Fell v. Spokane Transit Authority

• Decision Date: 29 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 61385-1,61385-1
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: , 5 A.D. Cases 584 Evelyn FELL; Jean Toews; Dianna Bailey; Don Howley; Hazel Proost; Richard Arundell; Paul Clements; Howard Bolton; and Coalition of the Responsibly Disabled, Respondents, v. SPOKANE TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a municipal corporation, Appellant.

Page 618

128 Wn.2d 618

911 P.2d 1319, 5 A.D. Cases 584

Evelyn FELL; Jean Toews; Dianna Bailey; Don Howley;

Hazel Proost; Richard Arundell; Paul Clements;

Howard Bolton; and Coalition of the

Responsibly Disabled, Respondents, v. SPOKANE TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a municipal corporation, Appellant.

No. 61385-1.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Feb. 29, 1996.

Reconsideration Denied May 9, 1996.

Perkins Coie, Thomas F. Kingen, James P. McNeill, III, Spokane, for appellant

Lonnie G. Davis, Seattle, Lawrence Weiser, Spokane, for respondents.

TALMADGE, Justice.

The Spokane Transit Authority (STA), a public transit agency, adopted a new plan for paratransit service for the disabled and the elderly in 1992. The

                plan apparently complied with the specific provisions on paratransit[911 P.2d 1321]  services set forth in the Federal Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA).  Although the overwhelming majority of users of paratransit services continued to receive services under the new plan, the plaintiff class did not.  They sued for an injunction prohibiting implementation of the new plan, claiming discrimination against the disabled in violation of RCW 49.60.215.  On summary judgment, the trial court ruled the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their claim for discrimination in public accommodations under our State's antidiscrimination law because STA failed to demonstrate that the service was "no longer reasonably possible."   Because the trial court failed to incorporate comparability of treatment into its analysis under RCW 49.60.215, we reverse and remand the case for trial
                

ISSUES

1. What is a place of public accommodation under RCW 49.60.215?

2. What is the test to establish a claim of discrimination in a place of public accommodation under RCW 49.60.215?

3. Did the trial court here err in granting summary judgment to plaintiffs under RCW 49.60.215 where the paratransit plan established by STA conformed to the requirements of ADA and the plaintiffs did not establish as a matter of law that they had not been treated in a fashion comparable to nondisabled persons?

FACTS

Prior to 1992, the STA offered paratransit service, an arranged service for aged and disabled persons, throughout In 1991, Congress passed the ADA. STA then began development of a comprehensive paratransit plan to conform with the provisions of ADA. STA involved the public in the adoption of the plan through a core committee, extensive public workshops and public hearings, and televised public hearings. STA sent notices to individuals affected by the proposed plan. ¹ Ultimately, STA adopted a new paratransit plan on January 23, 1992, providing for paratransit services within an area three-quarters of a mile around the fixed routes already operated by STA, with certain exceptions to that rule. The service was provided only to those who were unable to utilize the fixed route system; age or disability alone did not entitle a person to paratransit service. Ninety-nine percent of the people previously using paratransit services were served under STA's new paratransit plan.

its service area. Paratransit service was STA's most expensive service; fares accounted for only five percent of the actual cost of the service. Though paratransit service costs more to operate than fixed route service, paratransit users paid a lesser fare than fixed route customers.

The STA paratransit plan conformed to the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations adopted pursuant to the ADA. ² (Clerk's Papers at 283.)

Apart from a van pool service operated by private citizens with STA equipment, STA made no specific provision for service to nondisabled individuals residing outside of the area of the fixed routes operated by STA. The van pool was available to the disabled. Further, STA made a significant effort to provide an accessible fleet of buses within the corridors. ³

Although plaintiffs had the opportunity to participate, and did participate, in the deliberations of STA regarding the adoption of the paratransit plan, some 20 months after STA's adoption of the paratransit plan they filed suit for injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that STA's denial of direct paratransit service to them violated RCW 49.60 and WAC 162-26. ⁴ The parties stipulated to certain facts before the trial court, and the trial court granted a permanent injunction against STA's paratransit plan.

