Felts v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 28 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: Felts v. Ford Motor Co., 916 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App. 1995)
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: Kevin Duane & Joyce Irene FELTS, Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Respondent. 50679.

Page 798

916 S.W.2d 798

Kevin Duane & Joyce Irene FELTS, Appellants, v.FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Respondent.

No. WD 50679.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Nov. 28, 1995.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Jan. 30, 1996.

Application to Transfer Denied

March 26, 1996.

David T. Greis, Kansas City, for appellants.

Teresa L. Clark, Kansas City, for respondentFord Motor Co.

Before SMART, P.J., and LOWENSTEIN and BERREY, JJ.

SMART, Presiding Judge.

Kevin Duane Felts filed suit against Ford Motor Company("Ford") alleging a violation of his right under § 287.780, RSMo 1986¹ to be free of retaliation for exercising his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act.His wife, Joyce Irene Felts, also joined the suit with a claim for loss of consortium.The trial court sustained Ford's motion to dismiss.Felts claims that the trial court erred in sustaining Ford's motion because: (1) the first amended petition alleged all of the elements necessary to a claim under § 287.780; and (2) dismissal was a violation of the open courts provision of Art. I, § 14 of the Missouri Constitution and a violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of both the Missouri and the United States Constitution.Affirmed.

Kevin Felts has been employed by Ford since April 19, 1991.Felts sought and received medical care and treatment for pain and discomfort in his hands and wrists from April 8, 1993 through August 3, 1993 at the in-house medical clinic at Ford's Claycomo production facility.Felts was referred to Charles Vilmer, M.D., who performed surgical releases on the medial nerves bilaterally in two separate operations.Felts filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits on August 5, 1992.On July 27, 1992, after an examination by Dr. Vilmer, Felts returned to work with a work restriction letter that the doctor had provided him.On November 11, 1992, Dr. Vilmer took Felts off work for a week and ordered a return with certain restrictions, including no repetitive gripping.On December 15, 1992, Felts reinjured his hands.He was placed on "no work" status by Dr. Vilmer until June 21, 1993, when he returned to work with permanent restrictions.

On February 28, 1994, Felts filed suit against Ford and against the estate of Dr. William H. Bryan.On March 1, 1994he filed his first amended petition.In Count I of the petition, Felts outlined a claim for malpractice against Dr. Bryan, a treating physician at the in-house Ford clinic.In Count II, Felts attempted to state a claim against Ford for a violation of § 287.780.He alleged:

21.Defendant Ford's act of refusing to refer Mr. Felts to an authorized physician, Dr. Porubsky, after the medical necessity for such a referral was known by Defendant Ford, for treatment of injuries that arose out of and in the course of his employment was an act of discrimination and retaliation against Mr. Felts solely because he exercised his rights under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, Ch. 287, R.S.Mo.1986.

22.Defendant Ford's act of placing Mr. Felts on the line to open and lift vehicle hoods, after Mr. Felts had reason to believe that the job tasks exceeded Dr. Vilmer's physical restrictions, without a physical examination when one was possible and when the personnel available to perform such examination were present and had the opportunity to examine Mr. Felts, when the decision to place Mr. Felts on the line, and after all personnel available to perform examination had been made aware of Mr. Felt's physical pain and discomfort from injuries that arose out of and in the course of his employment was an act of discrimination and retaliation against Mr. Felts solely because he exercised his rights under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, Ch. 287, R.S.Mo.1986.

23.Defendant Ford's act of placing Mr. Felts on disability through his employee benefits, instead of continuing to provide the benefits available under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, Ch. 287, R.S.Mo.1986, for disability that resulted from injuries that arose out of and in the course of his employment was an act of discrimination and retaliation against Mr. Felts solely for exercising his rights under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law.

24.Defendant Ford's act of interference with the medical treatment Mr. Felts was receiving from Dr. Porubsky, who was within the chain of authorized treating physicians, who was treating Mr. Felts' injuries that arose out of and in the course of his employment was an act of discrimination and retaliation against Mr. Felts for exercising his rights under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law.

25.Defendant Ford's act of interference with the medical treatment Mr. Felts was receiving from Dr. Rose, who was within the chain of authorized treating physicians, who was treating Mr. Felts' injuries that arose out of and in the course of his employment was an act of discrimination and retaliation against Mr. Felts for exercising his rights under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law.

Ford filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Felts had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the claims asserted by Felts.The trial court sustained the motion, finding that the Labor and Industrial Relations Committee has exclusive jurisdiction over Felts' claims, citing Wiley v. Shank & Flattery, Inc., 848 S.W.2d 2(Mo.App.1992).The trial court's order was made final for the purpose of appeal.This appeal followed.

Felts maintains that the trial court erred in sustaining Ford's motion to dismiss because the petition stated a cause of action upon which relief could be granted because: (1) it alleged all of the elements necessary for a claim under § 287.780;(2) no request has been made to compel Ford to pay workers' compensation benefits; and (3) the injuries suffered by Felts are not injuries compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act("Act").Felts also contends that his action against Ford gives rise to the loss of consortium claim of Mrs. Felts.

"A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is solely a test of the adequacy of the plaintiff's petition."Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 306(Mo. banc 1993).We construe plaintiff's petition liberally, taking all properly pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences that are fairly deducible from the facts asserted in the petition.Murphy v. A.A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671, 672(Mo. banc 1992).Felts' assertion that the actions taken by Ford were acts of discrimination and retaliation against him for exercising his rights under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law is an assertion of a legal conclusion.In determining whether the petition is sufficient to state a claim, the legal conclusions of the pleader are not accepted uncritically.SeeMurray v. Ray, 862 S.W.2d 931, 934(Mo.App.1993).

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Section 287.120 establishes:

1.Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and shall be released from all other liability therefor whatsoever....

2.The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his wife, her husband, parents, personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such accidental injury or death, except such rights and remedies as are not provided for by this chapter.

"The Workers' Compensation Law is wholly substitutional in character and ... any rights which a plaintiff might have had at common law have been supplanted and superseded by the act, if applicable."Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 160(Mo. banc 1991)(quotingJones v. Jay Truck Driver Training Center, Inc., 709 S.W.2d 114, 115(Mo. banc 1986)).In the instant case, consistent with this principle, the trial court dismissed the action, citing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The trial court should grant the motion to dismiss when it appears, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.Felling v. Wire Rope Corp. of Am., 854 S.W.2d 458, 461(Mo.App.1993).

The trial court cited Wiley v. Shank & Flattery, Inc., 848 S.W.2d 2(Mo.App.1992), in its order of dismissal.In Wiley, the plaintiff filed suit for common law tort against his employer and that suit was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the workers' compensation law was plaintiff's exclusive remedy.In affirming the dismissal, this court looked to whether the workers' compensation law provided relief for the acts that the plaintiff charged his employer with committing.Id. at 4.The test articulated in Wiley is applicable in the instant case despite the fact that Felts filed under § 287.780 and not in common law tort.There is no distinction insofar as the analysis where the exclusivity of the Act is concerned.If the Act provides remedies for the wrongs alleged by Felts in his petition, then the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear the cause because workers' compensation law replaces traditional civil tort liability as to the employer.

Close examination of Felts' petition reveals that each and every claim of discrimination is, in reality, a traditional workers' compensation claim.In his petition, Felts claims that Ford interfered with medical treatment for his work related injuries.Specifically, he lists the refusal of a referral to Dr. Porubsky and the interference of Ford with medical treatment provided by Dr. Porubsky and Dr. Rose.In Wiley, we noted that § 287.140 provides that an employer is obligated to provide medical treatment as may be reasonably required to cure the injury to the...