Fellows v. Martin, 14055

• Decision Date: 01 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 14055,14055
• Citation: 584 A.2d 458,217 Conn. 57
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Dianne FELLOWS v. Marjorie MARTIN.

Page 458

584 A.2d 458

217 Conn. 57

Dianne FELLOWS v. Marjorie MARTIN.

No. 14055.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 27, 1990.

Decided Jan. 1, 1991.

Joel M. Ellis, with whom was Gregory J. Sherman, for appellant (defendant).

Lois Frankforter, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and BORDEN, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

The defendant tenant appeals from a judgment for the plaintiff landlord in a summary process action seeking possession of the leased premises for nonpayment of rent. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing to prevent the forfeiture of the lease on equitable grounds when the lessor's loss was small, the default slight, and the hardship to the tenant great. Although the tenant's appeal also raised five other issues, only one of these (the variance between the allegations in the complaint and the evidence offered by the landlord) was fully presented at trial. ¹ Because we reverse the decision on equitable grounds, we do not consider the merits of these other claims or their reviewability.

I

The trial court found the following facts. On March 4, 1983, the landlord leased a duplex apartment in East Hartford to the tenant for a term of ninety-nine years. The terms of the lease required the tenant to make a down payment in cash ($9900 ² paid at the execution of the lease), monthly payments for forty years on a promissory note ($419.57 per month), and monthly payments for the property tax ($54.48 per month) and insurance ($25.96 per month). ³ The lease also required the tenant to pay the landlord's actual costs of exterior maintenance. The trial court found that the total amount of "rent" due was $500.01. ⁴ The tenant withheld $25 from her rent check in April, 1988, because of a dispute over her parking accommodations. The landlord served the tenant with a notice to quit and commenced a summary process action to evict her from the premises.

The trial court rejected the tenant's special defenses of estoppel, based on the landlord's prior acceptance of amounts less than the full amount of rent, and satisfaction, based on the prior payment of $9900. In addition to her special defenses, the tenant also raised two counterclaims, seeking, inter alia, "[d]enial of the summary process action on equitable grounds." Counsel agreed at oral argument, and the transcript and trial briefs clearly show, that the trial court heard and considered the tenant's arguments in equity.

II

As a threshold matter, we must decide whether the tenant was entitled to raise an equitable defense or counterclaim in a summary process action. We last considered this issue forty-five years ago in Atlantic Refining Co. v. O'Keefe, 131 Conn. 528, 531, 41 A.2d 109 (1945), when we held that neither equitable nor legal counterclaims were available in summary process actions. ⁵ When Atlantic Refining Co. was decided, however, summary process actions were still decided by justices of the peace in the "justice courts," which did not have jurisdiction over equitable issues. ⁶ Giering v. Hartford Theological Seminary, 86 Conn. 208, 212, 84 A. 930 (1912). Summary process defendants at that time could not, therefore, raise equitable defenses, but could and did bring separate actions in equity to enjoin the prosecution of summary process actions. ⁷

In the years since Atlantic Refining Co., the legislature abolished the justice courts; Public Acts 1959, No. 28, §§ 130, 204; and, in 1978, created the housing docket of the Superior Court. Public Acts 1978, No. 78-365. In addition to hearing summary process actions; General Statutes §§ 47a-68(a), 51-165; "housing court" judges hear actions on a wide range of "housing matters" including administrative appeals, building code violations and "[a]ll actions for back rent, damages, return of security deposits and other relief arising out of the parties' relationship as landlord and tenant or owner and occupant." General Statutes § 47a-68(c), (f), (h).

After the creation of the housing docket in 1978, numerous Connecticut courts have concluded that defendants in summary process actions may raise equitable defenses and counterclaims, including the equitable doctrine against forfeitures. Morin v. DiMarco, 18 Conn.App. 417, 557 A.2d 1287 (1989); Tartaglia v. R.A.C. Corporation, 15 Conn.App. 492, 545 A.2d 573, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 810, 548 A.2d 443 (1988); Elliott v. South Isle Food Corporation, 6 Conn.App. 373, 506 A.2d 147 (1986); 750 Main Street Associates v. Specter, 5 Conn.App. 170, 497 A.2d 96 (1985); Mobilia, Inc. v. Santos, 4 Conn.App. 128, 492 A.2d 544 (1985); Filosi v. Hawkins, 1 Conn.App. 634, 635 n. 1, 474 A.2d 1261 (1984); Southland Corporation v. Vernon, 1 Conn.App. 439, 445, 473 A.2d 318 (1984); Haddad v. Francis, 40 Conn.Sup. 567, 537 A.2d 174 (1986), aff'd, 13 Conn.App. 324, 536 A.2d 597 (1988); Zitomer v. Palmer, 38 Conn.Sup. 341, 446 A.2d 1084 (1982); Danpar Associates v. Falkha, 37 Conn.Sup. 820, 438 A.2d 1209 (1981); S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy, 37 Conn.Sup. 579, 428 A.2d 806 (1981), aff'd, 188 Conn. 503, 450 A.2d 351 (1982); Mark I Enterprises, Inc. v. Sendele, 37 Conn.Sup. 569, 572, 427 A.2d 1352 (1981); Steinegger v. Fields, 37 Conn.Sup. 534, 537, 425 A.2d 597 (1980). Those courts that enunciated their underlying rationale reasoned that the ban on equitable issues in summary process proceedings arose from the jurisdictional limitations of the extinct justice courts, and concluded that the ban should be abolished. See, e.g., Southland Corporation v. Vernon, supra.

