Feil v. Senisi

Decision Date13 March 1950
Citation72 A.2d 348,7 N.J.Super. 517
PartiesFEIL v. SENISI et al.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court

Samuel A. Gennet, Newark, for plaintiff.

David Green, Newark, for defendants (Harry Rey, Jersey City, argued the motion).

WM. J. BRENNAN, Jr., J.S.C.

Defendant Angelo Senisi has moved to dismiss the second count of the complaint on the ground plaintiff's claim against him is barred by the statute of limitations, R.S. 2:24--2, N.J.S.A.

Plaintiff first urges that defendant may not raise this defense by motion but must plead it by way of answer to the complaint, citing Bentley v. Colgate, 163 A. 98, 10 N.J.Misc. 1222 (Sup.Ct.1932). This rule of practice has been superseded by the new Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 3:9--5 provides that 'for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material matter'. Under that rule, where it affirmatively appears on the face of the complaint that the action pleaded is barred by the statute of limitations, the defense can be raised by motion to dismiss under Rule 3:12--2(5) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This has been the interpretation in the Third Circuit of the comparable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631, at page 635 (Third Circuit 1942); Brictson v. Woodrough, 164 F.2d 107 (8th Circuit 1947); French v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 88 F.Supp. 714 (D.C.N.J.) decided by Forman, Jr.; and see Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Parish, 168 F.2d 238 at page 240 (10th Circuit 1948). It is an interpretation in complete accord with the intent and purpose of our new rules. It is clear that the defendant has the right to raise the bar of the statute of limitations by motion where the averments of the complaint supply the basis therefor.

Plaintiff then contends that the defendant was in active military service when the cause of action accrued and that under R.S. 2:24--26 (L.1945, c. 167, p. 586, § 1) N.J.S.A., the action is timely because the period of such service from and after that date is not to be included in computing the two year period of limitation under R.S. 2:24--2, N.J.S.A.

The alleged cause of action accrued August 30, 1947 and the action was brought one day over two years later. Defendant after a series of terms of military service commencing May 8, 1944 was discharged from the Army on May 30, 1947 but had re-enlisted on June 10, 1947 and was still on active duty outside the state on November 7, 1949, the date of the affidavit submitted by him on this motion.

R.S. 2:24--26, N.J.S.A., operates to toll the statute of limitations only as to parties in active military service 'in time of war and six months thereafter'. Defendant insists that the period of his military service from and after August 30, 1947 was not 'in time of war' and was therefore includible in the computation of the period of the bar of the statute of limitations.

I hold that defendant's active military service was on August 30, 1947, and continued to be up to the commencement of this suit, 'in time of war', and that no part of the time of such service is includible in the computation of the period of the bar. It is true that the shooting has long since stopped as between this nation and its Axis enemies and that the President of the United States has by Proclamation proclaimed 'the cessation of...

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16 cases
  • Williams v. Bell Telephone Laboratories Inc.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • May 3, 1993
    ...it in the Answer or to raise it by motion before filing an Answer when defense appears on face of Complaint); Feil v. Senisi, 7 N.J.Super. 517, 518-19, 72 A.2d 348 (Law Div.1950) (allowing defendant to raise statute-of-limitations defense in motion to dismiss where it affirmatively appears ......
  • Salz v. State House Commission
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • September 30, 1954
    ...of war which existed thereafter and through the national emergency declared by the President on December 16, 1950. Feil v. Senisi, 7 N.J.Super. 517, 72 A.2d 348 (Law Div.1950); 3 Code Fed. Regs. 71 (1950 supp.) (Presidential Proclamation 2914--1950, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, note preceding § 1);......
  • Publix Asbury Corp. v. City of Asbury Park
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court
    • August 21, 1951
    ...256 (Sup.Ct.App.Term, 1947.' (Italics mine). Judge Stein therein, distinguished that case from the case of Feil v. Senisi, 7 N.J.Super. 517, 72 A.2d 348 (Law Div. 1950), relied upon herein by the plaintiff, and he said: 'While that case involved private rights, nonetheless it called for a d......
  • Stanbery v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court
    • June 29, 1953
    ...18 N.J.Super. 192, 86 A.2d 806 (App.Div.1952), certification denied, 9 N.J. 609, 89 A.2d 305 (1952); contra, Feil v. Senisi, 7 N.J.Super. 517, 72 A.2d 348 (Law Div.1950), a statutory I find no ambiguity in the clause, '* * * and if such death does not result * * * from military or naval ser......
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