged agreement with the Bank that defendant was not liable on the note. None of these defenses is sufficient to preclude the entry of summary judgment, however, since the FDIC acquired the notes through a purchase and asset agreement and, therefore, took the notes as a holder in due course.
Newhart first contends that the notes were not supported by consideration since he did not receive the proceeds of any of the notes. The notes themselves, however, specifically state that value was received. Under Missouri law "proof of consideration is not required of an obligee who brings an action on a written agreement which imports a consideration...." Empire Gas Corp. v. Small's LP Gas Co., 637 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo.App.1982). Indeed, a note which recites that it is "`for value received' is prima facie evidence of consideration to support that agreement." Gover v. Empire Bank, 574 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Mo. App.1978). See also United States v. Glenn, 585 F.2d 366, 368 (8th Cir.1978) ( ). The fact that Newhart did not receive the proceeds of the loan is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of consideration. Wyckoff v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 561 S.W.2d 399, 401-402 (Mo.App. 1977) () (quoting Will v. Trumpelman, 171 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Mo.App.1943)). Thus, Newhart's lack of consideration defense is without merit.
Newhart next argues that he was discharged from any obligation he may have had on the note when the Bank extended the note without notifying him. The note provides, however, that "all parties to this instrument, whether as maker, co-maker, endorser, or guarantor, hereby waive presentment, protest, demand, notice of dishonor or default and agree to any and all renewals, extensions ... without notice to and without affecting the liability of the undersigned...." See Exhibits 1 through 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint. This waiver of notice provision is sufficient to hold Newhart liable on the note. Adelman v. Centerre Bank of Kansas City, 696 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Mo.App.1985). In addition, basic principles of contract law require that the court give full effect to the unambiguous language of the note. If there are "no ambiguities in the note's terms, the intentions of the parties are to be ascertained by the court as a question of law within the four corners of that document and it alone." Rouggly v. Whitman, 592 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Mo.App.1979). See also Bradley v. Buffington, 500 S.W. 2d 314, 318 (Mo.App.1973) (). Thus, the fact that Newhart alleges that the Bank knew that he signed the note only as a surety is not dispositive since the note itself does not contain any language to this effect.
Courts have strictly construed these requirements and have held that an individual cannot assert a defense against the FDIC unless all four requirements are met. If one or more requirements are not met the FDIC obtains a note as a holder in due course when it acquires the note pursuant to a purchase and assumption agreement. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 108 S.Ct. 396, 402, 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987). See also FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944, 106 S.Ct. 308, 88 L.Ed.2d 286 (1985) (); FDIC v. Merchants National Bank of Mobile, 725 F.2d 634, 635 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829, 105...
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