Feeney v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.

Decision Date11 August 1988
Docket NumberNo. 87 Civ. 9256(RJW).,87 Civ. 9256(RJW).
Citation693 F. Supp. 34
PartiesPatrick FEENEY, Plaintiff, v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Peter M.J. Reilly, Islip, N.Y., for plaintiff.

Joseph Lesser, New York City, for defendant; Keith E. Harris, of counsel.

OPINION

ROBERT J. WARD, District Judge.

Plaintiff, an employee of the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation ("PATH"), has brought this action against the railroad pursuant to the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51, the Boiler Inspection Act ("BIA"), 45 U.S.C. § 22, and the Safety Appliance Act ("SAA"), 45 U.S.C. § 1, for injuries arising from PATH's alleged negligence in maintaining safe working conditions. Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

On or about August 6, 1986, plaintiff avers he was injured at the PATH car shop in Jersey City, New Jersey. Plaintiff, seeking three million dollars in damages, alleges that his injuries resulted from the negligent and careless conduct of PATH's agents, servants, and employees in their railroad operations.

PATH operates an interstate commuter railroad between points in New York and New Jersey. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. The Port Authority is a corporate body created by compact between the States of New York and New Jersey with the consent of the Congress of the United States.1 PATH moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., on the ground that PATH, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Port Authority, is protected by the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court without consent.

DISCUSSION

A motion pursuant to Rule 12(c), Fed.R. Civ.P., is designed to provide a means of disposing of cases when the material facts are not in dispute and judgment on the merits can be achieved by focusing on the content of the pleadings and any facts of which the court will take judicial notice. 5 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure ¶ 1367 (1973). A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time after the pleadings are closed and can raise several of the defenses enumerated in Rule 12(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.

In this case, defendant is raising a 12(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction in its 12(c), Fed.R. Civ.P., motion.2 In evaluating a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the complaint as a whole will be construed broadly and liberally, but argumentative inferences favorable to the pleader will not be drawn. 5 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (1973). In addition, the burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. A case "should not be dismissed under a 12(b)(1) motion for want of jurisdiction except when it `appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.'" AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Investment Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 152-53 (2d Cir.1984) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). See Albert v. Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333, 1337-1338 (2d Cir.1987); Guilini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d 189, 193 (2d Cir.1981); Morabito v. Blum, 528 F.Supp. 252, 260 (S.D.N.Y.1981). Here, because plaintiff's claim is immaterial and frivolous if sovereign immunity applies to PATH, the court must determine to what extent PATH is protected from suit in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment.3

I. The Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment to the constitution provides:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of Subjects of any foreign State.

U.S. Const. Amend. XI.4

A literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment would solely preclude suits against a state brought by citizens of a different state, or by a citizen of a foreign state. While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a state by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has consistently held that an unconsenting state is immune from suits brought in federal court by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355, 39 L.Ed. 2d 662 (1974) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)); Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973).5

A crucial issue with respect to Eleventh Amendment immunity is determining when a state is a party in interest. It is well established that even though a state is not named a party to the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, supra, 415 U.S. at 663, 94 S.Ct. at 1355. Without question, a lawsuit is brought against a state for Eleventh Amendment purposes whenever the state or one of its agencies or departments is named as a defendant. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (per curiam). This principle has been expanded to include suits against federally chartered corporations since 1900. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 20 S.Ct. 919, 44 L.Ed. 1140 (1900). In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945), the Supreme Court stated:

When the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.

Id. at 464, 65 S.Ct. at 350. Thus, the rule has evolved that a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, supra, 415 U.S. at 663, 94 S.Ct. at 1355 (quoting Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 64 S.Ct. 873, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944)). See also Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Commission, 557 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir.1977).

The complaint in this action lists PATH, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Port Authority, as the sole defendant. In Port Authority Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 819 F.2d 413 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 344, 98 L.Ed.2d 370 (1987), the Third Circuit explicitly ruled that "the Port Authority is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity." See also Mineo v. Port Authority, 779 F.2d 939, 949 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1005, 106 S.Ct. 3297, 92 L.Ed.2d 712 (1986) (holding that the Port Authority should be treated as a state for Tenth Amendment purposes). In Port Authority Police Benevolent Association, supra, 819 F.2d 413, the Third Circuit dismissed an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Port Authority on the ground that the Port Authority enjoys sovereign immunity.6 The Court reasoned that under the Supreme Court test to determine the Eleventh Amendment immunity of a bi-state entity set forth in Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Port Authority enjoyed such immunity.7 The Court concluded that, for Eleventh Amendment purposes, the Port Authority must be considered an arm or alter-ego of the state.8

As a wholly owned subsidiary of the Port Authority, PATH is entitled to the privileges and immunities of the Port Authority, including Eleventh Amendment immunity of a state from suit in Federal Court. See N.Y. Unconsolidated Laws § 6612 McKinney (1979) ("Such subsidiary corporation and any of its property, functions and activities shall have all of the privileges, immunities, tax exemptions and other exemptions of the port authority and of the port authority's property, functions and activities."). Inasmuch as the claim against PATH is for a monetary damages award that could ultimately be paid from the state treasury, New York State is the real, substantial party in interest and the Eleventh Amendment is implicated. See Farid v. Smith, No. 86-2007, slip op. at 4311-4312 (2d Cir. June 22, 1988) (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state agencies if the state is the real party in interest).

Notwithstanding that an entity is an arm of the state protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the entity under certain circumstances can nevertheless be sued in federal court. Such a suit is permitted if Congress abrogates Eleventh Amendment protection in a federal statute, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976), or if a state explicitly waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3145, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447, 2 S.Ct. 878, 883, 27 L.Ed. 780 (1883)). Therefore, the court must determine whether in this case the FELA permits a suit against a state in federal court or whether New York State has specifically given consent for a federal lawsuit in PATH's enabling legislation.

II. Congressional Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The first way in which a state may be subject to suit in federal court is where Congress abrogates a state's immunity by exercising its legislative powers to enforce the substantive provisions of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, supra, 473 U.S. at 242, 105 S.Ct. at 3147.

The Supreme Court most recently discussed the nature of such abrogation in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987). Welch held that "Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court...

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4 cases
  • AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF NEW YORK v. Port Authority, 87 Civ. 2419 (MP).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • February 15, 1989
    ...New York and New Jersey, 819 F.2d 413, 418 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 344, 98 L.Ed.2d 370 (1987); Feeney v. PATH, 693 F.Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y.1988); Borough of Fort Lee v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Civ. Action No. 87-1238 (D.N.J. March 14, 1988) 1988 WL El......
  • Marley Co. v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • April 21, 1989
    ...("PATH"), as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Port Authority, is an arm or alter ego of the state. Feeney v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson, 693 F.Supp. 34, 37 (S.D.N. Y.1988). That conclusion was based in part on the Third Circuit's decision that the Port Authority is an alter ego of states o......
  • Leadbeater v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • May 30, 1989
    ...Trans-Hudson Corp., No. 87 Civ. 4593 (MGC), slip op. at ---, 1988 W.L. 112904 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1988); Feeney v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 693 F.Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y.1988). A state consent to suit statute does not necessarily work a waiver of eleventh amendment immunity. A state can ......
  • Feeney v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • April 26, 1989

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