Feik v. Sieg Co., 90-4058.
| Decision Date | 07 May 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-4058.,90-4058. |
| Citation | 823 F. Supp. 588 |
| Parties | Daniel J. FEIK, Plaintiff, v. SIEG COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, and Monroe Auto Equipment Company, a Delaware Corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Steven A. Wakeman, Kingery Durree Wakeman & Ryan, Peoria, IL, for plaintiff.
Jordan A. Fifield, Goldsworthy Fifield & Hasselberg, Rex K. Linder, Heyl Royster Voelker & Allen, Peoria, IL, for defendants.
Before the Court is Defendant Sieg Company's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count II of Plaintiff Daniel Feik's Complaint and Count II of Cross-claimant Monroe Auto Equipment Company's Cross-claim. Plaintiff's Complaint is in four counts. Counts I and II allege causes of action in negligence and strict liability against Sieg, and Counts III and IV make the same allegations against Monroe. Monroe's Cross-claim against Sieg seeks contribution from Sieg in the event that Monroe is found liable to Plaintiff under the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint. Only Count II of the Complaint and Cross-claim are at issue here. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
"A motion for summary judgment is not an appropriate occasion for weighing the evidence; rather, the inquiry is limited to determining if there is a genuine issue for trial." Lohorn v. Michal, 913 F.2d 327, 331 (7th Cir.1990). See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.ED.2d 202 (1986). This Court must "view the record and all inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Holland v. Jefferson National Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir.1989). When faced with a Motion for Summary Judgment, the non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings. Rather, it is necessary for the non-moving party to demonstrate, through specific evidence, that there remains a genuine issue of triable fact. See, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir.1991).
Sieg, an Iowa corporation, owns and operates an auto parts store in Aledo, Illinois. Monroe, a Delaware corporation, manufactures and sells Monroe Gas-Matic Struts (struts) for use on automobiles. On January 26, 1989, Plaintiff purchased two struts from Sieg. At the time Plaintiff purchased the struts, he also borrowed a compressor vise. (Complaint p. 1-2). The compressor, designed to compress springs, is used in the installation of struts.
Sieg obtained the compressor vise to loan to customers who chose to install struts themselves. No records were kept of who borrowed the compressor and customers were not charged for its use. (Elliot dep. 22-23). The compressor, however, was infrequently used, and in the words of Richard Elliot, the manager of Sieg's Aledo store, "we don't have that many over-the-counter do-it-yourselfers that install ... struts." (Elliot dep. p. 23).
At the time Plaintiff borrowed the compressor, a certain thread on a bolt in the compressor was stripped. Both Plaintiff and Elliot testified that Elliot informed Plaintiff of the stripped bolt. (Elliot Dep. p. 18, Plaintiff Dep. p. 26). Plaintiff also stated that Elliot told him to "do what you can with it." (Plaintiff Dep. p. 98). Plaintiff further testified that his "assumption was that ... the tool had been ... messed up for a while and other people had been using it." (Plaintiff Dep. p. 101).
The compressor did not come with instructions, but a warning label and certain directions were attached to the compressor. (Elliot Dep. p. 37, 57). The compressor included a warning to wear safety glasses, lubricate the compressor with "anti-seize" compound, and avoid torquing the bolt over 30 pounds. (Larson Dep. p. 75, 122, 124). Another warning stated (Larson Dep. p. 121). Plaintiff does not remember seeing the warnings, and does not recall reading the caution concerning eye protection. (Plaintiff Dep. p. 123).
On the same date that Plaintiff bought the struts and borrowed the compressor, Plaintiff and his brother attempted to install the struts onto Plaintiff's car, a Plymouth Reliant. (Plaintiff's Dep. 65, Daniel Feik Dep.). "During the process of installing the strut onto his automobile, Plaintiff suffered serious and permanent personal injury, when the rod nut supplied by Monroe with the strut, came loose, causing the rod nut and upper mounting bracket to shoot off of the strut with great force, striking Plaintiff in the eye ... resulting in the loss of his left eye." (Complaint p. 2).
