Feingold v. Rageon, Inc.

Decision Date15 July 2020
Docket Number18-CV-2055 (KMW)
Citation472 F.Supp.3d 94
Parties Deborah FEINGOLD d/b/a Deborah Feingold Photography, Plaintiff, v. RAGEON, INC. and John Does 1–4, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Andrea Terese Timpone, Christopher Jon Fladgate, Garson, Segal, Steinmetz, Fladgate LLP, Kevin F. Murphy, Wuersch & Gering LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Panagiota Betty Tufariello, Intellectulaw, Law Offices of P.B. Tufariello PC, Mt. Sinai, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

KIMBA M. WOOD, District Judge:

Plaintiff Deborah Feingold has brought an action for copyright infringement against Defendant RageOn, Inc. Pending before the Court are the partiescross-motions for summary judgment. At issue is whether Plaintiff owns valid copyrights for two photographs—one of Madonna and one of Keanu Reeves. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denies Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a professional photographer known for her portraits of celebrities and public figures. Two of those portraits figure centrally in the present lawsuit.

The first is of the musical artist Madonna holding a red lollipop against her tongue ("the Madonna Photograph"). In 2008, Plaintiff compiled an unpublished book titled "Bright Moments Photographs + Philosophies" ("Bright Moments"). The Madonna photograph appeared on the cover of and inside the book. Plaintiff registered Bright Moments with the United States Copyright Office under registration number VAu 1-091-877, effective December 19, 2009. The parties disagree about whether the Bright Moments copyright protects the Madonna Photograph.

The second photograph at issue is of the actor Keanu Reeves (the "Reeves Photograph").

The Reeves Photograph appeared in the March 9, 1989 issue of Rolling Stone magazine. Plaintiff claims, but Defendant disputes, that Plaintiff applied for and secured a copyright registration for the Reeves Photograph with registration number VA0001233837, effective August 14, 2003.

In January of 2018, Plaintiff learned that RageOn.com ("RageOn") was displaying the Madonna and Reeves Photographs.

RageOn is a platform that allows vendors to design merchandise and sell it to consumers through RageOn's online marketplace. RageOn processes purchases made through its online marketplace, collects payment from buyers, submits the buyers’ orders to the merchandise manufacturers, and coordinates shipping from the manufacturers to the buyers. The vendor who designed a given item receives a commission from RageOn when that item is purchased.

RageOn offered for sale through its marketplace three t-shirt varieties bearing the image of the Madonna Photograph and one t-shirt variety bearing the image of the Reeves Photograph.

Plaintiff initiated this action on March 7, 2018, and filed an amended complaint on May 31, 2018. (ECF Nos. 1, 144.) Discovery was ongoing when, on June 14, 2019, Defendant moved for summary judgment on its affirmative defense that Plaintiff's Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (ECF No. 58.) Discovery closed on August 28, 2019. (ECF No. 50.) On October 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all her claims: copyright infringement, contributory copyright infringement, and vicarious copyright infringement.1 (ECF No. 123.)

LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see O'Hara v. Weeks Marine, Inc. , 294 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir. 2002). A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought, and must draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See L.B. Foster Co. v. Am. Piles, Inc. , 138 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1998),

Whether a disputed issue of fact exists is for the court to decide. Balderman v. United States Veterans Admin. , 870 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1989). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant can satisfy its burden, "the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011).

Not every disputed fact is material, nor every issue genuine, within the meaning of Rule 56. A fact is "material" in the summary judgment context when its resolution "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine" when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

The same standards apply when a court is resolving cross-motions for summary judgment. "[E]ach party's motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration." Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc. , 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001).

B. Copyright Infringement Standard

The Copyright Act of 1976 grants copyright owners the exclusive right to reproduce their copyrighted work, to prepare derivatives of the work, and to sell copies of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 ; see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. , 471 U.S. 539, 546–47, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985). To establish liability for an infringement claim, a copyright owner must prove two principal elements: "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original." Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3 , 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. , 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991) ).

Regarding the ownership element, a certificate of registration from the United States Register of Copyrights within five years of first publication of a work "constitutes prima facie evidence of the valid ownership of a copyright, although that presumption of ownership may be rebutted." Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, Inc. , 193 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1999). This presumption "orders the burdens of proof," relieving a purported copyright owner of any duty "in the first instance to prove all of the multitude of facts that underline the validity of the copyright unless the [alleged infringer], by effectively challenging them, shifts the burden of doing so to the [purported owner]." Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp. , 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting H. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 157, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5773). "Generally speaking, the presumption of validity may be rebutted [w]here other evidence in the record casts doubt on the question.’ " Fonar Corp. v. Domenick , 105 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp. , 630 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1980) ). Where a work was registered more than five years after its first publication, the evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of registration is within the court's discretion. Stern v. Lavender , 319 F. Supp. 3d 650, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (Engelmayer, J.) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) ).

The copying element comprises two requirements: actual copying and improper appropriation. Actual copying may be established either by direct or circumstantial evidence that the alleged infringer had access to the protected work and that the allegedly infringing copy bears a "probative similarity" to the protected work. See Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television , Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997). Similarities between works are probative of copying if those similarities "would not be expected to arise if the works had been created independently." Odegard, Inc. v. Costikyan Classic Carpets, Inc. , 963 F.Supp. 1328, 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Koeltl, J.). Once actual copying has been established, the copyright owner must satisfy the "improper appropriation" requirement by demonstrating that the alleged copy bears "substantial similarities" to the protected elements of the copyrighted work; substantial similarities are those that would cause an average lay observer to "recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work." Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 912 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION
I. Copyright Infringement: The Madonna Photograph
A. Ownership of a Valid Copyright

Bright Moments—Plaintiff's book of photographs, including the Madonna Photograph—is an unpublished collective work. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(c). "Registration of an unpublished ‘collection’ extends to each copyrightable element in the collection and to the authorship, if any, involved in selecting and assembling the collection." 37 C.F.R. 202.3(b)(4)(i). However, "a published design included in an unpublished collection copyright registration application cannot be registered as part of the collection." Family Dollar Stores, Inc. v. United Fabrics Int'l, Inc. , 896 F. Supp. 2d 223, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (McMahon, J.).

Plaintiff claims that her copyright for Bright Moments under Copyright Registration No. VAu 1-091-877 protects the Madonna Photograph. Defendant argues that the Madonna Photograph falls outside of the coverage of the Bright Moments copyright because the photograph was published prior to its inclusion in Bright Moments.

Specifically, Defendant alleges that the Madonna Photograph was published in Star Hits magazine in 1982 or on a Madonna "fanblog" called Madonna Tribe in 2006. The Court finds that the Madonna Photograph remained unpublished when it appeared in Bright Moments and when Bright Moments was registered. The Bright Moments copyright therefore protects the Madonna...

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