Felix v. Hall-Brooke Sanitarium, HALL-BROOKE

• Decision Date: 15 December 1953
• Docket Number: HALL-BROOKE
• Citation: 140 Conn. 496,101 A.2d 500
• Parties: FELIX v.SANITARIUM. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 500

101 A.2d 500

140 Conn. 496

FELIX v. HALL-BROOKE SANITARIUM.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 15, 1953.

James F. Rosen and Louise Untermyer Wit, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).

John E. McNerney, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, were Francis J. Moran and Albert R. Moquet, New Haven, for appellee (defendant).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN QUINLAN and WYNNE, JJ.

O'SULLIVAN, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages under a complaint alleging a cause of action for assault and battery and one for false imprisonment. The answer was in the nature of a general denial. After the parties had rested, the court, upon motion, directed a verdict for the defendant upon the cause of action for false imprisonment but submitted to the jury the cause for assault and battery. They returned a defendant's verdict. The plaintiff has appealed.

We first dispose of the assignment of error attacking the partial direction of the verdict. Technically, the direction of a verdict is not in itself a ground of error. The question whether such action was warranted may be raised only by attacking a denial of a motion to set aside the directed verdict. Practice Book, §§ 381, 377. Because of the peculiar circumstances in this case, however, we will discuss the propriety of the court's action even though the matter has not been properly raised.

In testing the correctness of the court's action, we must consider the evidence in the aspect most favorable to the plaintiff. Burley v. Davis, 132 Conn. 631, 634, 46 A.2d 417; Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc., § 117. Evidence of that character, as it relates to the cause of action for false imprisonment, establishes, for the present purpose, the following facts: The defendant corporation conducts a sanitarium at Westport for the care of the mentally ill. On August 30, 1947, the plaintiff was seen professionally at Bethlehem by Dr. Rogowski, a specialist in mental diseases. As a result of his diagnosis, the doctor decided to send the plaintiff to the defendant for treatment. After first telephoning to the institution to make arrangements for the plaintiff's care, the doctor wrote out an emergency certificate of commitment of the plaintiff on a form provided by the Connecticut state department of health. The certificate recited: 'Charles Felix * * * is in need of immediate treatment in a hospital for mental diseases for the following reasons: Patient is hypomanic with grandiose ideas. He is irritable and headstrong and liable to get into serious trouble.' After the doctor had signed the certificate and had sworn before competent authority, to the truth of the matters contained therein, it was given to Robert Schnitman, the plaintiff's son-in-law. On the following day, that is, on August 31, 1947, Schnitman, accompanied by several members of the plaintiff's family, took the plaintiff by automobile from Bethlehem to the defendant's institution and turned him over to some of the defendant's employees, after delivering to the one in charge the emergency certificate executed by the doctor. The plaintiff was kept at the institution until he was released on September 21, 1947.

The court was correct in directing the verdict because of the plaintiff's inability to prove the elements of false imprisonment. Speaking broadly, false imprisonment is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another. 1 Swift's Digest 494; 22 Am.Jur. 353; see McGann v. Allen, 105 Conn. 177, 187, 134 A. 810; Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235, 255, 39 A. 169, 39 L.R.A. 353. The physical restraint imposed upon the plaintiff was not unlawful. The defendant was fully protected, by virtue of the statute then in effect, from any successful claim of false imprisonment. General Statutes, Rev.1930, § 1732, as amended by Cum.Sup.1935, § 676c. Under the provisions of that statute, any person who, like the plaintiff, has suddenly become in need of care and treatment in a hospital for mental illness may be 'confined in such hospital, either public or private, for not more than thirty days without order of any court.' The statute further provides that '[a]t the time of delivery of such person to such hospital, there shall be left, in the hands of the person in charge thereof, a certificate signed and sworn to by some reputable physician not more than three days prior thereto, stating that, after a personal examination made not more than three days prior to the date of such certificate, he is of the opinion that the person therein named is in need of immediate treatment and the reasons therefor.' While there is no express provision that the receipt of such a certificate is lawful authority for holding the person delivered at the institution, it is necessarily to be implied in view of the language used and of the purpose which the legislature sought to attain. See Hannan v. Administrator, 137 Conn. 240, 244, 75 A.2d 483, 21 A.L.R.2d 1068. Since the emergency certificate met all the conditions prescribed by the statute, its delivery to the defendant carried immunity from an action for false imprisonment.

The plaintiff assigns further error in the refusal of the court to grant permission to file a motion to set the verdict aside. A motion of that nature 'must be filed with the clerk within twenty-four hours, exclusive of such days as the clerk's office is not required to be open for at least two hours, after the verdict is accepted.' Practice Book, § 233. The rule further provides that 'for good cause the court may extend this time.' Ibid. The verdict in the case at bar was returned and accepted on December 11, 1952. On December 24, 1952, the plaintiff, who had discharged his counsel directly after the trial had been concluded, engaged a new one. The latter immediately filed a motion seeking an extension of the twenty-four hour limitation provided in the rule. The 'good cause' for which the extension was requested was the alleged illness of trial counsel on the day when and on the day after the verdict had been accepted. At a hearing held on January 2, 1953, trial counsel, who was called by the plaintiff, denied that he had been ill as alleged. No other testimony was offered on the matter. The court thereupon denied the plaintiff's motion. The finding of good cause lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge. Aubrey v. Meriden, 121 Conn. 361, 365, 185 A. 87. In view of the failure of the plaintiff to prove the sole ground advanced by him as a reason for extending the time limitation within which to file a motion to set the verdict aside, there was obviously no abuse by the court of its discretion.

Another assignment of error is addressed to what the plaintiff maintains was the prejudicial attitude which marked the conduct of the trial judge. An assignment of this nature is one not lightly to be made or summarily to be disposed of. Because of the gravity of the accusation, which strikes at the very core of judicial integrity and tends to undermine public confidence in the established judiciary, we have examined the record with infinite care,...