Feightner v. Bank of Oklahoma, NA, 95,207.

Citation65 P.3d 624,2003 OK 20
Decision Date04 March 2003
Docket NumberNo. 95,207.,95,207.
PartiesMary Norman FEIGHTNER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. BANK OF OKLAHOMA, N.A., Defendant/Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma

Frederic W. Southern, jr., Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Frederic Dorwart and J. Michael Medina, Tulsa, OK, for Defendant/Appellee.

LAVENDER, J.

¶ 1 Plaintiff/appellant, Mary Norman Feightner sued defendant/appellee, Bank of Oklahoma, N.A. (BOK) for unpaid overtime and unpaid loan origination commissions. Two issues are before us. One, did the trial judge correctly give summary judgment to BOK on the overtime claim as barred by claim (res judicata) and/or issue (collateral estoppel) preclusion as having been previously litigated in an adjudicative administrative proceeding had before the Oklahoma Department of Labor (DOL) under 40 O.S.2001, § 165.7 that resulted in a final order adverse to Ms. Feightner and in favor of BOK?1 Two, did the trial judge err in granting summary judgment to BOK because material disputed fact issues exist concerning the loan origination commission claim?

PART I. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

¶ 2 An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment by a de novo standard. This Court said in Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, 914 P.2d 1051:

Although a trial court in making a decision on whether summary judgment is appropriate considers factual matters, the ultimate decision turns on purely legal determinations, i.e. whether one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there are no material disputed factual questions. Therefore, as the decision involves purely legal determinations, the appellate standard of review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. [This Court], like the trial court, will examine the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted by the parties to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact. Further, all inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidentiary materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. (Citations omitted.)

Id. at 1053. If the materials subject to consideration on a motion for summary judgment either disclose controverted material facts, or, reasonable minds might reach different conclusions even if the material facts are undisputed, a motion for summary judgment should be denied. Perry v. Green, 1970 OK 70, 468 P.2d 483, 488-489. A de novo review involves a plenary, independent and non-deferential examination of the trial court's legal rulings. In the Matter of the Assessment of Real Property of Integris Realty Corporation, 2002 OK 85, ¶ 6, 58 P.3d 200, 203. In the final analysis, summary judgment process is properly invoked only when it serves to eliminate a useless trial. Id., 2002 OK 85, at ¶ 5, 58 P.3d at 203.

¶ 3 Whether preclusion doctrine will apply in any particular case is sometimes a question of law and in others a mixed question of law and fact. See Barker v. State Insurance Fund, 2001 OK 94, ¶ 6, 40 P.3d 463, 466

. It is solely a question of law if (1) the facts are undisputed [id.], (2) the preclusion question can be answered solely by reviewing the judgment put forward as the bar (Montague v. State ex rel. Com'rs of Land Office, 1939 OK 190, 89 P.2d 283, 284 Second Syllabus by the Court), or (3) the preclusion determination can be made solely by inspection of the record of the proceeding(s) culminating in the judgment put forward as the bar. Factor Oil Co. v. Brydia, 1938 OK 356, 85 P.2d 311, 312 Fifth Syllabus by the Court. "[A] deferential standard of review applies to resolutions of disputed facts when supported by reasonable evidence; an independent judgment standard of review applies to the ultimate conclusion that these facts do or do not trigger preclusion." Barker v. State Insurance Fund, supra, 2001 OK 94, at ¶ 6, 40 P.3d at 466 [quoting A. J. Bayless v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 179 Ariz. 434, 880 P.2d 654, 659 (Ariz.App.1993)].

¶ 4 We are also concerned in this case with the interpretation of 40 O.S.2001, § 165.7(G) and the legislative language employed there. A legal question involving statutory interpretation is also subject to a de novo review standard. Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 8 and f.n. 5, 33 P.3d 302, 305 and f.n. 5. With these standards in mind we turn to a review of the matter.

