Federal Trade Commission v. Mandel Brothers, Inc, No. 234
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | DOUGLAS |
| Citation | 79 S.Ct. 818,3 L.Ed.2d 893,359 U.S. 385 |
| Docket Number | No. 234 |
| Decision Date | 04 May 1959 |
| Parties | FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. MANDEL BROTHERS, INC |
v.
MANDEL BROTHERS, INC.
Mr. Daniel M. Friedman Washington, D.C., for the petitioner.
Mr. Samuel H. Horne, Washington, D.C., for the respondent.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner issued a complaint charging respondent, a retail department store, with violations of the Fur Products Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 175, 15 U.S.C. § 69, 15 U.S.C.A. § 69.
Page 386
Violations were found and a cease-and-desist order was issued. One of the principal violations found was that many of respondent's retail sales were falsely 'invoiced' in violation of § 3 of the Act.1 The term 'invoice' is defined in § 2(f) as 'a written account, memorandum, list, or catalog, which is issued in connection with any commercial dealing in fur products or furs, and describes the particulars of any fur products or furs, transported or delivered to a purchaser, consignee, factor, bailee, correspondent, or agent, or any other person who is engaged in dealing commercially in fur products or furs.' Section 5(b) provides that a fur product or fur is falsely 'invoiced' if it is not 'invoiced' to show (a) the name of the animal that produced the fur; and, where applicable, that the product(b) contains used fur, (c) contains bleached, dyed, or otherwise artificially colored fur, (d) is composed in whole or substantial part of paws, tails, bellies, or waste fur; (e) the name and address of the person issuing the 'invoice'; and (f) the country of origin of any imported furs.
Page 387
The Commission found that respondent had violated the 'invoice' provisions of the Act by failure to include in many of its retail sales slips of fur products, (a) its address, (b) whether the fur was bleached, dyed, or otherwise artificially colored, and (c) the correct name of the animal producing the fur.
The Act in § 4 also provides2 that a fur product is misbranded (1) if it is 'falsely or deceptively labeled * * * or * * * identified,' (2) if there is not affixed a label setting forth substantially the same six items of information required
Page 388
for an 'invoice,' or (3) if the label designates the animal that produced the fur by some name other than that prescribed in the Fur Products Name Guide.3 The Commission found that the labels on respondent's fur products were als e in numerous instances by reason of the failure to include information in three of the categories listed under the second part of § 4. It held, however, that there was no evidence that the labels were deficient in the other three categories of information. Nevertheless, it issued a cease-and-desist order against misbranding by failure to include in the labels the required six categories of information, all of which were listed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals first eliminated the prohibitions relating to invoicing on the ground that a retail sales slip was not an 'invoice' within the meaning of the Act; and second, it struck from the order the prohibition against misbranding through omission of the three categories as to which no violations were found. 254 F.2d 18. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari. 358 U.S. 812, 79 S.Ct. 54, 3 L.Ed.2d 55.
First, as to invoicing. We start with an Act whose avowed purpose, inter alia, was to protect 'consumers * * * against deception * * * resulting from the misbranding, false or deceptive advertising, or false invoicing of fur products and furs.' S.Rep. No. 78, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1. The House Report also emphasizes that the bill was 'designed to protect consumers and others from widespread abuses arising out of false and misleading matter in advertisements and otherwise. H.R.Rep. No. 546, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1. The Title of the Act (which, though not limiting the plain meaning of the text, is none-
Page 389
theless a useful aid in resolving an ambiguity (see Maguire v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 1, 9, 61 S.Ct. 789, 794, 85 L.Ed. 1149), states that its purpose was to 'protect consumers and others against * * * false invoicing of fur products and furs.' 65 Stat. 175. So we have an avowed purpose to protect retail purchasers against improper 'invoicing.' We therefore should read § 2(f) which contains the definition of 'invoice' hospitably with that end in view. Section 2(f) is not unambiguous. Yet we do not have here the problem of a penal statute that deserves strict construction. We deal with remedial legislation of a regulatory nature where our task is to fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole. Black v. Magnolia Liquor Co., 355 U.S. 24, 26, 78 S.Ct. 106, 108, 2 L.Ed.2d 5.
Section 2(f) uses 'invoice' to include a wri tten account' and 'memorandum.' So far a retail sales slip is included. Section 2(f) requires the 'invoice' to be issued 'in connection with any commercial dealing' in furs. A retail sale is plainly a 'commercial dealing.' Section 2(f) requires the invoice to be issued to a 'purchaser.' There again a customer of a retailer is a 'purchaser.' The case for inclusion of a retail sales slip in 'invoice,' as that term is used in the Act, would therefore seem to be complete. What turned the Court of Appeals the other way was the last phrase in § 2(f)—'or any other person who is engaged in dealing commercially in fur products or furs.' It held that 'engaged in dealing commercially' modifies not only 'any other person' but also all the other preceding terms in the subsection including 'purchaser.' Cf. United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U.S. 210, 218, 40 S.Ct. 139, 140, 64 L.Ed. 229. That is a possible construction. We conclude, however, that this limiting clause is to be applied only to the last antecedent.4 We think it would
Page 390
be a partial mutilation of this Act to construe it so that the 'invoice' provisions were inapplicable to retail sales. In the first place, the language of § 2(f) specifies in sweeping language the categories of persons for whose benefit the invoicing requirements were imposed, viz., purchaser, consignee, factor, bailee, correspondent, or agent. Then as a general catch-all 'any other person who is engaged in dealing commercially in fur products or furs' was added. In the second place, only by construing 'invoice' to include retail sales slips can the full protection of the Act be accorded consumers. We do not agree with the point stressed by respondent that the...
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