Fehlman v. State
| Decision Date | 17 April 1928 |
| Docket Number | 25,161 |
| Parties | Fehlman et al v. State of Indiana |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
1 EVIDENCE.---The rules of evidence do not permit an inference to be based on another inference. p. 752.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.---Evidence as to articles found in home of one of two defendants charged with burglary held inadmissible.---In a prosecution of two persons for burglary of a dwelling house (2446 Burns 1926) the admission of evidence pertaining to articles found in a search of the home of one of them, which she might have purloined from the home that was burglarized prior to the burglary, was error, as such evidence unquestionably had reference to the commission of an entirely separate and distinct offense from that for which the defendants were on trial. p. 753.
3. CRIMINAL LAW.---Admissibility of evidence of another crime.---Absolute necessity for the admission of evidence of another separate crime creates the exception to the rule against the admissibility thereof, and, unless such necessity is shown, the admission of such evidence is error. p. 753.
4. CRIMINAL LAW.---Instruction authorizing jury to consider evidence of another crime held erroneous.---Where evidence relative to another crime was erroneously admitted, an instruction that such evidence was not admitted to prove directly the crime charged, but that it could be considered by the jury in connection with all the other evidence in determining the intent of the defendants, the weight and credibility of their testimony, and whether the crime with which they were charged, if committed, was or was not a part of a criminal program or system, was erroneous when there was no evidence tending to show any connection between the two crimes. p. 753.
5. CRIMINAL LAW.---Connection between crime charged and collateral crime proved must be shown.---In order to make evidence of a collateral crime admissible, the connection between it and the crime charged must be shown by the evidence. p. 753.
6. CRIMINAL LAW.---Connection between crime charged and collateral crime question for the court.---Whether there is such connection between a collateral crime proposed to be proved and the crime for which the defendant is being tried so as to make evidence of the collateral crime admissible is a question for the court. p. 753.
7. CRIMINAL LAW.---Refusal of requested instructions not error when the same subject was fully covered by an instruction given. p. 754.
8. CRIMINAL LAW.---The burden of proof never shifts to the defendant in a criminal prosecution. p. 755.
9. CRIMINAL LAW.---Refusal to give correct instruction as to burden of proof was not error when court gave full instructions as to burden of proof and presumption of innocence.---In a criminal prosecution, it was not error to refuse to give a requested instruction that the burden of proof never shifts to the defendant where the court fully instructed the jury relative to the state having the burden of proving the defendants, or one of them, guilty of the crime charged, and as to the presumption that a defendant charged with crime is innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. p. 755.
10. CRIMINAL LAW.---Repetition of propositions of law in instructions.---A trial court, although requested so to do is not justified in emphasizing any particular phase of the case on trial by repeating propositions of law in instructions, however applicable the propositions may be. p 755.
11. CRIMINAL LAW.---Refusal to give requested instruction not error when not clearly drawn.---Unless a requested instruction is drawn with that care and clearness that will likely obviate a misunderstanding of its purpose, there is no error in refusing to give it. p. 755.
12. CRIMINAL LAW.---Defendant entitled to instruction that each juror must be satisfied that each essential element of the crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.---In a criminal prosecution, a defendant is entitled to a complete and specific instruction informing each individual juror that he must be satisfied from the evidence that each essential element of the crime with which the defendant is charged has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt before consenting to a finding of guilty. p. 755.
13. CRIMINAL LAW.---Injection into burglary case of irrelevant issue as to larceny requires reversal.---In a prosecution of two persons for burglary of a dwelling house (2446 Burns 1926), where evidence was admitted tending to show that one of them had been guilty of larceny of articles in the home burglarized, and such defendant proffered testimony that such articles were given to her, thus injecting into the case on trial an issue which was irrelevant, the judgment of conviction must be reversed. p. 757.
14. CRIMINAL LAW.---Evidence that one of two defendants charged with burglary had committed larceny at another time inadmissible on theory that defendants' intent was equivocal.---In a prosecution of two persons for burglary of a dwelling house (2446 Burns 1926), evidence that one of them had purloined articles from the same house while working there was not admissible on the theory that the intent of the defendants in committing the burglary was equivocal. p. 757.
