Felton v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth.

Decision Date19 February 1991
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 89-3349.
Citation757 F. Supp. 623
PartiesIrving FELTON, v. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gregory Holston, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Brian Kandell, Francis J. Connell, III and Maureen L. Hogel, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DuBOIS, District Judge.

Before the Court for a second time is the Motion of defendant, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA"), for Summary Judgment. In the Complaint, Irving Felton ("plaintiff") seeks damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained while he was employed by SEPTA as a trackman for its City Transit Division. Plaintiff brings his action under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (the "FELA"), which grants to every employee of a "common carrier by railroad" engaged in interstate commerce the right to recover for injuries resulting from the negligence of an employer railroad.1 SEPTA's Motion for Summary Judgment asserts that plaintiff was employed exclusively by its City Transit Division which is not a "common carrier by railroad" under the FELA. As such, SEPTA maintains that plaintiff's recovery is limited to that provided under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act. 77 P.S. §§ 1 et seq.

On January 31, 1990 the Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of SEPTA and issued a Memorandum. It reasoned that plaintiff, as a trackman for SEPTA's City Transit Division, was not an employee of a "common carrier by railroad" within the meaning of the FELA. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration, in which he argued that he was an employee of SEPTA — a single integrated employer providing both local and regional transportation services — and that the Court erred in finding he was an employee of SEPTA's City Transit Division. The Motion for Reconsideration was granted and, as requested by plaintiff, additional discovery permitted.

Having reviewed the issues for a second time, it remains the finding of the Court that plaintiff worked exclusively within SEPTA's City Transit Division. The Court further finds that SEPTA's City Transit Division, although part of the commuter authority known as SEPTA, is a separate operational entity which Congress did not intend to classify as a "common carrier by railroad" subject to the FELA. Accordingly, SEPTA's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. Because additional issues requiring comment have been raised on reconsideration, the prior Memorandum of this Court will be vacated.

I. BACKGROUND

SEPTA is a provider of public transportation services. Created pursuant to the Pennsylvania Urban Mass Transportation Law, 55 P.S. §§ 600.301 — 600.343, SEPTA was established as part of an effort to develop metropolitan transportation authorities within the Commonwealth. As it presently exists, SEPTA is comprised of four divisions: the Red Arrow, the Frontier, the City Transit and the Regional Rail Divisions. The first three divisions operate intrastate, with the City Transit Division providing services exclusively within the Philadelphia urban area. The Regional Rail Division is the sole provider of interstate regional commuter rail services.

Plaintiff was hired by SEPTA on October 4, 1977 as a Maintenance Trainee Laborer. He worked exclusively within the City Transit Division until the accident at issue in this case which occurred on June 16, 1987. At that time, he was employed as a trackman, and was working on a trackbed used solely by the Market-Frankford subway line, an intra-city line, at the subway station at 11th and Market Streets in Philadelphia. Plaintiff's injury occurred while he was lifting a tie from a subway track.2

As a result of the accident, plaintiff first was found to be temporarily disabled and was awarded worker's compensation benefits pursuant to the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, 77 P.S. §§ 1, et seq. In June of 1989 it was determined that plaintiff was totally disabled and his benefits were adjusted accordingly. Shortly before that determination was made, and despite the fact that plaintiff had received worker's compensation benefits for almost two years, plaintiff brought suit against SEPTA, claiming that his injuries were covered by the FELA rather than the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act.3

II. DISCUSSION
A. Review upon Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate in those cases where the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 341 (3d Cir.1990). Where one party submits evidence in support of a motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the other party to show the existence of triable issues. Mere allegations, bare assertions or suspicions are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982). Summary judgment may be granted if the evidence presented by the non-movant is merely colorable or is not significantly probative of the issues. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court analyzes the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Schafer v. Board of Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 247 (3d Cir.1990).

B. The Scope of FELA Coverage

The FELA provides the exclusive source of recovery for employees of interstate railroads injured or killed during the course of their employment. Enacted in 1908 when railroad technology was still in its infancy, the statute was described by the Supreme Court as a Congressional

response to the special needs of railroad workers who are daily exposed to the risks inherent in railroad work and are helpless to provide adequately for their own safety.

Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 329-30, 78 S.Ct. 758, 761-62, 2 L.Ed.2d 799 (1958), (citing Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 65, 63 S.Ct. 444, 450, 87 L.Ed. 610 (1943)) (emphasis added). The FELA evidenced Congress's recognition that human injury was "an inescapable expense of railroading." It's goal was to shift that expense equitably from worker to carrier. Id., (citing Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 438, 78 S.Ct. 394, 401, 2 L.Ed.2d 382 (1958)).

To recover under the FELA, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that the defendant is a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce; (2) that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant with duties furthering such commerce; (3) that the plaintiff's injuries were sustained while he was so employed; and (4) that the injuries were the result of the defendant's negligence. See, e.g., Fowler v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 638 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. Unit B Feb. 23, 1981); Betoney v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 701 P.2d 62 (Colo.App. 1984).

The threshold issue raised by SEPTA's Motion for Summary Judgment is whether plaintiff was employed by a "common carrier by railroad" engaged in interstate commerce. SEPTA argues that plaintiff was not so employed because he worked exclusively in intra state commerce as a trackman for SEPTA's City Transit Division. Plaintiff disputes this assertion, stating that it is improper to treat SEPTA's City Transit Division as a distinct entity. He claims that SEPTA is a single employer, operating an "integrated" network of local and regional transportation. Because SEPTA's Regional Rail Division falls within the FELA's coverage, plaintiff asserts that all of SEPTA must be viewed as a common carrier by railroad.4

Plaintiff admits that urban rapid transit systems, often referred to as subways or street railways, are not "common carriers by railroad" for purposes of the FELA. Moreover, the extension of urban transit lines across state boundaries does not convert a subway or street railway into a "common carrier by railroad." See, e.g., Omaha v. Council Bluffs Street Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 230 U.S. 324, 33 S.Ct. 890, 57 L.Ed. 1501 (1913); Ferguson v. Philadelphia, 113 F.Supp. 275 (E.D.Pa.1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 520 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867, 74 S.Ct. 107, 98 L.Ed. 377 (1953). As defined by one court:

A street railway is local, derives its business from the streets along which it is operated, and is in aid of the local travel upon those streets; while a commercial railway usually derives its business, either directly or indirectly, through connecting roads, from a large area of territory, and not from the travel on the streets of those cities ... along which they happen to be constructed and operated.

Mangum v. Capital Traction Co., 39 F.2d 286, 287 (D.C.Cir.1930).

Given that SEPTA's City Transit Division operates exclusively within the City of Philadelphia, it is clear that it is not a "common carrier by railroad" subject to the FELA. The question, therefore, is whether SEPTA's operation of a regional rail line is sufficient to convert SEPTA's entire operation, including its City Transit Division, into that of a "common carrier by railroad." The Court concludes that neither the law nor the facts will support such a result. It therefore will not extend FELA benefits to employees of SEPTA's City Transit Division.

C. Congress Did Not Intend to Grant FELA Benefits to Employees of Local Transit Systems Operating Regional Rail Lines

SEPTA first assumed operation of its Regional Rail Division following passage of the Northeast Rail Services Act of 1981 ("NERSA"). NERSA mandated the withdrawal of Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") as a provider of regional commuter rail...

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