Fehrle v. Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah

• Docket Number: Civil Action 4:22-cv-232
• Decision Date: 21 July 2023
• Parties: BRADLEY FEHRLE, Plaintiff, v. THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF SAVANNAH; CHATHAM COUNTY; and ROBIE WALP, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

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BRADLEY FEHRLE, Plaintiff, v. THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF SAVANNAH; CHATHAM COUNTY; and ROBIE WALP, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-232

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division

July 21, 2023

ORDER

R STAN BAKER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This action is before the Court on Defendants the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah (“the City”) and Officer Robie Walp's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff Bradley Fehrle commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging he was unlawfully arrested detained, and prosecuted following a motor vehicle accident that occurred when he unexpectedly experienced a seizure while driving. (Doc. 1.) In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against both Walp and the City (hereinafter, “Defendants”).^[1] (Doc. 4, pp 23-34.) Defendants filed the at-issue Motion to Dismiss arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution, that Walp is entitled to qualified immunity, and that the City is not liable for Walp's actions. (See generally doc. 8-1.) Plaintiff filed a Response, (doc. 14), and Defendants filed a Reply, (doc. 18). For the reasons more fully explained below, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion. (Doc. 8.)

BACKGROUND

I. The Accident and Walp's Investigation

The following are the relevant allegations asserted in the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 4.) On August 21, 2016, Plaintiff was driving with his friend, Shannon Bailey, in the passenger seat down East Anderson Street in Savannah, Georgia. (Id. at p. 5.) Plaintiff was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol. (Id. at p. 10.) While driving, Plaintiff had a seizure and lost control of his vehicle, leaving him incapacitated as the car accelerated. (Id. at p. 6.) The car then flipped multiple times, resulting in catastrophic damage to the vehicle, Bailey's death, and severe, life-threatening injuries to Plaintiff. (Id. at pp. 6-7.) Plaintiff was completely unconscious when paramedics arrived on the scene and transported him to the hospital. (Id. at p. 7.) Upon arrival at the hospital, the medical staff intubated Plaintiff and administered a number of medications, including Fentanyl and Midazolam, in an effort to save his life. (Id.) As documented in the hospital records included with his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital at 3:07 p.m., and these medications were administered to him at 3:42 p.m. (Id. at pp. 7-8, 10; see Id. at p. 8 (excerpt of medical record).) Plaintiff was given several more doses of Fentanyl and Midazolam on the same day. (Id. at p. 8.) Plaintiff ultimately survived and was discharged from the hospital nine days after the accident. (Id. at p. 9.)

Plaintiff has no family history of epilepsy. (Id. at p. 16.) Prior to August 21, 2016, he had suffered only one “possible” seizure. (Id.) Plaintiff had an MRI and an electroencephalogram in March and April of 2016, respectively, both of which yielded normal results. (Id.) Plaintiff had never been diagnosed with a seizure disorder before the date of the accident. (Id. at p. 17.) As of August 21, 2016, Plaintiff was in compliance with his doctor's instructions and recommendations, and no limitations had been set on his ability to drive. (Id.)

Officer Walp of the Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police Department was in charge of investigating Plaintiff's accident. (Id. at p. 9.) Within the course of his investigation, Walp obtained toxicology results from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”) that confirmed Plaintiff was not under the influence of alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, or other illegal drugs, but indicated the presence of Fentanyl and Midazolam in Plaintiff's blood. (Id. at pp. 9-11.) The blood sample used for GBI's toxicology screening was taken after Plaintiff was administered Fentanyl and Midazolam in the hospital. (See id. at p. 10.) On November 7, 2016, Walp prepared a report documenting the progress of the investigation in which he noted that the toxicology results indicated Plaintiff was driving under the influence of Fentanyl and Midazolam. (Id. at pp. 10-11.) He noted that he reached this conclusion because he had obtained and reviewed Plaintiff's hospital records and EMS report, and those records did not show Plaintiff was administered these drugs. (Id. at p. 11.)

II. Plaintiff's Indictment and Arrest

As a result of Walp's investigation, on July 5, 2017, Plaintiff was indicted and charged with six crimes in Chatham County Superior Court: two counts of First Degree Vehicular Homicide (O.C.G.A. § 40-6-393); two counts of DUI Drugs (O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391); Reckless Driving (O.C.G.A. § 40-6-390); and Hit and Run (O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270). (Id. at p. 12.) A bench warrant was issued, and Plaintiff was arrested on July 25, 2017, and thereafter booked at the Chatham County Detention Center. (Id.) According to the Amended Complaint, at the bond hearing, false evidence was presented depicting Plaintiff to be a “drug addict, thief, and a danger to the community.” (Id. at p. 13.) As a result, Plaintiff was denied bail and remained incarcerated. (Id.) Despite pressure to take a plea deal, Plaintiff continually refused to plead guilty to the crimes with which he was charged. (Id. at pp. 13-14.)

Plaintiff remained in jail until January 29, 2018, at which time he was bonded out after spending 188 days in the Chatham County Detention Center. (Id. at p. 14.) Plaintiff's criminal defense attorney eventually prevailed in showing the prosecutors that Plaintiff was not under the influence at the time of the accident and instead suffered a seizure while driving. (Id. at pp.1415.)

Thereafter, “rather than abandon the criminal case against [Plaintiff],” Officer Walp and the Office of the Chatham County District Attorney (the “DA”), sought a new indictment based on a new theory that Plaintiff was “driving a motor vehicle with a known seizure disorder without having taken his prescribed medication.” (Id. at p. 15.) On August 1, 2018, Plaintiff was indicted a second time and charged with two counts of First Degree Vehicular Homicide (O.C.G.A. § 406-393); two counts of Reckless Driving (O.C.G.A. § 40-6-390); and Hit and Run (O.C.G.A. § 406-270). (Id.) Plaintiff's prosecution continued until April 18, 2022, when the State of Georgia ultimately moved to dismiss the case due to insufficient evidence. (Id. at p. 18.)

III. Procedural History

Plaintiff initially filed this lawsuit on October 4, 2022, (doc. 1), and filed his Amended Complaint on October 13, 2022, (doc. 4). The Amended Complaint contains nine counts: (a) false arrest claims against Walp under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I) and against Walp and the City under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-1 (Count V); (b) malicious prosecution claims against Walp under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II) and against Walp and the City under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-40^[2] (Count VI); (c) claims for “Monell Liability”^[3] against the City (Count III) and against Chatham County (Count IV), both pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983; (d) an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Walp and the city (Count VII); (e) a negligent retention and training claims against the City (Count VIII); and (f) a claim for violations of the Georgia Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., against the City and Chatham County (Count IX). (Doc. 4, pp. 23-37.) Defendants the City and Walp thereafter filed the at-issue Motion, moving to dismiss Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII.^[4] (See generally doc. 8-1.) Plaintiff filed a Response, (doc. 14), and Defendants filed a Reply, (doc. 18).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must . . . state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must “accept[] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[e] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2009). However, this tenet “is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, “[a] complaint must state a facially plausible claim for relief, and ‘ [a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678).

The plausibility standard is “not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is also permitted “when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action.” Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989) (explaining that Rule 12 allows a court “to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law”).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's False Arrest...