Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 104373

• Decision Date: 30 April 1958
• Docket Number: No. 104373,104373
• Citation: 21 Conn.Supp. 38,143 A.2d 466
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Charles FEDOR v. MAUWEHU COUNCIL, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, Inc.

Page 466

143 A.2d 466

21 Conn.Supp. 38

Charles FEDOR v. MAUWEHU COUNCIL, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, Inc.

No. 104373.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Fairfield County.

April 30, 1958.

Nevas, Nevas & Robinson, South Norwalk, for plaintiff.

Clancy & Kenney, Bridgeport, for defendant.

MacDONALD, Judge.

This is an action brought by a minor boy through his father to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff while he was attending a Boy Scout camp and claimed to have been caused by defendant's negligent supervision of the camp. Defendant filed a special defense to the complaint alleging that plaintiff, through his father as next friend, had signed, as a condition of attending the camp, a waiver of any and all claims for damages in the event of injury, specifically and completely absolving the defendant. To this special defense plaintiff has demurred on several grounds.

Generally speaking, agreements exempting parties from liability for their own negligence are not favored by the law and, if possible, are construed so as not to confer immunity from liability. 6 Williston, Contracts (Rev.Ed.) § 1751B. It was said in Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 286, 293, 64 A.2d 51, 53, that a clause on a parking-lot ticket freeing the management from 'responsibility of any kind' was "revolting to the moral sense, and contrary alike to the salutary principles of law and a sound public policy." Although, as pointed out by defendant, the Malone case and the authorities cited therein involved bailments, the same principle of construction is involved here.

In Parillo v. Housing Authority, 16 Conn.Sup. 106, at page 107, the court sustained a demurrer to a special defense filed by the New Haven housing authority to a negligence action brought by an injured minor, for several reasons, including one of public policy which would appear to apply here, stating in the opinion (Mellitz, J.) as follows: 'Agreements exempting parties from liability for their own negligence may be valid in certain circumstances but are not favored by the law and if possible are construed not to confer immunity from liability. 6 Williston, Contracts (Rev.Ed.) § 1751B. Parties may not stipulate for protection against liability for negligence in the performance of a duty imposed by law or where the public interest requires performance. L'Heureux v. Hurley, 117 Conn. 347, 356, 168 A. 8; Williston, supra, § 1751C; 12 Am.Jur. 683, § 183; see note, 84 A.L.R. 654, for cases dealing with exculpatory stipulations in leases.'

As pointed out in Williston, at § 1751C, this general policy against construing agreements of the type involved here so as to confer immunity from liability for negligence is especially desirable in cases where a relationship once entered upon involves a status requiring of one party greater responsibility than that of the ordinary person and where the parties have not equal bargaining power and one party must either accept what is offered or be deprived of the relation. Certain language in defendant's memorandum in opposition to this demurrer would appear to a certain extent to indicate the applicability of the foregoing language to the facts of this case--notably where defendant argues: 'If this meritorious function [summer camp] is to be kept within the financial means of the greatest number of boys, some concession must be made. The concession in this case was the waiver of...