STA stipulated it had the physical and financial means to provide the service to plaintiffs. ⁵ The plaintiffs stipulated STA's actions were not arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiffs conceded the paratransit system provides greater service than that afforded the general public. (Clerk's Papers at 282.) Nevertheless, the trial court issued an injunction against STA's paratransit plan because, although STA's delineation of service corridors was within its authority and "pursuant to federal guidelines," STA

had failed to show the prior service was "no longer reasonably possible." ⁶

ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

It is well settled under Washington law that this court reviews a summary judgment de novo, treating all facts and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Tydings, 125 Wash.2d 337, 341, 883 P.2d 1383 (1994).

Notwithstanding the parties' stipulation, this court must determine if there were genuine issues of material fact below and the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). In fact, the parties' stipulation did not resolve the issues of material fact, facts upon which the outcome of this case (given the proper analytical framework) depended. Clements v. Travelers Indem. Co., 121 Wash.2d 243, 850 P.2d 1298 (1993). At least some of these questions of material fact were articulated below by the plaintiffs. ⁷

Moreover, plaintiffs never demonstrated that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the trial court improperly analyzed a case of disability discrimination in public accommodations under RCW 49.60.215. In particular, the trial court found that although STA complied with "federal guidelines" in its plan, it failed to show that prior service was no longer "reasonably possible." Nowhere in the entire jurisprudence of RCW 49.60 since its enactment in 1949 is such a legal standard to be found. A "reasonably possible" test for a case of discrimination in public accommodations is without precedent under Washington law, and creates a flawed analytical framework for deciding RCW 49.60.215 issues. In particular, the trial court's formulation of the test transforms an antidiscrimination statute into an entitlement statute and offers no principled limit to the reach of the statute. Our task is to formulate a workable analytical framework for a claim of disability discrimination in places of public accommodation under RCW 49.60.215.

B. WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

The starting point in the analysis of this case lies in the construction of the various statutes and regulations that apply to the decisionmaking of the STA with respect to service to disabled individuals. RCW 49.60.030 generally bans discrimination on the basis "of any sensory, mental, or physical disability." RCW 49.60 does not define "discrimination," ⁸ but RCW 49.60.030(1)(b) provides that the right to be free from discrimination extends to the "right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public The Human Rights Commission adopted regulations in WAC 162-26 to effectuate the policy of RCW 49.60, but did not adopt specific standards with respect to public transportation. ¹⁰ The Commission has approached this issue with only general standards on public accommodations. In WAC 162-26-060, the Commission stated that RCW 49.60.215 is best satisfied when disabled persons are treated as if they were not disabled, i.e., when the public entity provides "the same service" to the disabled as it provides to the nondisabled. ¹¹ The policy of RCW 49.60, however, can be satisfied where the same service is not

                resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement." 9  It is an unfair practice to discriminate in matters of public resort or accommodation "except for conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to all persons, regardless of ... the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability."   RCW 49.60.215.  RCW 49.60 is an antidiscrimination statute, as the Legislature stated in RCW 49.60.010
                provided, if "reasonable accommodation" is made for the disabled person's disability.  As a final, and least acceptable alternative, RCW 49.60 may be satisfied if an arranged service is offered for the disabled person.  WAC 162-26 specifically references sections 503 and 504 of the United States Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794, [911 P.2d 1324] but makes no reference to the ADA or the regulations adopted thereunder
                

C. THE ADA AND FEDERAL DOT REGULATIONS

In contrast to Washington's vague standards, the federal standards for treatment of the disabled are specific; they are more in the nature of entitlements. ADA's protection is not even conditioned upon a finding of "discrimination," as is true under RCW 49.60. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir.1995). ¹²

The ADA addresses discrimination in public transportation by requiring public transit agencies operating fixed route systems to provide paratransit and other special service transportation to disabled persons on a comparable level to the service provided for nondisabled users. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12143(a) (1995). ¹³

DOT adopted very explicit regulations to define precisely The ADA provides that local transit entities must provide paratransit services to the extent that providing such services would not impose an undue financial burden on such entities. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12143(c)(4) (1995). DOT regulations further refine...