Feist v. State
Decision Date | 16 September 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 12–31065.,12–31065. |
Citation | 730 F.3d 450 |
Parties | Pauline G. FEIST, Plaintiff–Appellant v. State of LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Defendant–Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Victor Roma Farrugia, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Amy Lynn Mcinnis, Edmond Wade Shows, Attorney, Shows, Cali, Berthelot & Walsh, L.L.P., Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant–Appellee.
Ellen Bentley Hahn, Esq., Lafayette, LA, Brian D. East, Senior Attorney, Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Before DAVIS, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
Pauline G. Feist, a former assistant attorney general for the Louisiana Department of Justice (“LDOJ”), claims that LDOJ (1) discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by declining to provide a free on-site parking space to accommodate her disability (osteoarthritis of the knee), and (2) violated the ADA and Title VII by terminating her employment in retaliation for charges she filed with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).1
The district court granted summary judgment on Feist's discrimination claim, holding that she failed to explain how the denial of on-site parking limited her ability to perform the “essential functions” of her job. Feist filed timely appeal, arguing that the ADA does not require a link between a requested accommodation and an essential job function.2
The district court also granted LDOJ's motion for summary judgment on Feist's retaliation claim, finding that Feist was dismissed for poor performance and holding that Feist produced no evidence that, but for a retaliatory motive, LDOJ would not have dismissed her. Feist appeals, claiming that she has evidence that any performance-based justification is mere pretext, intended to disguise the retaliatory dismissal.
Because we find an error in the district court's analysis of the discrimination claim, we vacate summary judgment in part and affirm in part.
This Court “reviews de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard as the district court.” Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir.2003). “Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party can show that ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” United States v. Renda Marine, Inc., 667 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir.2012) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court “must view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir.2013). In addition, an appellate court “may affirm summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, even if it is different from that relied on by the district court.” Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The ADA prohibits covered employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination includes failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Thus, a plaintiff must prove the following statutory elements to prevail in a failure-to-accommodate claim: (1) the plaintiff is a “qualified individual with a disability;” (2) the disability and its consequential limitations were “known” by the covered employer; and (3) the employer failed to make “reasonable accommodations” for such known limitations.3
The district court found that Feist is a qualified individual with a disability and that the disability was known by the employer, and the parties do not dispute these findings. Consequently, the sole question on appeal is whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in determining whether Feist's proposed accommodation was reasonable. The court held that Feist could not show the proposal reasonable because she “[did] not allege or demonstrate that the parking situation limited her ability to perform the essential functions of her job.” The LDOJ urges this Court to affirm the district court's interpretation. Feist, however, points out that reasonable accommodations are not restricted to modifications that enable performance of essential job functions. The language of the ADA, and all available interpretive authority, indicate that Feist is correct.
Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The text thus gives no indication that an accommodation must facilitate the essential functions of one's position. Moreover, the requested reserved on-site parking would presumably have made her workplace “readily accessible to and usable” by her, and therefore might have been a potentially reasonable accommodation pursuant to § 12111(9)(A).
The ADA's implementing regulations also indicate that reasonable accommodation need not relate to the performance of essential job functions. Indeed, the regulations suggest the contrary by defining reasonable accommodation as:
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant desires; or
(ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment ... that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position; or
(iii) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( o )(1) (emphasis added). Thus, a modification that enables an individual to perform the essential functions of a position is only one of three categories of reasonable accommodation.4 Moreover, EEOC guidance explicitly provides that “providing reserved parking spaces” may constitute reasonable accommodation under some circumstances. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App., § 1630.2( o ).
In arriving at its conclusion, the district court cited a decision in which we stated that “the existence vel non of a disability or impairment is material to a reasonable accommodation claim only insofar as it limits an employee's ability to perform his or her job.” Burch v. Coca–Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 315 (5th Cir.1997). However, Burch is inapposite because the question there was whether the plaintiff was a “qualified individual with a disability,” which is not in dispute here.
Therefore, because the district court erred in requiring a nexus between the requested accommodation and the essential functions of Feist's position, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We express no opinion as to whether the proposed accommodation was reasonable, and we respectfully decline appellee's invitation to consider alternate grounds for affirming summary judgment on Feist's discrimination claim.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA or Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) she participated in an activity protected under the statute; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556–57 (5th Cir.2007) (Title VII); Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir.1999) (ADA). LeMaire v. Louisiana, 480 F.3d 383, 388–89 (5th Cir.2007) (internal citation omitted), which the employee accomplishes by showing that the adverse action would not have occurred “but for” the employer's retaliatory motive, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, –––U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (Title VII); Seaman, 179 F.3d at 301 (ADA). In order to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must show “a conflict in substantial evidence” on the question of whether the employer would not have taken the action “but for” the protected activity. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
It is uncontested that Feist established the first two elements of her prima facie case. She participated in a protected activity when she filed complaints with the EEOC, and the dismissal constitutes an adverse action. The question before this Court is whether there is any evidence of the third element, a causal connection between the activity and the adverse action.
A plaintiff alleging retaliation may satisfy the causal connection element by showing “[c]lose timing between an employee's protected activity and an adverse action against him.” McCoy, 492 F.3d at 562. Such temporal proximity must generally be “very close.” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Wilkerson v. Boomerang Tube, LLC
...Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 701 (2012); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 46 (2003); Feist v. La. Dep't of Justice, 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013); Milton v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice, 707 F.3d 570, 572 (5th Cir. 2013); Atkins v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 667, 675 (5th Cir......
-
Gerald v. Univ. of S. Miss.
...known by USM; and (3) USM failed to make reasonable accommodations for the known limitations. See Feist v. La., Dep't of Justice, Office of the Attorney Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013). Unless "the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable accommodations" are open ......
-
T.B. v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist.
...and district courts have applied Nassarto ADA retaliation claims, and we do as well. See, e.g., Feist v. La., Dep't of Justice, Office of Att'y Gen.,730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir.2013); E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co.,782 F.3d 753, 767 (6th Cir.2015)(en banc); Staley v. Gruenberg,575 Fed.Appx. 153,......
-
Dugger v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ.
...that the employer denied his request for a reasonable accommodation. Washburn , 504 F.3d at 509 ; Feist v. La., Dep't of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen. , 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) ; Griffin v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 661 F.3d 216, 222 (5th Cir. 2011) ; Jenkins v. Cleco Power,......
-
An Onerous Burden: the Impact of Nassar Upon Mcdonnell Douglas in the Eleventh Circuit
...causation at the prima facie stage on summary judgment or at trial indirectly through temporal proximity." Id.61. Feist v. Louisiana, 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013).62. Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015); Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., ......
-
Chapter § 3-5 § 1630.5. Limiting, Segregating, and Classifying
...§ 12112(b)(1) deals only with physical segregation, not segregation by job assignments). The concept embodied in Feist v. Louisiana, 730 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2013) (see discussion below) is gaining traction and being expanded. • Hill v. Assocs. for Renewal in Educ., Inc., No. 12-0823 (JDB), 2......