Feliciano-Hernández v. Pereira-Castillo

Citation663 F.3d 527
Decision Date09 December 2011
Docket NumberNo. 11–1052.,11–1052.
PartiesAngel Luis FELICIANO–HERNÁNDEZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Miguel A. PEREIRA–CASTILLO, Former Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and Director of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Jane Doe; Conjugal Partnership Pereira–Doe; Víctor M. Rivera González, Former Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and Director of Corrections for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; Jane Doe # 2; Conjugal Partnership Rivera–Doe # 2; Zoé M. Laboy–Alvarado, Former Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and Director of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; John Doe; Conjugal Partnership Doe–Laboy; Nydia M. Cotto–Vives, Former Director of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; John Doe # 2; Conjugal Partnership Doe # 2–Cotto; Joseph Colón–Morales, Former Director of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; Jane Doe # 3; Conjugal Partnership Colón–Doe # 3; Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Facilities Superintendents John Poe # 1 Through # 5, Defendants, Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Federico Lora–López, with whom José J. Nazario De La Rosa was on brief, for appellant.

Carlos Lugo–Fiol, with whom Irene S. Soroeta–Kodesh, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, Leticia Casalduc–Rabell, Deputy Solicitor General, and Zaira Z. Girón–Anadón, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellees Zoé M. Laboy–Alvarado and Víctor M. Rivera–González.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Chief Judge.

In 1981, Angel Luis Feliciano–Hernández, a habitual offender with a record of sexual abuse and rape, was convicted of crimes and sentenced by a Puerto Rico court to a term of perpetual imprisonment for treatment until his rehabilitation, to last a minimum of twelve years. That twelve-year minimum sentence ended in 1993, and Feliciano–Hernández was not released from prison until 2008, fifteen years later.

On June 23, 2009, Feliciano–Hernández brought suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants are five named former Secretaries of the Puerto Rico Department of Corrections and their spouses and conjugal partnerships, as well as five unnamed Superintendents of prison facilities in the Commonwealth, identified as John Poe defendants.

The complaint alleged that the defendant officials had incarcerated Feliciano–Hernández beyond the lawful term of his imprisonment, asserting that this violated the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint sought compensatory damages in excess of $5 million and punitive damages in excess of $2 million.

On motion, the district court dismissed the complaint as to all defendants, in a thoughtful opinion and order, under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Feliciano Hernández v. Pereira Castillo, Civ. No. 09–1569, 2010 WL 3372527 (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010). After the complaint was dismissed and judgment was entered on August 24, 2010, Feliciano–Hernández on September 6, 2010, filed a motion for reconsideration and for leave to file an amended complaint, purportedly under Rules 52(b) and 59(a). The district court denied the motion by a short opinion and order, Feliciano Hernández v. Pereira Castillo, Civ. No. 09–1569, 2010 WL 5072567 (D.P.R. Dec. 8, 2010), and this appeal followed.

We hold that the complaint failed to state a claim under the pleading standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration, including denying leave to file a belated amended complaint. We affirm the dismissal.

I.

The following facts are taken from Feliciano–Hernández's complaint of June 23, 2009, the 1982 opinion of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico affirming his underlying conviction, People v. Feliciano Hernández, 13 P.R. Offic. Trans. 481, 113 P.R. Dec. 371 (1982), and the 2008 order of the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance regarding plaintiff's petition for a Puerto Rico writ of habeas corpus, People v. Feliciano Hernández, Crim. No. G 80 605 606 (P.R.Ct. of First Instance Apr. 25, 2008). We treat as true the well-pleaded facts in the complaint. SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 438 (1st Cir.2010) (en banc). We also consider other Puerto Rico court documents on which plaintiff relied.

