Felice v. Weinman
| Decision Date | 03 February 1964 |
| Docket Number | 124,Nos. 123,s. 123 |
| Parties | Ernest FELICE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Joseph WEINMAN, Defendant and Appellee. Vartkes HAROUTUNIAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Joseph WEINMAN, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Renne, Peres, Powell & Carr, Pontiac, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Howlett, Hartman & Beier, Pontiac, Kenneth B. McConnell, Pontiac, of counsel, for defendant and appellee.
Before the Entire Bench.
September 28, 1960 a car driven by plaintiff Felice and occupied by plaintiff Haroutunian was struck from the rear by a car owned and driven by defendant Weinman. Alleging that each had suffered personal injury, Felice and Haroutunian sued Weinman separately. Over objection of plaintiffs, the 2 suits were ordered consolidated for trial. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff Felice in the sum of $451 and a verdict for plaintiff Haroutunian in the sum of $601. Judgments upon such verdicts were entered. Plaintiffs appeal.
During the trial counsel for defendant openly injected these questions: (a) Whether one of the plaintiffs had 'received insurance benefits as a result of this accident' and (b) Whether on a collateral occasion one of the plaintiffs had presented a false claim under a certain policy of fire insurance. Finally, during argument to the jury, counsel for defendant told the jury that he represented 'the Auto Club.' Four of the jurors, as shown by answered questionnaires on file and statement in the record by the trial judge, 'had Auto Club insurance.'
No matter how any counsel may dress up his excuse for having brought forth--directly or indirectly by questioning of witnesses or by statement in the presence of the jury--the fact that an invisible defendant stands behind one or the other or both of the parties at bar, he must be judged guilty of having violated a standing rule of court this Court is trying to enforce. By this time surely, counsel should know better. For amplification, see Darr v. Buckley, 355 Mich. 392, 94 N.W.2d 837.
The ban of the rule is written in simple English. It applies to plaintiffs and defendants--and to their respective counsel--with equal force. Violation thereof places counsel in position where, the point having been timely raised and saved, he must by persuasive showing overcome a presumption that what occurred, whether intentional or otherwise, was prejudicially improper. There is no such showing here, nor could there be. It follows that plaintiffs' second motion for mistrial, made prior to return of verdicts by the jury, should--then and there--have been granted.
To conclude: The question before this Court, distinguished from court and jury below, is not whether the 2 plaintiffs have conspired together to amerce the defendant's insurer. That may or may not be true.* The question instead is whether the record discloses...
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Guerrero v. Smith, Docket No. 277983.
...error. Id. It is true that attorneys must avoid injecting the issue of insurance coverage and benefits into trial. Felice v. Weinman, 372 Mich. 278, 280, 126 N.W.2d 107 (1964); Kokinakes v. British Leyland, Ltd., 124 Mich.App. 650, 652, 335 N.W.2d 114 (1983). "[O]ur prior cases have made it......
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Fosness v. Panagos
...245 Mich. 97, 222 N.W. 83. Decision therein is conclusive of a holding of reversible error here.' Last year, in Felice v. Weinman, 372 Mich. 278, 126 N.W.2d 107, 1 said section 3030 was enforced again, that time against a defendant and his counsel. So, for the cases before us, the skilled t......
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Crenshaw v. Goza
...was not referred to again. There was clearly no flagrant violation of the spirit of the statute in this case. Felice v. Weinman, 372 Mich. 278, 126 N.W.2d 107 (1964), relied on by the defendant, is distinguishable factually because in that case defense counsel openly injected insurance ques......
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Lapasinskas v. Quick
...the issue of the father's negligence. Yet he deliberately and skillfully injected this impermissible argument. Cf. Felice v. Weinman (1964), 372 Mich. 278, 280, 126 N.W.2d 107. The plaintiff did what he could to protect himself. Anticipating the very argument that was made, he had sought th......