Feehan v. Marcone, SC 20216

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: JIM FEEHAN v. RICK MARCONE ET AL.
• Docket Number: SC 20218,SC 20217,SC 20216
• Decision Date: 30 January 2019

JIM FEEHAN
v.
RICK MARCONE ET AL.

SC 20216
SC 20217
SC 20218

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Argued December 21, 2018
January 30, 2019^*

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to the elections clause of the Connecticut constitution (art. III, § 7), the state House of Representatives "shall be the final judge of the election returns and qualifications of its own members."

Pursuant to statute (§ 9-319), votes for state representatives "shall be canvassed, during the month in which they are cast," by the treasurer, the secretary of the state and the comptroller, "and they shall declare, except in case of a tie vote, who is elected . . . representative" in each assembly district.

The plaintiff, the endorsed republican candidate for the office of state representative in the November, 2018 election for the 120th assembly district, sought certain relief in connection with an alleged mistake at a multidistrict polling place whereby approximately seventy-six voters were given ballots that were intended for use in the 122nd assembly district and the opposing democratic candidate, the intervening defendant Y, received only thirteen more votes than the plaintiff. In addition to seeking declaratory relief, the plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction requiring a new election and a prohibitive injunction preventing the three state defendants, the treasurer, the secretary of the state, and the comptroller, from declaring a winner. The plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint to include federal statutory (42 U.S.C. § 1983) claims alleging the deprivation of certain federal constitutional rights and filed an application for an order temporarily enjoining the state defendants from canvassing votes or declaring the results of such canvass. Y moved to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that, under the elections clause of the Connecticut constitution, the state House of Representatives has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding the election of its own members. The plaintiff objected, contending, inter alia, that the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to the statute (§ 9-328) governing contested municipal elections. The trial court granted Y's motion to dismiss with respect to the claims for declaratory relief and a mandatory injunction. The court nevertheless granted the plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction, precluding the state defendants from canvassing the votes or declaring a winner, in order to maintain the status quo until the House of Representatives was provided with an opportunity to exercise its authority. Thereafter, the plaintiff, the state defendants, and Y, upon certification by the Chief Justice pursuant to statute (§ 52-265a) that a matter of substantial public interest was involved, filed separate interlocutory appeals. Held:

1. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claims for declaratory relief and for a mandatory injunction requiring a new election: this court examined the factors set forth in State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672) for construing state constitutional provisions and concluded that the elections clause afforded the state House of Representatives exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiff's election challenge, as Connecticut case law analyzing that provision, federal and sister state case law analyzing other, analogous constitutional provisions, historical concerns regarding the separation of powers attendant to adoption of the 1818 constitution, the existence of statutes authorizing courts to hear election contests in contexts other than state legislative elections, and the adoption of a rule in the state House of Representatives establishing a committee on contested elections all indicated that the legislature's exclusive jurisdiction in matters regarding the election of its own members was not, as the plaintiff argued, limited to the mere vetting of arithmetic in tallying the votes cast; moreover, § 9-328 did not afford state courts jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims, this court having concluded that the applicable

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statutory (§ 9-1 [h]) definition of municipal election limits such contests to the election of public officials of a municipality, that the plaintiff's reliance on a separate statutory (§ 9-372 [7]) definition of municipal office, which includes those officials elected by voters within a single municipality, was misplaced because § 9-328 was not within the exclusive list of statutes to which the definition of municipal office set forth in § 9-372 (7) applied, and that the construction of § 9-238 urged by the plaintiff would yield absurd results by authorizing different treatment of state legislative elections depending on whether an assembly district is located in one town or multiple towns; furthermore, this court declined to address whether the supremacy clause of the United States constitution would override the elections clause of the Connecticut constitution with respect to the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain federal constitutional claims arising from state legislative elections because, in the absence of the plaintiff's allegation of intentional misconduct on the part of election officials, he had failed to sufficiently plead such a violation under standards set forth in applicable federal case law.

2. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction, and, accordingly, the trial court's granting of that application was reversed: contrary to the plaintiff's claim, the defendants' appeals from the trial court's order of injunctive relief were not rendered moot by the passage of the deadline set forth in § 9-319 because that deadline applied only to the canvassing of votes, and not to the declaration of a winner, and because § 9-319 does not contain other negative words invalidating or nullifying a late canvass or declaration; moreover, in light of this court's conclusion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims in the present case, the trial court also lacked jurisdiction to enjoin, even temporarily, the state defendants from canvassing the votes cast or from declaring a winner.

Procedural History

Action for a declaratory judgment ordering that a new election be held for the office of state representative for the 120th assembly district, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where Philip L. Young III intervened as a defendant; thereafter, the court, Bellis, J., granted the plaintiff's motion for an emergency temporary restraining order and granted in part the intervening defendant's motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff, the defendant Denise Merrill et al., and the intervening defendant, upon certification by the Chief Justice pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a that a matter of substantial public interest was at issue, filed separate appeals to this court. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; judgment directed.

Proloy K. Das, with whom were Matthew A. Ciarleglio and Kevin W. Munn, for the appellant in Docket No. SC 20216 and the appellee in Docket Nos. SC 20217 and SC 20218 (plaintiff).

Michael K. Skold, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, former attorney general, for the appellants in Docket No. SC 20217 and the appellees in Docket Nos. SC 20216 and SC 20218 (defendant Denise W. Merrill et al.).

William M. Bloss, with whom were Alinor C. Sterling and Emily B. Rock, for the appellant in Docket No. SC 20218 and the appellee in Docket Nos. SC 20216 and SC 20217 (intervening defendant Philip L. Young III).

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Opinion

ROBINSON, C. J. These expedited public interest appeals arise from an apparent mix-up at the Bunnell High School polling place in the town of Stratford (town), where it is alleged that approximately seventy-six voters who should have received ballots for the 120th assembly district election were instead given ballots for the 122nd assembly district, rendering those voters unable to vote for their assembly district's state representative. The plaintiff, Jim Feehan, who is the Republican Party's candidate for state representative in the 120th assembly district, brought this action seeking declaratory relief, a new election, and an injunction prohibiting the defendants, Secretary of the State Denise W. Merrill, Treasurer Denise L. Nappier, and Comptroller Kevin Lembo (state defendants), from declaring the intervening defendant, Phillip L. Young III, the Democratic Party's candidate, as the winner of that election.¹ After the Chief Justice granted the parties' separate applications for permission to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a, the plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint in part as barred by the elections clause set forth in article third, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution,² and the defendants appealed from the grant of the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction.³ We conclude that the elections clause gives our state House of Representatives exclusive jurisdiction over this election contest, and we disagree with the plaintiff's claims that (1) General Statutes § 9-328,⁴ which governs contested elections for "municipal office," confers jurisdiction on the courts over this case, and (2) under the supremacy clause of the United States constitution; see U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2;⁵ state courts have jurisdiction over his federal constitutional claims, notwithstanding the elections clause in the Connecticut constitution. Accordingly, we also agree with the defendants' claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the state defendants from canvassing the votes and declaring a winner. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court insofar as it dismissed the complaint and reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to its issuance of a temporary injunction.

The record reveals the...