Fenton v. Aleshire
Decision Date | 17 June 1964 |
Citation | 393 P.2d 217,78 Or.Adv.Sh. 1025,238 Or. 24 |
Parties | Howard FENTON, as Administrator of the Estate of Claudia Fenton, a minor, deceased, Respondent, v. Ronald L. ALESHIRE, by his Guardian adlitem, Marian Danforth, and William A. Sabel, Appellants. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Carrell F. Bradley, Hillsboro, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants.
Sol Siegel and Dwight L. Schwab, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Goldsmith, Siegel & Goldsmith, and Hutchison, Schwab & Burdick, Portland.
Before McALLISTER, C. J., and ROSSMAN, SLOAN, GOODWIN, and LUSK, JJ.
On October 27, 1961, Claudia Fenton, a girl eight years of age, was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant, Ronald L. Aleshire, and owned by the defendant William A. Sabel. She sustained injuries which resulted in her death. In an action brought by the administrator of the young girl's estate to recover damages for wrongful death, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Thereafter the court, on motion of the plaintiff, entered an order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial. This appeal is from that order.
The accident occurred a short time after five o'clock in the afternoon; it was raining hard, it was dark, and visibility was poor. Automobiles were being driven with their lights on. The defendant was driving in an easterly direction on Southwest Parkway in a suburb of Portland. Southwest Parkway is intersected in irregular fashion by Southwest Tremont on the north, and Southwest Edgewood on the south. At the southeast corner of this intersection are the building and playground of a public school. On the Southwest Parkway side the playground is elevated a few feet above the level of the street.
The defendant Aleshire, according to his testimony, was driving at a speed of fifteen to twenty miles per hour, and had passed through this intersection when he saw the decedent, apparently coming from the playground, about four feet from the right side of his car. Aleshire testified:
'Well, I saw her running off the bank and just like that she was in front of me, and I turned away to the right, trying to miss her, and I hit the brakes at the same time; when the car hit her, she spun off to the left.'
Aleshire further testified that the little girl was looking towards the east as she ran, that is, in the direction away from his car, and that she was struck by the left front headlight of the car.
The court assigned the following grounds for its order granting a new trial:
We will consider first the third ground, improper argument to the jury. The italicized language in the following portion of the closing argument of counsel for the defendants is the basis of the ruling:
Before the final arguments, counsel for defendants had informed the court that he intended to argue the italicized matter to the jury. Counsel for plaintiff objected and the court, without deciding the question, warned counsel for the defendants that it might constitute error, and allowed the plaintiff, in advance, an exception to such argument, if it should be made, so as to avoid the necessity of an interruption during the argument.
We agree with the court below that permitting the argument was error. Whether the parents of the deceased child had a cause of action for loss of services was wholly irrelevant to the issues for the determination of the jury: negligence of the defendant; contributory negligence of the deceased; proximate cause and damages.
That the statement was prejudicial we have no doubt. Made, as it was, in connection with counsel's argument as to the speculative nature of the claim for damages in a death case involving the death of an eight year old child, its natural tendency was to plant in the jury's mind the idea that they should allow no damages because the parents might recover in a different lawsuit brought for the loss of their child's services. We do not impute to counsel for the defendants a bad motive, but the best intentions could not neutralize the harmful effect of what he said. An argument of this kind can be just as prejudicial to a plaintiff as the wrongful injection of insurance into the trial can be to a defendant.
Hubbard v. Lamford Lbr. Co., Inc., 209 Or. 145, 150-151, 304 P.2d 943, relied on by the defendants is not controlling. There we affirmed the ruling of the trial court which sustained an objection to an improper argument to the jury on damages by counsel for the plaintiff and observed that in any event the ruling was not reversible because the verdict was for the defendant. Whatever may have been the propriety of the dictum in the context of that case, here we are dealing with an improper argument which, for all we know, may well have influenced the jury to find that, regardless of the questions of negligence and contributory negligence, no damages under the rule peculiar to such cases as this had been established by the evidence.
The defendants suggest that the point was waived by failure of the plaintiff to object at the time the argument was made. It is true that in Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Or. 426, 430, 374 P.2d 896, we indicated that the trial judge is not required to rule on a hypothetical state of affairs. But this is an appeal from an order granting a new trial for prejudicial error. In such a case it is immaterial on review whether a proper objection or any objection was made, Strandholm v. General Const. Co., 235 Or. 145, 152, 382 P.2d 843.
The court did not err in instructing the jury on sudden emergency. The emergency doctrine, as applied in automobile accident cases, was thus stated by Mr. Justice Brand in Frangos v. Edmunds, 179 Or. 577, 607, 173 P.2d 596:
According to the defendant Aleshire's testimony, he was confronted with an emergency not brought about by his own negligence when the little girl ran suddenly in front of his car. He applied his brakes and turned to the right. The only element of the rule which arguably is lacking is a choice of alternative courses. We think, however, that it might be properly contended that Aleshire could have avoided the accident by turning to the left instead of to the right and that, therefore, the instruction was applicable. See Raz v. Mills, 231 Or. 220, 227, 372 P.2d 955.
The court gave the jury the following instruction:
* * *'
We have re-examined the question and have reached the conclusion that the instruction on...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Randle v. Allen, 900189
...on the evidence and could be viewed by the jury as a "you-should-find-for-the-defendant" type of instruction. Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Or. 24, 393 P.2d 217, 222 (1964); see also Butigan, 320 P.2d at Of course, accidents do occur which might be unavoidable or for which the defendant or defend......
-
White v. Lock
...Cab Co., 49 Cal.2d 652, 320 P.2d 500, 65 A.L.R.2d 1 (1958); Schaub v. Linehan, 92 Idaho 332, 442 P.2d 742 (1968); Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Or. 24, 393 P.2d 217 (1964); Alaska Brick Co. v. McCoy, 400 P.2d 454 (Alaska 1965); City of Phoenix v. Camfield, 97 Ariz. 316, 400 P.2d 115 (1965); Chadw......
-
Fry v. Carter
...instruction was not error because "the jury was fully instructed on the general rules of liability for negligence"); Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Or. 24, 393 P.2d 217, 221 (1964) (noting several cases holding refusal to give instruction not reversible error because instruction is merely "clumsie......
-
Reinhart v. Young
...type of instruction, but because it may be misunderstood by the jury as constituting some separate sort of defense. Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Or. 24, 393 P.2d 217, 222 (1964). The instruction may have the effect of nudging or tilting the jury in a harmful manner when the evidence is close. Hu......