Felin v. City Of Philadelphia.

• Decision Date: 27 May 1946
• Parties: FELIN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

354 Pa. 317
47 A.2d 227

FELIN
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 27, 1946.

Appeal No. 79, January term, 1946, from order of Court of Common Pleas No. 4, Philadelphia County, No. 2423, December term, 1944; Brown, Jr., Judge.

The Board of Revision of Taxes of the City of Philadelphia assessed the land of Charles F. Felin at $30,800 for the year 1945. An appeal was sustained and the assessment reduced to $30,000. Exceptions were dismissed, and from the order of the common pleas court confirming the action of the trial judge, Charles F. Felin appeals.

Affirmed.

47 A.2d 228

Before MAXEY, C. J., and DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON, and STEARNE, Jj.

Samuel I. Sacks, of Philadelphia, for appellant.

Frank F. Truscott, City Sol., Michael D. Hayes, Asst. City Sol., and Joseph H. Lieberman, Sol., all of Philadelphia, for Board of Revision of Taxes.

DREW, Justice.

The Board of Revision of Taxes assessed appellant's acreage, at Dungan Road and Cottman Street, in the 35th Ward of the City of Philadelphia, at $30,800 for the year 1945. An appeal was sustained and the assessment reduced to $30,000. Exceptions were dismissed, and from the order of the court below confirming the action of the learned trial judge this appeal was taken.

Appellant contends the court erred when on direct examination, after plaintiff's expert had testified that in determining the value of plaintiff's property he had given weight to the sale of another property of approximately the same size in the immediate neighborhood in April, 1944 (which was six months prior to the assessment), it refused to allow the witness to state the sale price of that property.

It was not error to refuse to admit such testimony. The trial judge correctly stated the settled law of this Commonwealth as follows: ‘* * * it is not competent to prove by an expert witness the prices paid for other properties in the immediate neighborhood on direct examination, but he may be asked to state such prices, for the purpose of testing his credibility, good faith, and the accuracy and extent of his knowledge, on cross-examination, and interrogated thereabout, when the cross-examination opens the door, upon redirect examination. Brown v. City of Scranton, 231 Pa. 593, 603, 604, 80 A. 1113; Girard Trust Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 248 Pa. 179, 182, 183, 93 A. 974; Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives, etc., v. City of Philadelphia, 268 Pa. 559, 562, 564, 112 A. 76; McSorley v. School Dist. of Avalon...