PART II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT RECORD AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

¶ 5 Ms. Feightner went to work for BOK as an assistant vice president and branch manager in mid-1995 and worked for BOK until mid-1997. In July 1997, shortly after her employment with BOK ended, she submitted a wage claim form and an amended form to the Oklahoma Department of Labor (DOL). The forms claimed entitlement to overtime compensation she asserted BOK refused to pay. The DOL provided Ms. Feightner with an attorney to represent her, and the wage claim, on an individual basis, proceeded to hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in late January 1998.2 At the administrative level only issues concerning entitlement to overtime compensation were litigated to final result; entitlement to unpaid loan origination commissions was not adjudicated at the administrative level.3 ¶ 6 In June 1998 the ALJ issued detailed written "findings of fact[,] conclusions of law and order" (FF/CL), said decision culminating in judgment at the administrative level in BOK's favor based upon a determination Ms. Feightner was not entitled to overtime compensation. From review of the summary judgment evidentiary materials, which include a transcript of the hearing before the ALJ and the FF/CL, it is, in our view, an undisputed material fact that Ms. Feightner's alleged entitlement to overtime compensation was presented and litigated at the administrative level on two theories. One, although her job with BOK was a management position and, thus, an exempt one for purposes of overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., in actuality, during most of her employment with BOK she was required to perform numerous nonexempt functions and, thus, she was entitled to overtime compensation for hundreds of hours of overtime she was required to work during her tenure with BOK. Two, a BOK superior promised to pay her for the overtime claimed (at one and one-half times her effective hourly rate), thus, she was entitled to the overtime pay as a matter of oral contract. In other words, she claimed entitlement to overtime compensation by virtue of the provisions of the FLSA and via oral contract theory.

¶ 7 The ALJ ruled against Ms. Feightner on both theories. Also, the ALJ expressly noted in his conclusions of law that because Oklahoma does not have any overtime regulation he was required to apply federal standards set forth in the FLSA and that Act's implementing regulations. No appeal for judicial review to a State district court was taken from the ALJ's decision as would have been allowed by § 165.7(E) in conformity with the provisions of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act (OAPA), 75 O.S. 2001, § 250 et seq., as amended.4

¶ 8 Approximately one year later—in July 1999—Ms. Feightner filed the suit that is the subject of this appeal. Her petition alleges an oral contract providing for overtime compensation and loan origination commissions of three percent (3%) on all loan originations performed. The petition also claims a willful violation by BOK of the FLSA.

¶ 9 BOK moved for summary judgment. It asserted the overtime claim was barred as having been previously adjudicated adversely to Ms. Feightner in the administrative proceeding that culminated in the final order of the ALJ. As to the loan origination commission claim BOK's summary judgment evidentiary materials attempted to show it had paid Ms. Feightner all the commissions due. Ms. Feightner responded to the summary judgment motion arguing, in essence, her suit for overtime compensation was not barred because, although the suit seeks similar relief than sought at the administrative level, it also seeks other and additional relief, and that the dictates of § 165.7(G) express legislative intent to withhold affording preclusive effect to the administrative determination in a subsequent suit on that claim.

¶ 10 As to the loan origination commissions asserted to be due she presented evidentiary material, including her affidavit, she argued raised genuine material disputed factual issues. In essence, she challenged BOK's claim of payment of what she asserted was due. She also disputed BOK's position as to the proper rate of the commission and exactly upon what activity the commission was to be earned. In such regard BOK attempted to show by its evidentiary materials that a commission of three basis points, which it asserts means 1/100th of one percent, was due on all loans ultimately funded, not merely originated by Ms. Feightner. BOK also asserted in its summary judgment submission(s) that it would make no business sense for BOK to pay a commission merely on loans originated, rather than loans actually funded, because BOK only derived a benefit when the loan was funded. It also, in essence, questioned the credibility of Ms. Feightner's affidavit concerning her recitation of oral agreement reached on the loan commission claim and the lack of corroborative evidence as to such an agreement. Finally, as we read Ms. Feightner's affidavit she, in effect, swears therein that she reached an express oral agreement with an authorized BOK superior to be compensated by a three percent (3%) commission in addition to her regular salary.

¶ 11 As noted above, the trial judge gave summary judgment to BOK. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV (COCA) reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. All three judges of the COCA believed summary judgment was erroneously given to BOK on the loan origination commission claim because material disputed fact issues existed. The COCA...

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