We agree that there is no longer sufficient justification for the old prohibition against the application of equitable principles barring forfeitures to summary process; that the prohibition, arising from an obsolete system, is itself obsolete; and that equitable defenses and counterclaims implicating the right to possession are available in a summary process proceeding. ⁸ If, then, the tenant's equitable claim was properly raised, it was properly before the trial court. ⁹

III

The tenant's answer did not raise the equitable doctrine against forfeitures as a defense to the summary process action but instead sought by way of a counterclaim the "denial of the summary process action on equitable grounds." The doctrine against forfeiture was, however, considered in principle by the trial court and briefed by the tenant. The tenant thus raised the issue below sufficiently for us to consider it upon review, particularly in light of the doctrine that once any equitable claim has been raised, the court retains its equitable jurisdiction to consider all of the equities before it in order to render complete justice; Natural Harmony, Inc. v. Normand, 211 Conn. 145, 149, 558 A.2d 231 (1989); McGaffin v. Roberts, 193 Conn. 393, 404, 479 A.2d 176 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S.Ct. 1747, 84 L.Ed.2d 813 (1985); Clipfel v. Kantrowitz, 143 Conn. 184, 188, 120 A.2d 416 (1956); Beardsley v. Halls, 1 Root 366 (1792); even where the equitable jurisdiction was conferred by a defendant's counterclaim. Seymour Water Co. v. Horischak, 149 Conn. 435, 442, 181 A.2d 112 (1962).

IV

" 'Equity abhors ... a forfeiture.' " Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338, 357, 334 A.2d 452 (1973), quoting Pierce v. Staub, 78 Conn. 459, 466, 62 A. 760 (1906); Sheets v. Selden, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 416, 421, 19 L.Ed. 166 (1868). It is well settled that equity will relieve against the forfeiture of a lease for nonpayment of rent. Kann v. King, 204 U.S. 43, 27 S.Ct. 213, 51 L.Ed. 360 (1907); Sheets v. Selden, supra, 74 U.S. at 421, 19 L.Ed. 166; 1 Restatement (Second), Property, Landlord and Tenant § 12.1, comment n; J. Eaton, Handbook of Equity Jurisprudence (2d Ed.) § 27; H. McClintock, Handbook of Equity § 31; 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in the United States of America (5th Ed.) § 453; 3 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence (14th Ed.) § 1727; see Nicoli v. Frouge Corporation, 171 Conn. 245, 246, 368 A.2d 74 (1976); Thompson v. Coe, 96 Conn. 644, 115 A. 219 (1921). This ancient principle allows relief because "[i]n reason, in conscience, in natural equity, there is no ground to say because a man has stipulated for a penalty in case of his omission to do a particular act (the real object of the parties being the performance of the act), that if he omits to do the act he shall suffer an enormous loss wholly disproportionate to the injury to the other party." 3 J. Story, supra, § 1728. The "penalty" is the forfeiture of the leasehold, imposed for "omission to do a particular act," that is, to pay rent; if the payment may be secured without a forfeiture, equity will not permit a forfeiture. J. Eaton, supra, § 34; 2 M. Friedman, Leases (2d Ed.1983) § 16.2; H. McClintock, supra, § 31; J. Story, supra; 2 J. Taylor, American Law of Landlord and Tenant (9th Ed.) § 495; 2 H. Tiffany, Law of Landlord and Tenant § 194(3).

Connecticut Appellate and Superior Courts have applied the ancient equitable doctrine against forfeitures to summary process actions for nonpayment of rent and have occasionally, on the particular facts of each case, granted relief to the tenant. Danpar Associates v. Falkha, supra; Syncro Flame Burner Corporation v. Windham Development Co., 11 Conn.Sup. 28 (1942); Seaboard Oil Co. v. Williamson, 1 Conn.Sup. 47 (1935); Dinardo v. Preston, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Housing Session, Docket No. SPNH8912-023883 (July 18, 1990), 16 Conn.Law Trib. No. 38, p. 33; Googel v. Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. SPH8604-32516 (March 23, 1987), 2 C.S.C.R. 558. More often, while applying the same doctrine to different facts, our courts have declined to grant such relief to tenants. See, e.g., Morin v. DiMarco, supra; Elliott v. South Isle Food Corporation, supra; Mobilia, Inc. v. Santos, supra; Haddad v. Francis, supra; Zitomer v. Palmer, supra...