Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 1242
Decision Date | 17 May 1996 |
Docket Number | D,No. 1242,1242 |
Citation | 84 F.3d 539 |
Parties | Jeffrey FEINMAN and Gary Kosseff, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC.; Oppenheimer & Co.; Smith Barney, Inc.; Merrill Lynch & Company; Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Incorporated, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 95-9081. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Roger W. Kirby, New York City (Ira M. Press, Kaufman Malchman Kirby & Squire, New York City, on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants.
Charles A. Gilman, New York City (Jonathan Sherman, Cahill Gordon & Reindel, New York City, on the brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before NEWMAN, Chief Judge, and FEINBERG and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
This appeal challenges the practices of several of the nation's largest stock brokerage firms in the labeling of their fee charges in connection with securities transactions. Jeffrey Feinman and Gary Kosseff appeal from the September 30, 1995, judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Denise Cote, Judge), dismissing their suit alleging securities fraud. Appellants alleged that the firms charged hidden commissions on every transaction, mislabeling their charges as transaction fees on confirmation slips supplied to the customer. The District Court ruled as a matter of law that appellants had failed to show both materiality and reliance. We agree and therefore affirm.
After every securities transaction, stock brokers are required to provide the customer with a confirmation slip disclosing, among other things, the nature and amount of the transaction and any additional charges. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1995) and NYSE Rule 409. Each of the defendants routinely charges a transaction fee, ranging from $2.35 to $4.85, for each purchase or sale processed. On the confirmation slips, the fees are variously identified as covering "handling, postage and insurance if any" (Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.); "handling" (Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.); "service" (Smith Barney, Inc.); and "processing" (Merrill Lynch & Co.).
Feinman and Kosseff, who dealt with each of the defendant firms for eight years, received confirmation slips identifying transaction fees for every purchase and sale. They alleged that the fees charged far exceed the cost to the firms of such items and instead represent hidden, fixed commissions, disguised to circumvent rules prohibiting fixed rates and to prevent customers from negotiating the fees. Feinman and Kosseff sought to represent a class of similarly situated securities customers against a class of brokerage firms charging excessive transaction fees.
The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that deceptive labeling of the transaction fees was not material as a matter of law to the plaintiffs' decisions to purchase and sell securities and that the plaintiffs could not as a matter of law show that they relied on this mislabeling. We agree.
To bring a successful complaint for securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994), a plaintiff must allege that, "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the defendant, acting with scienter, made a false material representation or omitted to disclose material information and that plaintiff's reliance on defendant's action caused plaintiff injury." In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir.1993) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1397, 128 L.Ed.2d 70 (1994).
Appellants contend that, correctly identified as commissions, the transaction fees would have been material to their decisions, made over the course of their eight-year dealings with the defendants, to purchase or sell securities.
In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976), the Supreme Court, defining materiality in the proxy rules context, stated that information is material if it would have "assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder." Id. at 449, 96 S.Ct. at 2132. The Court later adopted this rule in the context of a securities fraud claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231, 108 S.Ct. 978, 983, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988). The Court noted that in TSC Industries it had been "careful not to set too low a standard of materiality" lest it "lead management 'simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information--a result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.' " Id. (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 448-49, 96 S.Ct. at 2132). Further, where the alleged misstatements are "so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of their importance," a court may find the misstatements immaterial as a matter of law. Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir.1985); see also TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 450, 96 S.Ct. at 2133 ( ).
We believe the District Court properly concluded that no reasonable investor would have considered it important, in deciding whether or not to buy or sell stock, that a transaction fee of a few dollars might exceed the broker's actual handling charges. 1 Each of the defendants' confirmation slips itemized the amount of the fee; the appellants were never charged more than the amounts reported on these slips. See Levine v. NL Industries, Inc., 926 F.2d 199, 203 (2d Cir.1991) ( ).
Cases in which we have refused to find that representations were not material as a matter of law have involved misstatements or omissions that did, or at least had the potential to, cause the plaintiff financial harm. See Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 519 (2d Cir.1994) ( ); Goldman, 754 F.2d at 1067 ( ); cf. Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 789 F.2d 105, 111-12 (2d Cir.1986) ( ).
Simply stated, reasonable minds could not find that an individual investing in the stock market would be affected in a decision to purchase or sell a security by knowledge that the broker was pocketing a dollar or two of the fee charged for the transaction. Cf. Burke v. Jacoby, 981 F.2d 1372, 1381 (2d Cir.1992) (, )cert. denied, 508 U.S. 909, 113 S.Ct. 2338, 124 L.Ed.2d 249 (1993). If brokerage firms are slightly inflating the cost of their transaction fees, the remedy is competition among the firms in the labeling and pricing of their services, not resort to the securities fraud provisions.
Appellants did not attempt to plead that the mislabeling of the fees "induced [them] to enter into the transaction[s]." Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1495 (2d Cir.1992). In most cases, reliance, also known as transaction causation,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 11–1095.
...complaint. As an initial matter, we must satisfy ourselves that jurisdiction is secure. We find, relying on Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539 (2d Cir.1996), that SLUSA doesn't apply because any alleged misrepresentation (though pled as a breach of contract we assume for pur......
-
In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.
...(6) causing damage to plaintiff. See Schick v. Ernst & Young, 808 F.Supp. 1097, 1101 (S.D.N.Y.1992); see also Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539, 540 (2d Cir.1996); In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1017, 114 ......
-
King Cnty., Wash. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG
...a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of their importance”) (quoting Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539, 540–41 (2d Cir.1996)); Sotheby's Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Baran, 107 Fed.Appx. 235, 238 (2d Cir.2004) (“It is well established that con......
-
United States v. Litvak
...See Wilson, 671 F.3d at 131.In trying to persuade us otherwise, Litvak relies principally upon Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539 (2d Cir.1996), in which purchasers of securities brought suit against stock brokers with whom they dealt. The purchasers alleged that the brokers......
-
Second Circuit Overturns Fraud Convictions In United States V. Litvak
...cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 71 (2013)). 4 Id. at *27. 5 Id. at *26 n.12. 6 Id. at *25. 7 Id. at *33. 8 Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539 (2d Cir. 9 United States v. Litvak, No. 14-2902-cr, at *43. 10 Id. at *45 (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447 (2d Cir. 2014)......
-
SECURITIES FRAUD
...investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of their importance” (quoting Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539, 540–41 (2d Cir. 1996))); Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650, 655 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a CEO’s false statements about his educ......
-
Securities fraud.
...investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of their importance (citing Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539, 540-41 (2d Cir. 1996))); Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650, 655 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that CEO's false statements about his educatio......
-
Securities Fraud
...investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of their importance” (quoting Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539, 540–41 (2d Cir. 1996))); Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650, 655 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a CEO’s false statements about his educ......
-
Securities fraud.
...delay in availability of funds would have been material in decision to purchase treasury-bill); Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539, 541 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding customers failed to show misrepresentations of transaction fees were material to their securities (35.) See United ......