Felts v. Cleveland Hous. Auth.
| Decision Date | 26 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:10–cv–238. |
| Parties | John M. FELTS, Plaintiff, v. CLEVELAND HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John M. Felts, Cleveland, TN, pro se.
Howard B. Jackson, James W. Friauf, T. Joseph Lynch, Wimberly, Lawson, Wright, Daves & Jones PLLC, Knoxville, TN, for Defendant.
Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to Bradley County Circuit Court [Court Doc. 13], filed December 7, 2010; Defendant/Counter–Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and to Strike Answer to Counter–Complaint [Court Doc. 22], filed January 20, 2011; and Plaintiff's Motion to Add Additional Claim and Additional Defendants [Court Doc. 39], filed August 12, 2011. For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to Bradley County Circuit Court [Court Doc. 13] and Motion to Add Additional Claim and Additional Defendants [Court Doc. 39] will be DENIED, and Defendant/Counter–Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and to Strike Answer to Counter–Complaint [Court Doc. 22] will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. PLAINTIFF'S PRO SE STATUS
Plaintiff represents himself in this matter. Although a pro se pleading must be construed liberally and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)), his pro se status does not exempt the Plaintiff from the requirement that he comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir.1991). Pro se plaintiffs must comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, which provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief....” LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Hous. Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1104 (6th Cir.1995). Although the standard of review is liberal, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir.1996); LRL Properties, 55 F.3d at 1103–04. Further, this Court is not “required to create [Plaintiff]'s claims for him,” because “[t]o do so would requir[e the] courts to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff” and would “transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Thompson v. A.J. Rose Mfg. Co., 208 F.3d 215 (6th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir.1985)). See also, Crawford v. Crestar Foods, 210 F.3d 371 (6th Cir.2000).
After Plaintiff failed to appear at the November 15, 2010 Scheduling Conference, the Court ordered the parties to appear before the Court on December 7, 2010 for a show cause hearing, where Plaintiff was to be prepared to “show cause why he should not be subjected to sanctions, up to and including dismissal of the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute this action, due to his failure to appear at the scheduling conference.” (Court Doc. 11, Show Cause Order 1–2.) At that hearing, Defendant submitted evidence of its costs associated with the November 15, 2010 scheduling conference Plaintiff did not attend, and the Court took under advisement the issue of whether Plaintiff should be sanctioned for his non-appearance. (Court Doc. 14, Dec. 7, 2010 Hr'g Mins.) The Court then proceeded to conduct the Scheduling Conference.
During that hearing—and throughout the pendency of this case in general—the Court repeatedly warned Plaintiff of the risks associated with representing himself:
[P]roceeding pro se in a federal lawsuit is an enormous task. If you choose to do that, I'm going to have to ask that you familiarize yourself with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and comply with the Court's orders in this case and meet all of the deadlines that we're going to set today. Are you prepared to do that?
Plaintiff assured the Court that he wanted to proceed with the suit, and the Court again warned him that, if the Court set a schedule for the case, Plaintiff would have to “educate [him]self as best [he could] to pursue this case,” to do his “very best to comply with the deadlines that we're going to set today.” ( Id. at 11:12–19.) Plaintiff again agreed to do so.
The Court then conducted the scheduling conference and, before concluding it, “warn[ed Plaintiff] one more time” that:
proceeding pro se in a federal lawsuit is a very demanding and onerous undertaking. I'm going to give you as much leeway as I can as a pro se litigant, but I'm not going to give you so much leeway that your opponent suffers legal injury as a result of your failure to comply with court-ordered deadlines.
( Id. at 28:24–29:6.) The Court once again asked if Plaintiff was prepared to “to familiarize yourself with both the substantive and procedural law,” and after Plaintiff assured the Court he was so prepared, the Court noted for a final time that “if you don't, keep in mind, I can impose sanctions up to and including dismissal of your case,” which Plaintiff acknowledged. ( Id. at 29:7–16.) Finally, in accordance with the Court's verbal instructions at the December 7, 2010 hearing, the Court issued an Order the same day [Court Doc. 16], in which it reminded Plaintiff that “pursuant to the same rule [E.D. Tenn. LR 83.13], he has a duty to monitor the progress of the case and to prosecute the action diligently and that he is expected to be familiar with and follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Eastern District of Tennessee Local Rules.” (Court Doc. 16, Dec. 7, 2010 Order.)
II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMANDA. Legal Standard
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that possess “only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 141 (6th Cir.2003) (internal citations omitted). See also, Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir.2005). Accordingly, there is a presumption that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Hudson, 347 F.3d at 141 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a civil action brought in state court may be removed to federal court if the federal court has original jurisdiction over the matter. Federal courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Further, “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy ....” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Finally, “[w]henever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by [28 U.S.C. § 1331] is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
B. Background
Defendant filed its Notice of Removal [Court Doc. 1] on August 25, 2010. In that Notice, Defendant identifies, as grounds for removal, that on August 23, 2010 it was served with a copy of Plaintiff's “Petition for nullity of eviction and to reinstate tenancy” [Court Doc. 1–1, Compl.] and a copy of Plaintiff's “Uniform Civil Affidavit of Indigency” [Court Doc. 1–2]. The first document Defendant identifies as the “complaint,” which was itself an appeal for a trial de novo pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 29–18–128 and 16–15–729 of a final judgment in an unlawful detainer action brought by Defendant in the General Sessions Court for Bradley County, Tennessee filed by Plaintiff on August 20, 2010. Defendant argued that the Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over Plaintiff's claims alleging: “a violation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution” (“due process claim” and “equal protection claim”); “a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794 seq.” (“Rehabilitation Act claim”); “a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.” (“ADA claim”); and “a violation of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.” (“FHA claim”). (Court Doc. 1, Notice of Removal ¶ 5.) Defendant also argued that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over Plaintiff's state statutory and common law claims as they were so related to the claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction. ( Id. ¶ 7.)
As previously discussed, on December 7, 2010, the Court held a hearing on its Show Cause Order [Court Doc. 11] and conducted the Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f) Scheduling Conference for this case. During that hearing, the Court asked Defendant's counsel what the statutory basis for the subject matter jurisdiction was in the case, and Defendant's counsel responded by listing of Plaintiff's federal claims and asserted that there was no dispute as to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. (Hr'g Tr. 15:16–16:3.) During that discussion Plaintiff did not raise his concerns about remand to the Court. But, shortly thereafter, he did say that he “applied two motions” one of which was a “motion [ ] to remand back to Bradley County Circuit Court ... [e]ven though the time limit, I believe was 30 days had ran out on that, they have made consideration and expanded past the time limit.” (Hr'g Tr. 17:17–18:5.) The Court directed him to file those...
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