Fenlon v. Thaler
| Decision Date | 16 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-11-1385 |
| Parties | ROBERT MAXWELL FENLON, TDCJ-CID NO. 1015511, Petitioner, v. RICK THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Robert Maxwell Fenlon, a Texas prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Docket Entry No. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a state court felony judgment in Harris County, Texas. He has also challenged the validity of several prison administrative disciplinary hearings. The respondent has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 32) arguing that the challenge to the state court judgment is barred by the statute of limitations established by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The respondent further argues that the challenges to the disciplinary hearings have no validity. After reviewing the pleadings and the available records, the court has determined that the motion for summary judgment should be granted in part and denied in part.
Court records reveal that Fenlon was convicted of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (cocaine between 4 and 200 grams) and that a jury sentenced him to thirty years in TDCJ-CID. State v. Fenlon, No. 825756 (179th Dist. Ct. , Harris County, Tex. Nov. 30, 2000) (Docket Entry No. 28-25 at 90-91). The First Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed Fenlon's conviction, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused his Petition for Discretionary Review on June 11, 2003. Fenlon v. State, 2002 WL 31835768, NO. 01-01-00062-CR (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 19, 2002, pet. ref'd). Certiorari was denied on January 12, 2004. Fenlon v. Texas, 124 S.Ct. 1055 (Mem 2003).
The Clerk's Office of the Court of Criminal Appeals has submitted an affidavit stating that the Court's records contain no application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Fenlon (Docket Entry No. 32-1 at 2). Fenlon did file an application for writ of habeas corpus in 179th State District Court on March 18, 2010. The application is still pending in state district court and has not been forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Fenlon previously filed a federal habeas petition seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state court remedies. Fenlon v. Dretke, No. H-04-1541 . Subseguently, the United States Courtof Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Fenlon's Motion for a Certificate of Appealability. Fenlon v. Quarterman, No. 06-20790 (5th Cir. Jan. 20, 2009).
The present petition (Docket Entry No. 1) was executed by Fenlon on April 4, 2011, mailed from the prison in an envelope post-marked April 7, 2011, and filed by the Clerk on April 8, 2011. Fenlon presents the following grounds for relief regarding his state court judgment:
Fenlon challenges the results from three prison disciplinary charges that were brought against him.
Fenlon was charged with refusing to obey orders after he rejected a trusty camp assignment (Docket Entry No. 1-1 at 20). He stated that the assignment was detrimental because it would restrict his access to a law library. Id. at 22. He also asserted that he was legally blind and that the trusty camp had numerous trip hazards which would expose him to a greater risk of physical harm and that he was restricted from living in areas with surfacehazards such as those present in the camp. Id. Fenlon states that he was found guilty on March 11, 2010, and that he lost a total of 1000 days of good time (Docket Entry No. 1 at 8). He was also placed in Administrative Segregation after being demoted from State Approved Trustee 2 (S2) to Line Class 3 (L3) (Docket Entry No. 1 at 8). The Disciplinary Report submitted by Fenlon indicates that he was assessed with the following punishments: a loss of 45 days of commissary privileges; a temporary loss of contact visitation; a classification demotion from 3 (S3) to S4; and a forfeiture of good time credits.1
Fenlon filed a Step 1 Grievance challenging the outcome of the proceeding, and the unit warden upheld the disciplinary officer's decision on May 10, 2010, (Docket Entry No. 1-1 at 17, 18). He then filed a Step 2 Grievance in which the decision was overturned on June 28, 2010, and he was notified that his records would be corrected. Id. at 12.
Fenlon contends that his records were not corrected and that the punishment was not rescinded. Id. at 9. He also contends that the overturned disciplinary case was used to enhance punishments imposed in the two subsequent disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 8.
Fenlon's next disciplinary charge was "Assaulting an Officer with a weapon, namely food," by splashing the officer with peanut butter (Docket Entry No. 1 at 12; Docket Entry No. 1-1 at 6). Fenlon asserts that he was found guilty of the infraction on April 12, 2010, and was assessed the following punishments: forfeiture of 300 days of good time and a change in custody status from S4 to L3.2 He asserts the following grounds for relief:
Fenlon's third disciplinary charge involved biting a nurse while she was administering ammonia smelling salts due to his non-responsiveness (Docket Entry No. 1 at 15). He states that he was found guilty on May 26, 2010, and was assessed the following punishments: forfeiture of 700 days of good time and placement in administrative segregation. Id. at 14. Fenlon asserts the following grounds for relief:
The Respondent contends that Fenlon's challenge to his conviction is time-barred because it became final on September 9, 2003, the expiration date for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Respondent notes that Fenlon has not filed a state application for a writ of habeas corpus that would toll the running of the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and that Fenlon has not presented any facts which would entitle him to equitable tolling. While acknowledging that Fenlon had previously filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Respondent points out that the petition was dismissed as unexhausted more than five years ago. Fenlon v. Ouarterman, No. H-04-1541 (S.D. Tex. 2005). The Respondent concludes that the current challenge to the state court judgment is over six and a half years late and is barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations.
The Respondent argues that the challenges to the prisoner disciplinary proceedings are without merit. He asserts that the first two proceedings have no basis because Felon did not lose anygood time in either case. According to the Respondent, Fenlon's good time was restored in the first disciplinary proceeding, No. 20100181527, and no good time was forfeited in the second proceeding, No. 20100216007.
The Respondent contends that Fenlon's challenge to the evidence in the third disciplinary hearing, No. 20100268536, has no legal basis because such administrative proceedings only require a modicum of evidence to support a hearing officer's conclusion that the prisoner is guilty of the charge. The Respondent further argues that the alleged exculpatory evidence is of no consequence due to the low threshold of proof necessary to support the outcome of a prison disciplinary proceeding. Finally, the Respondent asserts that Fenlon failed to present his enhancement claim because it was not exhausted in the administrative process, and therefore, is procedurally barred.
Fenlon's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is subject to review under the federal habeas statutes as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Woods v. Cockrell. 307 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2002); Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1997), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997). A federal habeas petitioner challenging a state court decision is not entitled torelief unless the state court judgment:
The 1996 AEDPA provisions "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1849 (2002), citing Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518 (2000) . Habeas relief should only be granted where the state court's decision is both incorrect and objectively unreasonable. Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 476 (5th Cir. 2001), citing Williams, at 1521.
Summary Judgment standards established...
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