From Newton Circuit Court; George A. Williams, Judge.
Gerald Fehlman and Jennie Miller were convicted of burglary in the first degree (§ 2446 Burns 1926), and they appeal.
Reversed.
Charles M. Snyder, Ray R. Cummings, James C. Murphy and Hanley & Hanley, for appellants.
Arthur L. Gilliom, Attorney-General and Edward J. Lennon, Jr., Deputy Attorney-General, for the State.
Appellants, by an amended affidavit, were charged with burglary in the first degree. § 2446 Burns 1926. Trial before a jury and verdict of guilty as charged in the affidavit. On this verdict the court rendered judgment against each of the appellants.
The overruling of appellants' several motion for a new trial is the only error relied on for a reversal of the judgment. The causes assigned in support of this motion and not waived challenge the court's rulings in refusing to give certain of their tendered instructions; the giving of an instruction by the court upon its own motion; the refusal to admit and in admitting certain testimony.
A brief statement of this case, as it appears from the evidence, may assist in a better understanding of the questions presented and their disposition. On June 16, 1924, in the nighttime, the farm dwelling house of Jennie M. Conrad, situate about thirty rods from the village of Conrad, Indiana, and in which she then resided, was burglarized and a quantity of jewelry, currency and travelers' checks belonging to Mrs. Conrad and by her kept in a dresser drawer in her bed room was taken and carried away. At that time, appellant Miller, with her husband, Joe Miller, resided on a farm about eight miles from the Conrad home. Mr. Miller, during the years 1922 and 1923, was employed continuously by Mrs. Conrad in promoting her farm interests. During the week, he usually lodged at the tenant quarters and would go home each week end. His wife, this appellant, two or three days each week from the last of July, 1923, until about the first of February, 1924, did housework for Mrs. Conrad, going and returning to her own home each day. Alfred Caul, in the spring of 1923 and until about February 1, 1924, when he left for Hammond, Indiana, made his home with the Millers and during part of which time he assisted Mrs. Miller in the care of horses, cattle and hogs for his board. Caul, while living at the Miller home, was at Conrad's a "few times" and did some work there. At Hammond, he obtained employment, but soon thereafter he was arrested, pleaded guilty to a larceny charge, sentenced to pay a fine and to be imprisoned for 160 days, which sentence was suspended.
A short time after Caul left the Millers, they employed appellant Gerald Fehlman, who remained with them several months after the alleged burglary. On October 13, 1924, Caul returned to the Miller home and, finding no one there, entered the house took a revolver, a $ 100 Liberty bond, $ 87 in money, a white sapphire ring, two checks, one given to Mrs. Miller by her husband and one to her by a Mr. Beagley, a key to a Ford machine, a safety box key, and left a note of warning. That night Mrs. Miller and Fehlman went to Hammond, notified the police of the robbery and then returned home. Three days later, October 16, Caul was arrested, and on the next day he was given into the custody of the sheriff of Newton county. He escaped from the Newton county jail, but was recaptured and rejailed. Originally, Caul and these appellants were jointly charged by affidavit with the Conrad burglary. That affidavit was dismissed, and on October 12, 1925, appellants alone were, by affidavit, charged with that offense. On November 2, 1925, the latter affidavit was amended, and trial thereon was had January 20, 1926. Caul, then under an arson charge and at liberty on his own recognizance, was the principal witness for the state, and testified that on Saturday before June 16, 1924, he was at the Miller home and the question of robbing Mrs. Conrad of her money and jewelry was discussed by the witness, Mrs. Miller and Fehlman. Mrs. Miller told where the Conrad property was kept and how it could be gotten. It was then agreed that the witness and Fehlman should attempt to get it, and whatever was obtained should be divided one-third to each of the three. Further testifying, he said that, on the night of the Conrad burglary, he and Fehlman left the Miller home, walked to Enos, Indiana, took a freight train to Conrad and then walked to near the home of Mrs. Conrad, where they waited until she retired. They then obtained some gasoline, poured it on the...
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