Federal Labor Relations Authority v. U.S. Dept. of Navy

Decision Date29 May 1992
Docket Number90-3724,Nos. 90-3690,s. 90-3690
Citation966 F.2d 747
Parties140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2361, 60 USLW 2780 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Petitioner in 90-3690, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF the NAVY, Navy Ships Parts Control Center, and U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Fleet Material Support Office, and U.S. Department of the Navy, NAVSEA Logistics Center, and U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Publishing and Printing Service, Respondents, American Federation of Government Employees, Intervenor. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF the NAVY, Navy Ships Parts Control Center, and U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Fleet Material Support Office, and U.S. Department of the Navy, NAVSEA Logistics Center, and U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Publishing and Printing Service, Petitioners in 90-3724, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Before: MANSMANN, NYGAARD and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.

Reargued Feb. 19, 1992.

Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN, GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD, ALITO, ROTH and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.

The Federal Labor Relations Authority seeks enforcement of its order requiring that the United States Department of the Navy disclose to a union, designated an exclusive bargaining representative, the home addresses of employees within a particular bargaining unit. Our inquiry focuses on whether disclosure of these home addresses is permissible under either of two exceptions to the Privacy Act: 1) Exemption 6 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(6), which exempts from disclosure only "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b)(2); and 2) disclosure "for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this section and described under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b)(3).

With respect to the FOIA exception, the Navy urges that we reconsider our previous decision of United States Dep't of the Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 881, 109 S.Ct. 632, 102 L.Ed.2d 170 (1988) (holding that the FOIA exception permits disclosure) in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989). Because we held that disclosure was permissible under the FOIA exception, we did not address the routine use exception in Dep't of the Navy.

I.

This controversy arose in January of 1988, when the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1156, AFL-CIO (Union), the intervenor in this case and a certified exclusive bargaining unit representative under the Labor Statute, 1 requested that five Navy Commanding Officers supply the names and home addresses of all non-supervisory employees within the bargaining unit. 2 As a factual matter, it is undisputed that the Navy has provided the Union with the names of all of the bargaining unit employees and that the Union possesses the home addresses of its members. At issue remain only the home addresses of bargaining unit employees who have neither joined the Union nor consented to the disclosure of their home addresses to the Union.

After its requests were denied, the Union filed a charge against the Navy for unfair labor practices in violation of the Labor Statute, 5 U.S.C.A. § 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8). J.A. at 62. An administrative law judge subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the Union, and by order dated September 28, 1990, the FLRA affirmed the ALJ in a brief opinion that incorporated the reasoning of its lengthier opinion in United States Dep't of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, 37 F.L.R.A. (No. 39) 515 (1990), issued just two days earlier. 3 United States Dep't of the Navy, Navy Ships Parts Control Center, 37 F.L.R.A. (No. 58) 722 (1990) (Navy Ships Parts Control Center ). The FLRA then petitioned our court for enforcement and the Navy petitioned for review. Our appellate jurisdiction over these cross-petitions is premised upon 5 U.S.C.A. § 7123(b) and (a), respectively.

We review FLRA determinations under the arbitrary and capricious standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A). See Dep't of the Navy, 840 F.2d at 1134. We also accord "considerable weight" to the agency's construction of its own enabling statute, the Labor Statute, but less deference to the FLRA's construction of the FOIA or the Privacy Act. Id.

II.

In the Labor Statute, Congress plainly stated that collective bargaining "safeguards the public interest" and "contributes to the effective conduct of public business;" therefore, "labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest." 5 U.S.C.A. § 7101(a)(1)(A), (B) and (2). To achieve this goal, the Labor Statute provides for the award of exclusive representation to labor organizations, 5 U.S.C.A. § 7111, and imposes interrelated rights and obligations upon an exclusive bargaining representative, 5 U.S.C.A. § 7114. The disclosure provision at issue here, section 7114(b)(4), also outlines the obligations of both the exclusive bargaining representative and the government agency "to negotiate in good faith." In particular, the Labor Statute specifies that "[a]n exclusive representative is responsible for representing the interests of all employees in the unit it represents without discrimination and without regard to labor organization membership. " 5 U.S.C.A. § 7114(a)(1) (emphasis added); S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 104, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 2723, 2826. See Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 531, 109 S.Ct. 1282, 1285, 103 L.Ed.2d 539 (1989); Dep't of the Navy, 840 F.2d at 1135. Thus, irrespective of a bargaining unit employee's union membership, the Union shoulders a statutory mandate to represent that individual's interests.

Subsection (b) imposes upon the exclusive bargaining representative the "duty to 'negotiate in good faith' [which] include[s] approaching negotiations with a sincere resolve to reach an agreement, being represented at negotiations by [an] appropriate representative prepared to discuss and negotiate on all negotiable matters." S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 104, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2826. In this manner, the Labor Statute affixes intertwined rights and obligations upon the exclusive representative toward bargaining unit employees, without regard to union membership. Thus, the Union has sought disclosure of these home addresses under the Labor Statute that describes collective bargaining as in the public interest and imposes obligations upon exclusive bargaining representatives to further that purpose.

The Labor Statute's disclosure provision requires government agencies to furnish data "which is normally maintained by the agency in the regular course of business" and "which is reasonably available and necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining ..." "to the extent not prohibited by law." 5 U.S.C.A. § 7114(b)(4) (emphasis added). 4 The Navy contends that the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a, prohibits disclosure to the Union of nonmember employees' home addresses absent employee consent unless one of twelve exceptions applies. See also FLRA v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1448 (D.C.Cir.1989) (deferring to the FLRA's determination that "to the extent prohibited by law" refers to the Privacy Act), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1055, 110 S.Ct. 863, 864, 107 L.Ed.2d 948 (1990). As mentioned previously, only two exceptions are presented here: the FOIA and the routine use exceptions to the Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b)(2) and (3).

III.

A preliminary question posed is whether under the Labor Statute these home addresses are "necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining; ...." 5 U.S.C.A. § 7114(b)(4)(B). Because an exclusive representative bears a statutory duty to represent the "interests of all employees ... without regard to labor organization membership," 5 U.S.C.A. § 7114(a)(1), and these employees may evidence reluctance to participate in the Union's bargaining efforts, the FLRA has taken the approach that home addresses are per se necessary to collective bargaining. The Navy contends, however, that a particularized factual finding of the availability of alternative avenues of communications must be made in each case and suggests, somewhat ambiguously, that the FLRA's failure to appraise alternatives to home addresses in this case is tantamount to a failure to find the prerequisite necessity for home addresses required for a request for disclosure under section 7114(b)(4). 5 The FLRA took the position that disclosure of home addresses was necessary for collective bargaining initially in Farmers Home Administration Finance Office, St. Louis, Missouri (Farmers Home II ), explaining that disclosure would "enable the Union to communicate effectively and efficiently, through direct...

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