Fellows v. Mich. Comm'n for the Blind
| Decision Date | 20 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 313563. |
| Citation | 854 N.W.2d 482,305 Mich.App. 289 |
| Parties | FELLOWS v. MICHIGAN COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Mark E. Kamar, Lansing and Gerald J. Cichocki for Ronald Fellows.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Matthew Schneider, Chief Legal Counsel, and Thomas D. Warren and Christopher W. Braverman, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Michigan Commission for the Blind.
Before: FITZGERALD, P.J., and SAAD and WHITBECK, JJ.
This case involves an issue of first impression: namely, the proper interpretation of the Michigan blind and visually disabled person's act (the Act), MCL 393.351 et seq. Among other things, the Act created respondent, the Michigan Commission for the Blind (the Commission),1 an administrative agency to which the Legislature delegated certain powers. This dispute is about the extent of those powers—specifically, whether the Legislature granted the Commission the ability to award monetary damages to aggrieved claimants. Petitioner, a blind man who operated a concession at the Cadillac Place state office building, claims the Act implies that the Commission has the power to award monetary damages; the Commission says petitioner's reading of the Act is incorrect, and that the Act does not permit it to award monetary damages.
We agree with the Commission, and hold that it does not have the power to award monetary damages to claimants, including petitioner. The powers of an administrative agency are limited to: (1) express powers (i.e., powers that are expressly granted by the Legislature in the language of the enabling statute); and (2) implied powers (i.e., powers that are necessary to the due and efficient exercise of the powers expressly granted by the enabling statute). Because no part of the Act expressly grants the Commission the authority to award monetary damages, and because that authority is not necessary to the due and efficient exercise of the powers expressly granted by the Act, the Commission does not have the power to award monetary damages.
Accordingly, the holding of the trial court, which stated that the Commission had the power to award petitioner monetary damages, is hereby reversed and petitioner's claim is dismissed.
Petitioner, Ronald Fellows, is blind and operated vending machines and a coffee shop at Cadillac Place from 2005 to 2008. He did so pursuant to the Act, which mandates that a concession “in a building or on property owned or occupied” by the state “shall be operated by a blind person....” MCL 393.359. At the time the state took occupancy of Cadillac Place,2 three concessions run by sighted vendors also operated in the building: Star Pharmacy, Subway, and Blend Café.3 When it occupied Cadillac Place, the state allowed these vendors to continue to operate under their old lease agreements.
Petitioner did not like the competition he received from Star Pharmacy, which apparently sold similar food items as his café. He complained to the Commission's Business Enterprise Program (BEP),4 and alleged that Star Pharmacy was taking away business that was rightfully his. After reviewing his complaint, the BEP's agent determined that it could not address petitioner's demands, because Star Pharmacy had a valid lease. Petitioner then sought administrative review, and asked that the Commission: (1) advise blind operators of the efforts the Commission made on their behalf, (2) inform other state agencies in Cadillac Place of the rules governing food service and catering, (3) help resolve his conflict with Star Pharmacy, and (4) bar advertisements for outside catering companies in Cadillac Place. He did not request monetary damages.
When the BEP's internal administrative review failed to resolve his claim, petitioner sought a contested hearing before a hearing officer pursuant to MCL 393.355(g) and Mich. Admin. Code, R 393.56, and made the same demands that he had made during the administrative review process. Again, he did not ask for monetary damages. The hearing officer heard the case in 2010 and recommended dismissal of petitioner's complaint. He noted that petitioner had ceased operation of his café, and that the issue was now moot. In the alternative, he suggested the Commission's board find for the Commission, because it had taken all appropriate steps to address the business competition of which petitioner complained.
The Commission's board rejected the hearing officer's recommendations, and instead remanded the matter to the hearing officer “for a full evidentiary hearing to determine damages Mr. Fellows may have suffered at Cadillac Place.” This was the first time the question of damages was mentioned.
