Federinko v. Forrest Cty.

• Docket Number: 2023-CA-00204-SCT
• Decision Date: 07 March 2024
• Citation: Federinko v. Forrest Cty., 381 So.3d 343 (Miss. 2024)
• Parties: John E. FEDERINKO v. FORREST COUNTY, Mississippi, and Butch Benedict, Jr., Coroner
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

381 So.3d 343

John E. FEDERINKO

v.FORREST COUNTY, Mississippi, and Butch Benedict, Jr., Coroner

NO. 2023-CA-00204-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

03/07/2024

FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, HON. STEPHEN B. SIMPSON, JUDGE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL ADELMAN, Hattiesburg

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: WILLIAM R. ALLEN, KATELYN A. RILEY, Brookhaven

BEFORE KITCHENS, P.J, COLEMAN AND GRIFFIS, JJ.

GRIFFIS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. John E. Federinko appeals the trial court’s denial of his cross-motion for partial summary judgment and its grant of Forrest County’s motion for summary judgment. Because Federinko failed to allege a tortious or negligent act, the trial court’s order of dismissal is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On July 6, 2017, Alison Dawkins was discovered by her husband, Jon Dawkins, hanging by her neck from an extension cord in their bedroom closet. Jon called 911. Law enforcement and other first responders were dispatched to the residence, where they found Dawkins’s body in the master bedroom on the floor just outside the closet. Jon explained to law enforcement that he had taken Dawkins down from the hanging position and had laid her on the floor.

¶3. Paramedics determined that Dawkins was deceased and called the coroner. Forrest County Deputy Coroner Lisa Klem arrived and conducted an on-site investigation that included an examination of the scene, an examination of Dawkins’s body, and multiple interviews. Deputy Coroner Klem also drew postmortem blood and vitreous fluids, obtained and reviewed Dawkins’s medical records, and consulted with various medical doctors.

¶4. Dawkins’s postmortem blood and vitreous fluids were sent to MedScreens, Inc., for testing. The toxicology report from STL Forensic Toxicology showed no presence of drugs in Dawkins’s blood.

¶5. As a result of her investigation, Deputy Coroner Klem concluded that Dawkins’s cause of death was suicide and that an autopsy was not necessary. Forrest County Coroner Douglas Eugene Benedict, Jr., agreed with Deputy Coroner Klem’s conclusion regarding Dawkins’s cause of death and her decision not to order an autopsy.

¶6. Federinko, Dawkins’s father, disagreed with Deputy Coroner Klem’s conclusion regarding Dawkins’s cause of death. As a result, on February 14, 2018, at Federinko’s expense, Dawkins’s body was exhumed, and an autopsy was performed by Dr. Adel Shaker. According to the autopsy report, tissue from Dawkins’s kidney, liver, and spleen were collected and submitted for testing. The toxicology report from Axis Forensic Toxicology indicated that the following drugs were found in Dawkins’s liver: amphetamines, cannabinoids, THC-COOH, analgesics, buprenorphine, norbuprenorphine, anticonvulsants, gabepentin, and multiple stimulants including caffeine, nicotine, and cotinine. Dr. Shaker concluded that Dawkins’s cause of death was buprenorphine toxicity. He found that an investigation "should be performed to exclude a staged suicidal scene and to confirm if [Dawkins] was prescribed [b]uprenorphine." He explained that the marks on Dawkins’s neck were inconsistent with suicide and that given the levels of buprenorphine and norbuprenorphine in her liver, Dawkins would not have had the cognitive and physical ability to hang herself.¹

¶7. Federinko filed a complaint against Forrest County and Coroner Benedict under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and alleged that Coroner Benedict and Deputy Coroner Klem "failed to require an autopsy, failed to obtain or attempt to obtain post-mortem blood, urine and/or vitreous fluids, allow[ed] the spoliation of evidence[,] and took insufficient photographs." Federinko asserted that "these duties are ministerial" and that as a result of Coroner Benedict and Deputy Coroner Klem’s failure to perform these ministerial duties, "Dawkins’s death was wrongfully classified as a suicide when i[n] fact it ha[d] strong elements that suggest her death was a homicide." Federinko claimed he "sustained severe mental anguish and extensive emotional pain," and he sought "full recovery under the provisions of the [MTCA]." The parties later filed an agreed order of dismissal dismissing all claims against Coroner Benedict in his individual capacity.