Plaintiff testified that the compressor itself was laying on the floor when the accident occurred, but that the compressor played a role in the accident by not compressing the spring enough. (Plaintiff's Dep. p. 56-58). Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that "the threads on the center bolt of the compressor were stripped, preventing it from compressing the Strut sufficiently so as to enable the safe and proper installation of the Strut." (Complaint p. 4).
The general rule of products liability is set out in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965). This rule states that:
The plaintiffs must prove that their injury or damage resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one and that the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer's control.
Id. Of course, the rule of strict liability is not only applied to manufacturers but to distributors as well. Bainter v. Lamoine LP Gas Co., 24 Ill.App.3d 913, 321 N.E.2d 744 (1974).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff has not alleged liability on the part of the manufacturer of the compressor, but on Sieg, an auto parts dealer that loaned the compressor to Plaintiff. In a similar situation, the court in Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 49 Ill. App.3d 480, 7 Ill.Dec. 341, 364 N.E.2d 502 (1977), stated that:
Suvada applies with equal compulsion to all the parties in a chain who place the article into commerce. While liability does not depend upon whether there was an actual sales transaction ... it is necessary that the party to be charged with liability be in the business of placing the allegedly defective product into the stream of commerce.... Accordingly, it becomes apparent that the cornerstone of liability rests upon the defendant's active participation in placing the product into commerce for use and consumption by others.
Keen, 7 Ill.Dec. at 343, 364 N.E.2d at 504.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Sieg argues that there has been no allegation that Sieg was part of the original producing and marketing chain or that the compressor was unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the manufacturer's control. Consequently, Sieg argues that it cannot be held liable in strict product liability because the compressor had already left the chain of distribution before it was loaned to Plaintiff.
In support of its position, Sieg refers the Court to Timm v. Indian Springs Recreation Association, 187 Ill.App.3d 508, 135 Ill.Dec. 155, 543 N.E.2d 538 (1989). In Timm, plaintiff sued defendant for injuries sustained after plaintiff fell from a golf cart owned and operated by defendant. Defendant purchased the cart from Indian Springs, and Indian Springs had previously purchased the cart from Harley Davidson.
In deciding Timm, the court noted that "anyone who is in the business of placing a defective product into the stream of commerce by leasing it, rather than selling it, may be strictly liable for any injuries which proximately result therefrom." Timm, 135 Ill.Dec. at 158, 543 N.E.2d at 541. (citations omitted). The court went on to note that the sale of leased equipment does not ordinarily "remove the former lessor from the chain of distribution so as to defeat imposition of strict liability." Id. The court further noted that the cornerstone of strict liability "rests upon the defendant's active participation in placing the product into commerce for use and consumption by others." Timm, 135 Ill.Dec. at 159, 543 N.E.2d at 542. Liability, however, "will not be imposed upon a defendant who is not a part of the original producing and marketing chain." Id.
Having stated the above principles, the court then analogized the facts before it to the facts in Keen. In Keen, plaintiff sued a grocery store in strict liability for injuries sustained from a defective grocery cart. The store furnished the grocery cart to customers incident to selling other items. The Keen court found that the grocery cart was placed into the stream of commerce by the party who distributed it to the store, but that the store, like its customer, was merely a user of the grocery cart. The Keen court further found that the grocery cart was a mere item of convenience that not every customer would use, and that the customer was not compelled to use the cart. Keen, 7 Ill.Dec. at 343, 364 N.E.2d at 504. Because the grocery store could not be considered part of the distributive chain within the ambit of strict liability, the store could not be held liable.
After considering the Keen facts, the Timm court stated "in this case, just as was the grocery store in Keen, defendant was a private individual consumer which incidentally provided golf carts to users of the course ... a one-time sale by a private owner not in the business of selling golf carts to the general public does not invoke the law of strict liability." Timm, 135 Ill.Dec. at 159, 543 N.E.2d at 542.
Sieg, and the above-cited cases, also refer to Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975). In Peterson, the court held that the doctrine of strict liability could not be imposed to render the seller of a used automobile liable in the absence of allegations that the defects existed when the product left...
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