Federal Trade Commission v. FA Martoccio Co.
Decision Date | 12 February 1937 |
Docket Number | No. 401.,401. |
Citation | 87 F.2d 561 |
Parties | FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. F. A. MARTOCCIO CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Martin A. Morrison, Asst. Chief Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, of Washington, D. C. (W. T. Kelley, Chief Counsel, Federal
Trade Commission, and Henry C. Lank and James W. Nichol, Sp. Attys., Federal Trade Commission, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for petitioner.
Arnold L. Guesmer, of Minneapolis, Minn., for respondent.
Before STONE, SANBORN, and WOODROUGH, Circuit Judges.
This is a proceeding brought by the Federal Trade Commission for the enforcement of a "cease and desist" order entered by it against the respondent.
Respondent is a manufacturer of candy selling its product, in interstate commerce, to wholesalers and jobbers. The candy was packed in cartons, each containing a large number of uniform small candy bars, a smaller number of one-quarter pound bars, a yet smaller number of one-half pound bars and a "push card." The candy is of good quality. The smallest bars are of the size and kind usually retailing for five cents each. A push card is a stiff pasteboard card with covered holes in each of which is a concealed number. On the card is set forth certain numbers which entitle the purchaser (who uncovers one of them) to a quarter pound bar and certain other numbers entitling to a half-pound bar. For five cents, any purchaser may uncover a number on the card. He may secure a number calling for one of the two larger size bars. If he does not, he gets a five-cent bar which is reasonably worth what he pays. The purchaser may buy a five-cent bar and pay no attention to the card. There is no requirement that the purchaser use the card in buying the small bars. These cartons of candy are sold by the wholesalers and jobbers to retailers who may use the card or not in selling the candy.
The essential portions of the "cease and desist" order are as follows:
Respondent has filed here its "petition to set aside Commission's order" wherein it presents 34 challenges to the findings, the conclusions or the order of the Commission.
For convenience, we treat the case by consideration of the grounds and reasons advanced by respondent in its brief why the order of the Commission should not be enforced but should be set aside. At the threshold of our inquiry we are faced with a decision of the Supreme Court upon a situation so near to this one before us that the heavy burden is upon respondent to distinguish that case from this one. In fact, this is the main task of respondent in this litigation and we find it convenient to treat most of respondent's arguments in connection therewith.
The case of Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Brother, Incorporated, 291 U.S. 304, at page 307, 54 S.Ct. 423, 424, 78 L.Ed. 814, involved against a candy manufacturer using a candy sales plan known as the "break and take," which is described in the opinion as follows:
After stating "that the practice complained of is a method of competition in interstate commerce and that it is successful in diverting trade from competitors who do not employ it" (291 U.S. 304, at page 308, 54 S.Ct. 423, 425, 78 L.Ed. 814) and that "a practice so widespread and so far reaching in its consequences is of public concern" (291 U.S. 304, at page 308, 54 S.Ct. 423, 425, 78 L.Ed. 814), the court discussed and determined the unfairness of the method. After stating that the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 42 S.Ct. 384, 66 L.Ed. 729, had decided that "A method of competition which casts upon one's competitors the burden of the loss of business unless they will descend to a practice which they are under a powerful moral compulsion not to adopt, even though it is not criminal, was thought to involve the kind of unfairness at which the statute was aimed" (291 U.S. 304, at page 313, 54 S.Ct. 423, 426, 78 L.Ed. 814), the court continued as follows:
From the above statements concerning the issues in and the above quotations from the Keppel Case, appear two matters vital here. One of these is that the court broadly asserted that "the element of chance as employed" there was an unfair method of competition within the Federal Trade Commission Act (section 5 15 U.S.C.A. § 45). The other is that the "element of chance" there employed would seem to be not different in essentials from the method employed here. We now turn to consideration of the reasons advanced by respondent to distinguish this case.
(1) Respondent contends there is no element of "chance" in a true sense present in its method because there is no possibility of loss to the consumer, since he gets five cents worth of good candy in any event and may get several times that amount for the same money. This distinction is not valid. Under the Keppel Case, the vice of the method there condemned is that the element of chance is employed as a factor in competitive sales. While most gambling or chance games involve possible loss to the player as well as possible gain, it does not change the character of the game as one of chance merely to remove the possibility of loss. In fact, to remove all possibility of loss would make more effective the incentive to play by removing the most...
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