Felton v. Lopez
| Decision Date | 27 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | 1:12-cv-01066-AWI-GSA-PC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | KELVIN FELTON, Plaintiff, v. J. LOPEZ, et al., Defendants. |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANT'S RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, OR BASED ON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, BE GRANTED IN PART, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; AND THAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE BE DENIED
(Doc. 38.)
Kelvin Felton ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case now proceeds on Plaintiff's original Complaint, filed on June 29, 2012, against defendants Correctional Officer (C/O) J. Lopez and C/O S. Harrison for use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and on Plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint, filed on April 19, 2013, against C/O J. Lopez for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. (Docs. 1, 22.)
On May 2, 2014, Defendant Lopez ("Defendant") filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Supplemental Complaint for failure to state a claim, or in the alternative, based on qualified immunity. (Doc. 38.) Defendant also moves under Rule 12(f) to strike exhibits attached to the original Complaint, because they concern allegations against Correctional Sergeant C. Beltran who is not a defendant in this case and thus are irrelevant and prejudicial. (Id.) On June 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motions. (Doc. 45.) On July 1, 2014, Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. 47.) Defendant's motion to dismiss and to strike are now before the court.
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at California Men's Colony West in San Luis Obispo, California. The events at issue in the Supplemental Complaint allegedly occurred at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (SATF) in Corcoran, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there.
Plaintiff alleges that on July 20, 2012, C/O J. Lopez, knowing that Plaintiff had an existing shoulder injury, pushed Plaintiff from behind and extended his baton in hopes of provoking an altercation between Plaintiff and himself. This incident occurred after Plaintiff won a rules violation report authored by C/O Lopez, which angered C/O Lopez. The incident was witnessed by the entire dining hall.1
Plaintiff requests monetary damages and declaratory relief.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") the Court has a statutory duty to screen complaints in cases such as this and dismiss any claims that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Given therequirements of the PLRA, the Court is disinclined to view with favor a subsequent motion seeking dismissal for failure to state a claim. On January 9, 2014, this Court issued an order indicating that it had screened Plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and found that it stated cognizable claims against Defendant Lopez for use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. (Doc. 30.) While the order finding cognizable claims did not include a full analysis,2 the Court conducted the same examination as it does in all screening orders. In other words, the Court's conclusion was based upon the same legal standards as this 12(b)(6) motion.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976). The court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).
The first step in testing the sufficiency of the complaint is to identify any conclusory allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
After assuming the veracity of all well-pleaded factual allegations, the second step is for the court to determine whether the complaint pleads "a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) ( the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard for plausibility is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court generally may not consider materials outside the complaint and pleadings. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state any claims in the Supplemental Complaint against Defendant, for use of excessive force or retaliation.
"What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . ." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). "The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claimis . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) ()). However, not "every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action." Id. at 9. "The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
"[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Id. at 7. "In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it." Id.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims about being pushed by Defendant Lopez fails to plead that he suffered more than a de minimus injury as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
Defendant argues that while Plaintiff alleges that on July 20, 2012, Defendant Lopez "pushed him from behind and extended his baton in hopes of provoking an altercation," and that Defendant's "excessive force . . . caused further injury to Plaintiff's left shoulder," (Doc. 22 at ¶6), Plaintiff does not allege with any particularity that the push was in a location of his body that involved the shoulder, or had any effect whatsoever on the shoulder, which alleges nocausal link and thus, is just de minimus. Defendant argues that the PLRA requires a prisoner to show that he suffered a "physical injury" which must be more than de minimus but need not be significant. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Oliver, 289 F.3d at 627. Defendan...
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