Felder v. Henson

• Decision Date: 11 September 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:13-cv-01622-AWI-JLT (PC)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: ANTHONY E. FELDER, Plaintiff, v. HENSON, et al., Defendants.

ANTHONY E. FELDER, Plaintiff,
v.
HENSON, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01622-AWI-JLT (PC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

September 11, 2015

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEFENDANTS' TO GRANT MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(Docs. 21, 32)

21-DAY DEADLINE

In this action, Plaintiff seeks to impose liability against Defendants Henson, Amaro, Gibson, Kruse, Kuckenbaker, Morgan, Villaba, and Hill for excessive use of force and deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment ("Felder I").

I. Procedural History

On March 4, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on arguments that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit and for failure to state a cognizable claim. (Doc. 21, MTD.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to which Defendants replied. (Docs. 25, 29.)¹ Plaintiff filed a surreply² without authorization of the Court and, therefore, it is not considered. (Doc. 32.)

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On April 3, 2014, the Ninth Circuit decided Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2013). Albino held that challenges to exhaustion of administrative remedies should be brought in a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than as an unenumerated motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). On May 13, 2014, Defendants filed a motion withdrawing the portion of their motion that pertained to the exhaustion issue and their request to proceed on the remainder of their motion was granted.³ (Docs. 33, 34.) Thus, only the portion of Defendants' motion that challenges whether Plaintiff has stated cognizable claims is addressed at this time.

Further, on June 16, 2015, Defendants filed a notice of related case which indicated that Plaintiff was asserting similar facts and claims to those in this case in another action -- Felder v. Lakshmi, et al., USDC, Eastern District of California, No. 1:14-cv-00291-DLB ("Felder II"). (Doc. 36.) Upon review and consideration, that action was consolidated with the present case. (Doc. 37) At the time of consolidation, pending in Felder II, was Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) and Plaintiff's motion to amend (Doc. 17) -- upon which briefing was completed and/or time for briefing had passed so as to be deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(1). Defendants' motion to dismiss and Plaintiff's motion to amend in Felder II, are briefly addressed herein for completeness and in fairness to all parties. The Court will recommend the motion to dismiss be granted and that Plaintiff be granted leave to file an amended, consolidated complaint in which he can attempt to correct the deficiencies in the allegations he raised in both actions.

II. Legal Standards -- Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Dismissal is proper if there is a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1762 (2012). In resolving a 12(b)(6) motion, a court's review is generally limited to the operative pleading. Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir.

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2007); Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2006); Schneider v. California Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); Conservation Force, 646 F.3d at 1242; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court must accept well-pled factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998; Sanders, 504 F.3d at 910; Huynh, 465 F.3d at 996-97; Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000). Prisoners proceeding pro se are still entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

Further, "[i]f there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both of which are plausible, plaintiff's complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216-17. "Plaintiff's complaint may be dismissed only when defendant's plausible alternative explanation is so convincing that plaintiff's explanation is implausible. The standard at this stage of the litigation is not that plaintiff's explanation must be true or even probable. The factual allegations of the complaint need only 'plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'" Id. (emphasis in original). "Rule 8(a) 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' to support the allegations." Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added in Starr).

III. Discussion

A. Felder I

Defendants raise two arguments upon which they assert the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims: that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently link the named Defendants to his factual allegations (Doc. 21-2, MTD, 6:7-7:8); and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim based on lack of a causal

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relationship (id., at 7:9-8:14).

1. Plaintiff's Allegations

All of Plaintiff's allegations are found on page three of the 1stAC. The complaint reads⁴:

IV. Statement of Claim
On May 16, 2013, I arrived to Avenal State Prison From Chuckwalla Valley State Prison. Upon my arrival I was detained by the Defendants I named in III Defendants (A) & (B) informing me that They Had reason to believe that I was in possession of contraband. My response was that you have the wrong inmate. Not soon after making this statement I was Being physically forced to the ground and punched in the right side of my neck. Out of fear of my safety I started yelling so other inmates could witness the excessive force and attack against me. I was also given 2 sedation shots 1 - Haldol 1 - Benadryl and then I was terrorized and illegally intterogated and was made to sign paper while drugged by Sgt. Amaro and ISU Gibson! All the Defendants was involved and present in this incident.

V. Relief
As a result of the defendants assault and terrorist act against me I continue to suffer painfully and emotionally damage which was documented by doctors at Avenal and Soledad State Prison. For my neck; both wrist and my right knee damage im asking to be granted 1,000,000 million dollars for compensatory damages and im seeking punitive damages against the defendants to punish The guards for assaulting me, illegal interrogation and For The Terrorist Act committed against me By All defendants in my claim.

2. Defendants' Motion

a. Linkage

Defendants argue that that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently link the named Defendants to his factual allegations. (Doc. 21-2, MTD, 6:7-7:8.)

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a

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constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights.

Upon initial screening, it appeared that Plaintiff may not know which specific Defendant(s) engaged in the attack and which Defendant(s) were present and watched -- which is not implausible under the situation alleged. Plaintiff's allegations clearly describe an attack while he was being received for placement in Avenal State Prison and were found cognizable under the lenient standards that are to be afforded to pro se inmate Plaintiffs. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Further, his allegations contained "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a), which ". . ....