Fedor v. Kudrak
| Decision Date | 14 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:02 CV 1489(CFD).,3:02 CV 1489(CFD). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | George FEDOR, Plaintiff v. Joseph KUDRAK, et. al. Defendants. |
John R. Williams, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.
Jennifer L. Schancupp, Peter G. Kruzynski, Thomas E. Katon, Susman, Duffy & Segaloff, New Haven, CT, for Defendants.
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff George Fedor brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Shelton and two of its police officers, Joseph Kudrak and Neil O'Donoghue. Fedor claims that because he was involved in divorce proceedings, he was not provided the same law enforcement services by the defendants as those in other situations. Fedor claims that he was deprived of access to the courts, equal protection of the law, freedom from unreasonable seizure, and substantive due process under the United States Constitution. Pending is the defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, that motion is granted.
At some point in 1999, Fedor's wife filed for a divorce in the Connecticut Superior Court. In the summer of that year, the state court issued a series of protective orders prohibiting Fedor from entering his former home in Shelton, Connecticut, and requiring that he have no contact with his wife.
On August 23, 1999, an agreement concerning the removal of personal property from the Shelton home was signed by Fedor and his wife and was approved as an order by the Superior Court. The agreement provided that Fedor could enter the Shelton house on August 28, 1999, at 11:00 a.m. to "remove his personal items;" however, his entry was subject to numerous restrictions. For example, a police officer had to be present, Fedor's entry was limited to two hours, and he was not permitted to bring any other individual with him. The agreement provided that he could remove "the contents of the bottom of his closet and all his mail, and the contents of the top drawer of [his wife's] dresser." Additionally, the order attached a schedule of particular personal items Fedor could remove. The parties here dispute whether that agreement allowed him to take a silverware set that had been a present to him and a previous wife, as well as which specific areas of the house were covered by the word "premises" in the order.
Fedor was accompanied by Officer Kudrak on August 28 to the Shelton home, and he removed certain items, but was not permitted to enter a room he formerly used as an office. He was also not permitted to remove the silverware set.
On December 21, 1999, the silverware set was returned to Fedor. He claims, however, that a number of pieces of the set were missing, allegedly kept by his wife. On either May 26 or 27, 2000, Fedor made a complaint to the Shelton police department concerning the missing pieces of the silverware set, as well as the condition of certain pieces that were returned to him. In August 2000, Fedor met with Officer O'Donoghue concerning his complaint. O'Donoghue did not arrest Fedor's wife or apply for a search warrant of her home, as requested by Fedor.
Fedor subsequently brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The defendants have moved for summary judgment.
In a summary judgment motion, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(c)); accord Miner v. Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Where, as in this case, the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only demonstrate that there is a lack of evidence to support the nonmovant's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1998). Once the movant has established a prima facie case demonstrating the lack of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must provide enough evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991). A plaintiff may not rely on conclusory statements or mere contentions that the evidence in support of summary judgment is not credible. Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir.1993). Similarly, a plaintiff, as the nonmovant, may not rest "upon the mere allegations or denials" in its complaint to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). Therefore, after discovery, if the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof," then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. When addressing a motion for summary judgment, the Court resolves "all ambiguities and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the non-moving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide." Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992). Thus, "[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Maffucci, 923 F.2d at 982.
The defendants move for summary judgment on all claims in the complaint. Specifically, they argue that (1) Fedor has failed to state a proper equal protection claim; (2) defendants Kudrak and O'Donoghue are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim; (3) Fedor has failed to state a proper § 1983 claim against the town of Shelton; and (4) Fedor has failed to raise claims for interference with his right to access to the courts, violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive due process, or unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Fedor responded only to the first three of those claims, and asserts that there are genuine issues of material fact. Fedor does not address the latter claims.2
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," and is "essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). To analyze the plaintiff's equal protection claim, the Court San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). Courts, including this one, have found that, "suspect classes are defined as groups who historically have been subjected to discrimination; whose obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics mark them as a discrete community; or who are politically powerless due to their minority status." See, e.g., Leocata v. Wilson-Coker, 343 F.Supp.2d 144, 150 (D.Conn.2004).
The defendants moved for summary judgment on Fedor's equal protection claim on the basis that he has not alleged that he is a member of a protected class. In response, Fedor argues that the Shelton police department treats divorcing spouses differently from all other citizens. Fedor alleged in his complaint that he was "deprived of his right to equal protection of the law as a result of the town's policy refusing to investigate or otherwise consider complaints of theft arising in the domestic context." The class he asserts his membership in is therefore "divorcing spouses."3 Fedor cites no decision recognizing such a group as entitled to "protected class" status for equal protection analysis. Moreover, the group identified by Fedor does not by its nature necessarily involve race, sex, or any other suspect classification for this inquiry. Therefore, the disputed "policy does not burden a fundamental right or involve a suspect or quasi-suspect classification such as race, sex, alienage, or national origin." That policy, therefore, is "presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification ... is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir.1998) citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249.
The issue before the Court, then, is whether the specific conduct underlying Fedor's equal protection claim survives the scrutiny of rational basis. The conduct in question is Kudrak's refusal to allow Fedor to enter his office at the Shelton home and remove the silverware set, and O'Donoghue's failure to seek an arrest warrant or search warrant based on the criminal complaint Fedor filed. As to the latter, O'Donoghue stated in his affidavit that he "fully investigated" Fedor's complaint and did not seek to obtain a search warrant for his wife's home because of insufficient evidence. As to...
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