Fenton v. Clark
| Decision Date | 12 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-00069 (Erie) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | EUGENE FENTON, Petitioner v. SUPERINTENDENT MICHAEL CLARK, Respondent |
OPINION AND ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF No. 10)
Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoner Eugene Fenton (Fenton) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 4. He is challenging the judgment of sentence imposed upon him on January 30, 2009, by the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County, Pennsylvania, at its criminal docket number CP-20-CR-001034-2007. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Fenton's petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. ECF No. 10. For the reasons that follow, the Respondent's motion will be granted and Fenton's petition will be dismissed.1
The Court takes the following factual background from the Pennsylvania Superior Court's opinion addressing Fenton's appeal from the denial of his third petition for post-conviction relief:
On November 20, 2008, a jury convicted [Fenton] of third-degree murder and aggravated assault in connection with the October 23, 2007 death of an eleven-month-old child. [Fenton] was watching the baby alone while the child's mother, [Fenton's] girlfriend, was at work, and [Fenton] caused serious injuries to the child. When the baby's mother returned home the following morning, the child was whimpering and moaning. She called an ambulance, and the baby wastransported to the hospital, where he underwent surgery but died from his injuries to his brain.
Com. v. Fenton, 2015 WL 6954382, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2015).
In December of 2007, Fenton was charged by criminal information with violations of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2501(a) (criminal homicide); 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) (aggravated assault); 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2705 (reckless endangerment); and 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4304 ().2 See ECF No. 10-4. Fenton was found guilty of criminal homicide in the third degree and aggravated assault on November 20, 2008. He was sentenced to a term of not less than twenty years on his murder conviction. The state court merged his aggravated assault conviction with his murder conviction for sentencing purposes. Fenton did not file a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
On January 4, 2010, Fenton filed, with the assistance of counsel, a petition seeking post-conviction relief in the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9541 (PCRA). The state court dismissed Fenton's petition on June 7, 2010. No appeal from that dismissal was filed. Fenton then filed a second PCRA petition on November 20, 2010. He alleged that his attorney was ineffective for not filing an appeal of the June 7, 2010 order dismissing his first request for post-conviction relief. Counsel was appointed and, on November 10, 2011, the state court granted Fenton's petition. As relief, Fenton was permitted to file an appeal, nunc pro tunc, from the June 7, 2010 dismissal of his first post-conviction petition. Fenton filed his appeal to the Superior Court on November 14, 2011. On July 13, 2012, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmedthe dismissal of Fenton's original PCRA petition. Fenton did not file a petition seeking allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Fenton then filed a third PCRA petition on November 8, 2013. That petition was dismissed by the state court on May 14, 2014. Fenton appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the dismissal on November 9, 2015. Fenton did not file a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Fenton filed the instant petition for habeas corpus relief with this Court on February 18, 2020.3 ECF No. 1. The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition on July 28, 2020. ECF No. 10. Fenton was given multiple opportunities to respond to the Respondents' motion— first until October 2, 2020, and then again until January 26, 2021. See ECF No. 15, ECF No. 20. He has not done so. The Court will therefore consider his petition as well as the Respondents' motion without Fenton's response.
Fenton's petition raises three grounds for relief. First, he argues that his sentence was erroneously imposed due to his lack of a prior criminal record. ECF No. 4, p. 6. Next, he raises a layered ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. p. 7. Finally, Fenton asserts "newly discovered evidence/facts mandatory minimum sentence, RRRI eligible" as grounds for relief. Id., p. 8. The Respondents argue that Fenton's habeas petition is untimely and should be dismissed because it was filed beyond one year after Petitioner's conviction became final. See ECF No. 10, ¶ 18-23. As discussed below, certain of Petitioner's claims fail to state grounds for habeas relief and, as to all claims, the petition is untimely.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) imposes a one-year limitations period for state prisoners seeking federal habeas review. It is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and it provides:
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In analyzing whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus has been timely filed under the one-year limitations period, a federal court must undertake a three-part inquiry. First, the court must determine the "trigger date" for the one-year limitations period pursuant to section 2244(d)(1). See Caldwell v. Mahally, et al., 5741706, *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019). Second, the court must determinewhether any "properly filed" applications for post-conviction or collateral relief were pending during the limitations period that would toll the statute pursuant to section 2244(d)(2). Id. Third, the court must determine whether any of the other statutory exceptions or equitable tolling should be applied on the facts presented. Id.
The statute of limitations set out in § 2244(d)(1) must be applied on a claim-by-claim basis. Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2004), cert denied, 543 U.S. 1067 (2005). The Court will, therefore, separate Fenton's claims for analysis of their timeliness. Before reviewing his claims for their timeliness, however, the Court must first determine whether Fenton's grounds for relief are cognizable for purposes of habeas review. A claim must be "cognizable" for purposes of federal habeas review, which constricts a federal court's review to the determination whether a conviction violated federal law. King v. Mahally, 2019 WL 3558028, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3548922 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2019). "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Here, Fenton's first claim does not implicate federal law.
Fenton states his first ground for relief as follows: "Sentencing was wrong (sentence modification)." ECF No. 4, p. 6. In support, he states that Id. Because Fenton contends the Pennsylvania state court violated or misapplied state law in failing to give him credit for his lack of a criminal record, he has asserted a state law claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See, e.g., Brown v. Fields, 2020 WL 6742882, *3 (D. Del. Nov. 17, 2020) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) ().
To state a cognizable federal habeas claim based on an alleged state sentencing error, a petitioner must show that the alleged error was "so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process violation." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). Simply stated, Fenton has failed to demonstrate that the failure to credit his lack of a criminal record on his Pennsylvania sentence denied him due process of law. Here, Fenton does not allege that the sentence imposed exceeded statutory limits, that the state court's sentence was arbitrary, or that any particular constitutional right was violated, nor did he raise such arguments on direct appeal; indeed he did not file a direct appeal. See, e.g, Foss v. Superintendent of SCI Fayette, 2020 WL 2141800, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 2126886 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2020). Thus, construed as a claim of sentencing error, it is not cognizable in a habeas proceeding and will be...
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