Petitioner then received a second contested hearing before a hearing officer. The BEP moved to dismiss the case because: (1) the hearing officer had no jurisdiction to award damages, and (2) petitioner never claimed damages. The hearing officer did not rule on the BEP's motion to dismiss. Petitioner, now represented by an attorney, alleged that the Commission had breached a “vending facility agreement” and misrepresented the existing competition at Cadillac Place to induce him to open his business.5 He also asserted that the Commission “illegally” allowed sighted vendors to operate in the building, which supposedly reduced his potential profits for three years, and demanded $475,576 in damages.
The hearing, which took place in 2011, was not a model of proper procedure. The hearing officer heard no testimony; no representatives of the Commission were present; and the only evidence received was a copy of the Star Pharmacy lease, some sales reports from petitioner, Subway, and Star Snack, and an affidavit concerning Subway's business records. The hearing officer made no findings on whether a breach of contract, misrepresentation, or any other misconduct occurred, but it nonetheless recommended that the Commission “determine an appropriate amount of damages in this matter based on the evidence presented at the hearing.”
When the matter returned to the Commission's board in March 2012, the board refused to award petitioner damages. Petitioner appealed in the Ingham Circuit Court, which reversed the board's decision and awarded petitioner $475,576 in damages. The court rejected the Commission's argument that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to award monetary damages, on the grounds that “such power is clearly necessary for the proper and efficient operation of BEP agreements.” In support of its theory, the court cited one administrative decision in which the board had awarded monetary damages to a blind licensee, and claimed that MCL 393.358 implied that the board had the authority to do so. Further, the court stated that the board's decision not to award damages was arbitrary and capricious, holding that the board had “implicitly” admitted its own liability for failing to curtail competition when it remanded for a hearing on damages.
The Commission appealed the trial court's order to our Court in late 2013, and argues that it should be reversed because: (1) as an administrative entity, it does not have express statutory authority to award monetary damages, nor does it have the implied power to do so; and (2) its refusal to award damages thus cannot be arbitrary and capricious.
When we analyze an appeal of a trial court's review of an agency decision, we afford “[g]reat deference ... to the [trial court's] review of the agency's factual findings.” Romulus v. Dep't of Environmental Quality, 260 Mich.App. 54, 62, 678 N.W.2d 444 (2003). But “substantiallyless deference, if any, is [afforded] to the [trial court's] determinations on matters of law.” Id. “Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo,” Petersen v. Magna Corp., 484 Mich. 300, 351, 773 N.W.2d 564 (2009), and our analysis of the trial court's determination of the law looks to “whether the [trial] court applied correct legal principles,” Romulus, 260 Mich.App. at 64, 678 N.W.2d 444 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Our Court's “objective when interpreting a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Book–Gilbert v. Greenleaf, 302 Mich.App. 538, 541, 840 N.W.2d 743 (2013). “When ascertaining the Legislature's intent, a reviewing court should focus first on the plain language of the statute in question, and when the language of the statute is unambiguous, it must be enforced as written.” Fisher Sand & Gravel Co. v. Neal A Sweebe, Inc., 494 Mich. 543, 560, 837 N.W.2d 244 (2013) (citation omitted). “An agency's decision that is in violation of statute or constitution [or] in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency ... is a decision that is not authorized by law and must be set aside.” Romulus, 260 Mich.App. at 64, 678 N.W.2d 444 (quotation marks, citations, and alteration marks omitted).
Administrative agencies are a creation of the Legislature, and their powers are accordingly limited to those that the Legislature chooses to delegate to them through statute. York v. Detroit (After Remand), 438 Mich. 744, 767, 475 N.W.2d 346 (1991). The statutory language conferring such powers must be “clear and unmistakable” and is subject to “strict interpretation.” Herrick Dist. Library v. Library of Mich., 293 Mich.App. 571, 583, 810 N.W.2d 110 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Though it is possible for an administrative agency to possess implied powers, it can only infer such authority when that authority is “ ‘necessary to the due and efficient exercise of the powers expressly granted’ by the enabling statute.” Id. at 586, 810 N.W.2d 110, quoting Ranke v. Corp. & Securities Comm., 317 Mich. 304, 309, 26 N.W.2d 898 (1947).
In this case, petitioner brings suit against an administrative agency (the Michigan Commission for the Blind) created by an...
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