¶8. Forrest County moved for summary judgment and argued it was entitled to immunity under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(d) (Rev. 2019) "as the decisions made concerning [its] investigation, including its decisions regarding an autopsy, photographs, and evidence collection [we]re discretionary-functions." Federinko responded to Forrest County’s motion and filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

¶9. In his cross-motion, Federinko argued he was "entitled to partial summary judgment on the grounds that Forrest County failed to provide an autopsy for … Dawkins." Federinko asserted that the duty to conduct an autopsy was ministerial and required as a matter of law because it involved a death affecting the public interest. He further asserted that even assuming Forrest County’s decision not to perform an autopsy was the exercise of a discretionary function, Forrest County was not entitled to discretionary-function immunity.

¶10. After a hearing on the motions, the trial court found no merit to Federinko’s claims and therefore denied his cross-motion and granted Forrest County’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered two orders: an order denying Federinko’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment and an order of dismissal. Both orders were entered and filed on the same day. Federinko timely appealed.

¶11. On appeal, Federinko argues (1) the trial court erred by denying his cross-motion for partial summary judgment, and (2) the trial court erred by granting Forrest County’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint. In response, Forrest County argues this Court lacks jurisdiction over the trial court’s order denying Federinko’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment because it was not a final, appealable judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1, 2] ¶12. "[O]n appeal, we review de novo the trial court’s dismissal based on MTCA immunity." Williams v. City of Batesville, 313 So. 3d 479, 482 (Miss. 2021) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilcher v. Lincoln Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 243 So. 3d 177, 181 (Miss. 2018)). "Additionally, when reviewing a grant of summary judg- ment, this Court employs a de novo standard of review." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville, 158 So. 3d 1106, 1109 (Miss. 2015), overruled by Wilcher, 243 So. 3d 177)).

[3] ¶13. "As ‘[j]urisdiction is a question of law[,]’ we review jurisdictional challenges de novo." Curry v. Clemons, 313 So. 3d 1032, 1032 (Miss. 2021) (alterations in original) (quoting Tyson Breeders, Inc. V. Harrison, 940 So. 2d 230, 232 (Miss. 2006)).

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

¶14. Forrest County argues this Court lacks jurisdiction over the trial court’s order denying Federinko’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment because it was not a final, appealable judgment. This Court disagrees.

¶15. Under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of the judgment.

Miss. R. Civ. P. 54(b). As the advisory committee notes to the rule explain:

Rule 54(b) is designed to facilitate the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but fewer than all the claims or as to one or more but fewer than all the parties in an action involving multiple claims or multiple parties, so as to enable the non-prevailing party to perfect an appeal as of right of a final judgment. Absent a certification under Rule 54(b), any order in a multiple-party or multiple-claim action that does not dispose of the entire action is interlocutory, even it if appears to adjudicate a separable portion of the controversy.

Miss. R. Civ. P. 54 advisory comm. n.

[4] ¶16. Here, Forrest County filed a motion for summary judgment, and Federinko filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court ruled on both motions, denying Federinko’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment, granting Forrest County’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissing Federinko’s complaint with prejudice. The cumulative effect of the trial court’s ruling on the motions and its dismissal of the complaint "amounted to a final disposition regarding all issues in the case." Maness v. K & A Enters, of Miss., LLC, 250 So. 3d 402, 408 (Miss. 2018). Federinko timely filed his notice of appeal after the trial court entered its order of dismissal.

¶17. Because there has been a final disposition on all claims, this Court has jurisdiction. See LaFontaine v. Holliday, 110 So. 3d 785, 787 (Miss. 2013) ("Generally, a final judgment is one that adjudicates the merits of the controversy and settles all issues between all parties." (citing Miss. Waste of Hancock Cnty., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Hancock Cnty., 818 So. 2d 326, 330 (Miss. 2001))).

II. Summary Judgment

[5] ¶18. "The [MTCA] provides the exclusive civil remedy against a governmental entity for lawsuits seeking money damages arising out of tortious actions." Moton v. City of Clarksdale, 367 So. 3d 979, 983 (Miss. 2023) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1 to -7 (Rev. 2019)). Forrest County is a governmental entity. As such, the actions of its employees² acting within the course and scope of their employment fall under the MTCA. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7 (Rev. 2019).

¶19. Under the MTCA, the Legislature waived "the immunity of the state and its political subdivisions from claims for money damages arising out of the torts of such...