On April 14, 1981, a Puerto Rico court sentenced Feliciano–Hernández for his convictions on two counts of committing lewd and indecent acts, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 4067; two counts of aggravated restraint of liberty, id. § 4172; and one count of unlawful carrying and use of a weapon, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 25, § 414, as the law then stood. Feliciano–Hernández had also been charged with attempt to commit rape, but the court ordered acquittal of that count. The court took judicial notice of Feliciano–Hernández's two previous convictions for rape and one conviction each for repeated rape and for attempt to commit statutory rape. It sentenced him as a habitual offender to [p]erpetual imprisonment, for treatment until his social rehabilitation is accomplished” and “adjudged that the minimum imprisonment [would] be 12 years.”

We do not repeat the complaint's allegations that Feliciano–Hernández took steps while in prison to rehabilitate himself because they are not material to the ultimate issues in this case. We focus on the allegations which are pertinent to whether the individual defendants were ever given or put on adequate notice of the claims that Feliciano–Hernández must be released under the terms of his original sentence, so as to support a § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to a violation of constitutional rights.

After his minimum sentence was completed in 1993, the Parole Board reviewed Feliciano–Hernández's case annually, and each year it denied his request for parole. The complaint alleges that each year the Parole Board did not “notify the Administration of Correction of the nature of the plaintiff's sentence and of his rights to be released from imprisonment.” Feliciano–Hernández does not claim that he personally provided the Department of Corrections or any particular official with such notice. In 1996 he was reclassified to minimal custody status, which he maintained until his release.

In 1998, Feliciano–Hernández filed a pro se pleading with a Puerto Rico court requesting a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release. The court entered an order on June 23, 1998, requiring the Department of Corrections to explain the reasons for Feliciano–Hernández's continued incarceration in light of the April 14, 1981 judgment. The Department of Corrections opposed the habeas petition and informed the court that Feliciano–Hernández's case was before the Parole Board. The court denied the request for habeas relief.

On August 16, 1998, the Parole Board again denied Feliciano–Hernández's request for parole and again did not give the Department of Corrections notice of the nature of his sentence and his right to be released.

The complaint alleges, without subsidiary factual support, that during 2003 and 2004 unnamed employees of the Department of Corrections informed their unnamed supervisors of Feliciano–Hernández's unlawful incarceration and noted specifically that he had been imprisoned in excess of twenty-two years, he had been in “minimum custody” for eight years, he did not require further therapy, and his work was uninterrupted and satisfactory. There is no allegation that any of the individual named or John Poe defendants were so notified and there are no supporting facts as to any such notice.

Feliciano–Hernández alleges that the Department of Corrections' records indicated that he was imprisoned for rape or attempted rape, which adversely affected his evaluations, rights, and privileges during his incarceration. While he did have prior convictions for those crimes, which led to his categorization as a habitual offender, the offenses for which he was sentenced in 1981 did not themselves include rape or attempted rape. To address this mischaracterization issue, in 2005 Feliciano–Hernández initiated pro se mandamus proceedings in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, moving the court to order the Department of Corrections to correct its records to show Feliciano–Hernández was not incarcerated for rape or attempted rape. The court granted the petition and so ordered. There is no allegation that the Department of Corrections failed to comply with the court order. Nor is there any allegation that Feliciano–Hernández sought as relief release from prison or asserted any constitutional claim. In his federal complaint, Feliciano–Hernández alleges, without further support, that the Department of Corrections “nevertheless” continued to deny him his rights and privileges under the reasoning that he had been sentenced to “perpetual imprisonment.”

Feliciano–Hernández filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance in Mayagüez on May 29, 2007.1 That petition also did not assert any constitutional claim. Instead, it evidently claimed that Feliciano–Hernández had been rehabilitated and that annual evaluations of his progress toward rehabilitation had never taken place. On April 25, 2008, the court, after hearing testimony, accepted the recommendation of counsel and of “the Public Ministry” that Feliciano–Hernández be transferred to a halfway house within thirty days, that he remain there for no less than six months and no longer than a year, and that he be referred to the Pre–Release Services to assist him with reintegration into the community. He was also ordered to register with the Sexual Offender Registry and to complete...

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