Felker v. Bartelme

• Decision Date: 21 April 1970
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 53379
• Parties: Marilyn FELKER, Adm. of Est. of Frank S. Felker, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C. M. BARTELME, d/b/a Bartelme's Tavern, and Harold Feigenholtz, Trustee, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 74

260 N.E.2d 74

124 Ill.App.2d 43

Marilyn FELKER, Adm. of Est. of Frank S. Felker, deceased Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C. M. BARTELME, d/b/a Bartelme's Tavern, and Harold Feigenholtz, Trustee, Defendants-Appellees.

Gen. No. 53379.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

April 21, 1970.

Hurford, Feigenholtz & Busch, Gerrard & Gerrard, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

James D. Griffith, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

McCORMICK, Presiding Justice.

A suit was brought by Marilyn Felker, as administrator of the estate of her husband, Frank S. Felker, deceased. The suit grew out of a collision of an automobile driven by Warthen L. K. Hobbs and the Felker vehicle on February 8, 1963, at about 8:45 p.m. As a result of the collision Felker was killed, and his wife, as administrator of his estate, brought an action against Hobbs under the Wrongful Death Act, and against C. M. Bartelme, d/b/a Bartelme's Tavern, and Harold Feigenholtz, trustee, the fee owner of the tavern property, under the Dram Shop Act. At the close of plaintiff's case the defendants' motion for a directed verdict was granted. This appeal questions the propriety of that action of the trial court.

The collision occurred near an unregulated 'T' intersection at Dundee and Landwehr Roads in Cook County. Hobbs' westbound car was turning south when the Felker automobile, traveling east, struck it. Hobbs said he had been in the tavern about half an hour during which time he had purchased and consumed two shots of whisky and had shared a 12-ounce bottle of beer with his wife. According to Police Officer Arlie Page, Hobbs said he drank his wife's drink when she went into the washroom, but Hoobs denied having taken the drink and denied having told Officer Page he did.

Hobbs testified that the road on which the accident occurred was a two-lane road, with one lane going in each direction, and that it was dry on the evening in question. The speed limit on Dundee Road was 55 miles per hour. Hobbs testified that he put on his left turn signal as he approached Landwehr Road and 'saw a car coming from the West, perhaps half a mile away. I was watching that car all the time until the collision. Two seconds before I got hit I saw a second car in the eastbound lane.' This 'second car' was Felker's which collided with Hobbs'.

Officer Page arrived at the scene of the accident within minutes. In his testimony he said, 'Hobbs told me he turned into a driveway instead of Landwehr Road and that he saw no oncoming headlights when he started to turn.' He also testified that Hobbs had told him he 'believed' he had his left turn signal on as he approached Landwehr Road.

Another police officer, J. D. Mills, testified he had a conversation with Hobbs at the hospital the morning after the accident, at which time Hobbs had admitted that while at home he had half a pint of whisky and a quart of beer, both of which he shared with his wife. The court informed the jury that that statement was binding only on the defendant who made it, and was not admissible against the tavern owner or operator. Later, the judge indicated he was not considering that testimony in his ruling on the motion for a directed verdict.

Kyle Simpson testified that he and his wife were traveling east on Dundee Road on the night in question and saw the collision. He stated: 'Immediately before the collision an eastbound car passed us approximately 500 feet west of Landwehr Road. I was going about 30 miles per hour at that time. There was also a westbound car in the center of Dundee Road. The eastbound car was going at a very high excessive rate of speed. I did not notice any directional signals being given by the westbound car.' Simpson later said he had told a police officer he had no idea how fast the car was traveling when it passed him; that before the eastbound (Felker) car reached the intersection at Landwehr it was back in the eastbound lane; and that the speed of the Felker car could have been '55 miles an hour and could have been 80 miles an hour. I would have no idea of what the speed of that car was * * * The speed limit was 55 miles an hour. The speed of the Chevrolet (Felker car) could have been 53 miles an hour.'

The question before this court is whether there existed an issue of fact which should have been submitted to the jury. In their brief the defendants assert: 'No evidence was introduced with regard to the condition of sobriety of Warthen L. K. Hobbs at/or prior to the accident at 8:45 P.M. Mr. Hobbs was not asked on cross-examination about his condition nor was anyone else asked to testify who had observed it.' We cannot agree that there was 'no evidence' regarding the issue of Hobbs' sobriety at the time of the accident. There was evidence that he had consumed alcoholic beverages at the tavern, but such testimony would not raise a jury question as to the issue of intoxication, since the single fact that one has drunk alcohol does not permit the conclusion that he was drunk.

We do not agree with the plaintiff when he says that Illinois cases have held that the mere drinking of alcohol raises a jury question as to intoxication. The plaintiff has cited Nystrom v. Bub, 36 Ill.App.2d 333, 184 N.E.2d 273; Osborn v. Leuffgen, 381 Ill. 295, 45 N.E.2d 622; Davis v. Oettle, 43 Ill.App.2d 149, 193 N.E.2d 111; and Matkins v. Fenorsky, 348 Ill.App. 125, 108 N.E.2d 373, as supporting the proposition that the issue of intoxication is made out simply by showing that the alleged intoxicant drank alcohol, but in fact, none of those cases stands for that proposition. In each of them there was evidence that the alleged intoxicant had drunk alcohol, plus evidence of unusual behavior, or opinion evidence that defendant was drunk. Under those circumstances a jury would be entitled to conclude that the defendant was drunk.

In Fenorsky the defendant said he had felt 'groggy' after leaving the tavern; he moved slowly and felt heavy, conditions he had not experienced before drinking. In Oettle the court noted at page 151, 193 N.E.2d at page 112: 'A number of witnesses testified that immedidately following the accident they observed Frank Emery and he was apparently intoxicated. These witnesses included a Doctor who treated Emery for his injuries at the hospital. There was no evidence to the effect that Emery was not intoxicated.' In Leuffgen the alleged intoxicant had been sitting at a bar for some time with glasses and bottles in front of him; the bartender was partially intoxicated; and two games of dice broke up with angry quarreling followed by the alleged intoxicant's vicious assault on the decedent. The court found these facts as circumstances tending to prove intoxication.

In Bub a witness to the accident testified as to the condition of the alleged intoxicant by saying: '* * * I have an opinion as to whether he was intoxicated or not. My opinion is I think he was drinking quite heavily and was drunk.' (At page 341, 184 N.E.2d at page 276.) A registered nurse who appeared at the scene of the accident expressed the opinion that the defendant was intoxicated. These statements, together with the proof that the defendant had consumed some alcoholic beverages prior to the accident were considered sufficient to warrant a finding that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident.

There are at least two elements involved in a Dram Shop action as to proof of intoxication; one must show that the alleged intoxicant consumed alcohol, and must present independent evidence showing that he was in fact intoxicated. It is not sufficient, as plaintiff...