Fenn Mfg. Co. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities

• Decision Date: 31 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 15057,15057
• Citation: 652 A.2d 1011,232 Conn. 117
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: FENN MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES et al.

Page 1011

652 A.2d 1011

232 Conn. 117

FENN MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES et al.

No. 15057.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 1, 1994.

Decided Jan. 31, 1995.

Philip A. Murphy, Jr., Com'n Counsel, with whom was Charles Krich, Staff Atty., for appellant (named defendant).

Susan K. Krell, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Barbara E. Gardner, Hartford, filed a brief for Connecticut Employment Lawyers Ass'n as amicus curiae.

Susan S. Chambers, New Haven, D. Charles Stohler and Giovanna M. Tiberii, Waterbury, filed a brief for Connecticut Business and Industry Ass'n as amicus curiae.

Before CALLAHAN, KATZ, PALMER, FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN and MARY R. HENNESSEY, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The issue before the court is whether the named defendant, commission on human rights and opportunities (CHRO), is authorized pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-86(a) ¹ to award damages for emotional distress based upon a violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(7). ² We hold that CHRO is not so authorized.

The following facts are undisputed. The claimant, Janeen Rose, filed a discrimination complaint with CHRO against her employer, the plaintiff, Fenn Manufacturing Company, alleging that the plaintiff had discriminated against her because of her pregnancy in violation of § 46a-60(a)(7). Pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-83, ³ CHRO made a finding of reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff had discriminated against Rose. After a subsequent failure of conciliation, the complaint was certified for a public hearing before hearing officer Herbert Scott, who ordered the plaintiff to pay Rose $6555.78 for wages lost after she walked off the job prior to the birth of her child, $739.76 for wages lost while attending the hearing, $50 in attorney's fees, and $5000 for emotional distress. Legal interest at the rate of 10 percent from the date of judgment was also assessed.

The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Superior Court. ⁴ It raised the following issues: (1) whether the hearing officer employed incorrect legal standards and made erroneous findings of fact in deciding that Rose had a reasonable belief that continued employment in her existing position might cause injury to herself and to her fetus; (2) whether the hearing officer employed incorrect legal standards and made erroneous findings of fact in deciding that the plaintiff had failed to "make a reasonable effort to transfer Rose to any suitable temporary position which may then have been available to her"; and (3) whether the hearing officer exceeded his statutory authority when he awarded "back pay" and damages for emotional distress to Rose as a result of the acts of which she had complained. The trial court, in a thorough and comprehensive opinion, dismissed the appeal as to the hearing officer's finding that a discriminatory practice had transpired in violation of § 46a-60(a)(7)(E) and his decision that lost wages were appropriate and authorized; however, the trial court sustained the appeal on the issue of damages for emotional distress.

CHRO appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court and we transferred the case to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). CHRO challenges the trial court's determination that § 46a-86(a) does not authorize CHRO's award of compensatory damages. This claim is controlled by our decision in Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 653 A.2d 782 (1995). Consistent with our holding in that case, we conclude that CHRO was not authorized to award Rose $5000 for emotional distress.

The judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiff's appeal is affirmed.

In this opinion the other Justices concurred.

1 General Statutes § 46a-86 provides in relevant part: "COMPLAINT: DETERMINATION; ORDERS; DISMISSAL.MISSAL. (a) If, upon all the evidence presented at the hearing conducted pursuant to section 46a-84, the presiding officer finds that a respondent has engaged in any discriminatory practice, the presiding officer shall state his findings of fact and shall issue and file with the commission and cause to be served on the respondent an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from the discriminatory practice and further requiring the respondent to take such affirmative action as in the judgment of the presiding officer will effectuate the purpose of this chapter."

2 General Statutes § 46a-60 (formerly § 31-126) provides in relevant part: "DISCRIMINATORY EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES PROHIBITED.D. (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section....

"(7) For an employer, by himself or his agent: (A) To terminate a woman's employment because of her pregnancy; (B) to refuse to grant to that employee a reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from her pregnancy; (C) to deny to that employee, who is disabled as a result of pregnancy, any compensation to which she is entitled as a result of the accumulation of disability or leave benefits accrued pursuant to plans maintained by the employer; (D) to fail or refuse to reinstate the employee to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other service credits upon her signifying her intent to return unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so; (E) to fail or refuse to make a reasonable effort to transfer a pregnant employee to any suitable temporary position which may be available in any case in which an employee gives written notice of her pregnancy to her employer and the employer or pregnant employee...