Fenje v. Feld
| Citation | 301 F.Supp.2d 781 |
| Decision Date | 09 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01 C 9684.,01 C 9684. |
| Parties | Paul FENJE, M.D., Plaintiff, v. James FELD, M.D., in his official capacity and in his individual capacity, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
John Stephen Xydakis, Attorney at Law, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Norman P. Jeddeloh, Arnstein & Lehr, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Paul Fenje, M.D. claims that he was improperly terminated from the anesthesiology residency program ("the Program") at the University of Illinois at Chicago Medical School (the "University"). Named as the defendant in this case is James Feld, M.D., individually and in his official capacity as a University employee involved in the Program. Pending are both parties' motions for summary judgment and related motions to strike.
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint contains seven counts as follows. Except for Count Seven which is brought against defendant Feld in his individual capacity only, each count is brought against Feld in his individual and official capacity, with only injunctive relief being sought in his official capacity; that is, the official capacity claims are not for damages, which would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Fenje v. Board of Governors of University of Illinois at Chicago Medical School, 2002 WL 959837 *3 ("Fenje I" ). Count One is a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that plaintiff was denied constitutional due process in that he was denied a pretermination hearing. Count Two is a § 1983 claim that plaintiff was denied due process in that he was denied an adequate posttermination hearing. Count Three is a § 1983 claim that plaintiff was denied due process in that his posttermination hearing was delayed. Count Four is a § 1983 claim that the Resident Agreement plaintiff entered into with the University is facially unconstitutional in violation of due process in that it did not expressly provide for a time period in which to hold a termination hearing. Count Five is a § 1983 due process claim that plaintiff's termination improperly stigmatized him. Count Six is a § 1983 equal protection "class of one" claim.1 Count Seven is a state law claim that defendant Feld tortiously interfered with plaintiff's contract with the University.
On a motion for summary judgment, the entire record is considered with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant and all factual disputes resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Associates, Inc., 330 F.3d 991, 994-95 (7th Cir.2003); Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir.2003); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 653-54 (7th Cir.2002). The burden of establishing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant. Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir.2001); Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir.1999). The nonmovant, however, must make a showing sufficient to establish any essential element for which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Binz v. Brandt Construction Co., 301 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir.2002); Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.2002). The movant need not provide affidavits or deposition testimony showing the nonexistence of such essential elements. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. However, the movant must place his arguments within a factual context and a court is not obliged to address unfocused arguments. Anderson v. Cornejo, 225 F.Supp.2d 834 845 (N.D.Ill.2002); Oak Ridge Care Center, Inc. v. Racine County, Wis., 896 F.Supp. 867, 876 (E.D.Wis.1995); In re ContiCommodity Services, Inc. Securities Litigation, 733 F.Supp. 1555, 1571 (N.D.Ill.1990), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., Brown v. United States, 976 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir.1992), aff'd in part sub nom., ContiCommodity Services, Inc. v. Ragan, 63 F.3d 438 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1104, 116 S.Ct. 1318, 134 L.Ed.2d 471 (1996). Additionally, it is not sufficient to show evidence of purportedly disputed facts if those facts are not plausible in light of the entire record. See NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 236 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1104, 115 S.Ct. 2249, 132 L.Ed.2d 257 (1995); Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 481, 485 (7th Cir.1991); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 476-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852, 109 S.Ct. 137, 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988). As the Seventh Circuit has summarized:
The party moving for summary judgment carries the initial burden of production to identify "those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir.1996) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citation and internal quotation omitted)). The moving party may discharge this burden by "`showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmovant must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "The nonmovant must do more, however, than demonstrate some factual disagreement between the parties; the issue must be `material.'" Logan, 96 F.3d at 978. "Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute." Id. (citation omitted). In determining whether the nonmovant has identified a "material" issue of fact for trial, we are guided by the applicable substantive law; "[o]nly disputes that could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." McGinn v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 102 F.3d 295, 298 (7th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). Furthermore, a factual dispute is "genuine" for summary judgment purposes only when there is "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Hence, a "metaphysical doubt" regarding the existence of a genuine fact issue is not enough to stave off summary judgment, and "the nonmovant fails to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial `where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party....'" Logan, 96 F.3d at 978 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).
The parties and, especially, the attorneys involved in this case have had a particularly contentious relationship. At the deposition of plaintiff, repeated and unnecessary interruptions and objections by plaintiff's counsel, as well as evasive answers by plaintiff himself, resulted in the deposition being continued to another date under the supervision of the magistrate judge assigned to the case. Obstructive conduct has again been exhibited in plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A) statement ("Pl.56.1(b)(3)(A)") responding to defendant's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement ("Def.56.1(a)(3)"). Plaintiff objects to virtually every assertion contained in defendant's statement and also moves to strike the entire statement. Most of the objections are without merit.
Even if a party fails to authenticate a document properly or to lay a proper foundation, the opposing party is not acting in good faith in raising such an objection if the party nevertheless knows that the document is authentic. See Erickson v. Baxter Healthcare, Inc., 151 F.Supp.2d 952, 971 (N.D.Ill.2001); In re Interstate Steel Setters, Inc., 65 B.R. 312, 316 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986). For example, although a deposition transcript should be certified by the court reporter, objecting that the certification is missing is inappropriate and merely obstructive when the objecting party has no basis for believing the transcript is inauthentic or inaccurate. This is especially true when the certification is not missing. Additionally, such oppositional conduct often does not serve the client because it obscures possible meritorious contentions. Nevertheless, the court will consider the objections that have been raised. However, it is not this bench's practice to strike any motions or any portion of a Rule 56.1 statement. To the extent a factual statement is not adequately supported, it will not be credited. The objections are generally addressed in the Appendix attached to the end of today's Opinion (hereinafter "Appendix" or "App."). The rulings that are recited in the Appendix have been applied in setting forth the facts to be taken as true for purposes of summary judgment.
Plaintiff's second objections to defendant's evidence in support of its motions for summary judgment and motion to strike the same [108]2 is a more detailed statement of plaintiff's previously filed motion to strike defendant's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of material facts [95]. The earlier motion will be denied as moot. Plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A) response to defendant's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of material facts [110] appears to be identical to Document [108] except that Document [110] omits the language requesting that items be struck. Document [110] first sets forth 20 types of objections with supporting case law, then responds paragraph-by-paragraph to defendant's statement of facts while referencing the previously recited objections....
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...the documents in discovery. Documents produced by the opposing party during discovery may be treated as authentic. Fenje v. Feld, 301 F.Supp.2d 781, 809 (N.D.Ill.2003). The Plaintiffs generally cite the documents at issue for statements in the documents made by Dish employees or agents. A s......
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...some threats made verbally in the presence of testifying witness, and made reference to school disciplinary meeting. Fenje v. Feld , 301 F.Supp.2d 781 (N.D. Ill. 2003). E-mail authenticated for summary judgment purposes by affidavit demonstrating e-mail address from which messages originate......
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Authentication
...some threats made verbally in the presence of testifying witness, and made reference to school disciplinary meeting. Fenje v. Feld , 301 F.Supp.2d 781 (N.D. Ill. 2003). E-mail authenticated for summary judgment purposes by a൶davit demonstrating e-mail address from which messages originated,......
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Authentication
...some threats made verbally in the presence of testifying witness, and made reference to school disciplinary meeting. Fenje v. Feld , 301 F.Supp.2d 781 (N.D. Ill. 2003). E-mail authenticated for summary judgment purposes by a൶-davit demonstrating e-mail address from which messages originated......
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