Ferguson v. Ashcroft
| Decision Date | 27 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CRIM. 02-09-D-M3.,No. CIV. 03-122-D-M3.,CIV. 03-122-D-M3.,CRIM. 02-09-D-M3. |
| Citation | 248 F.Supp.2d 547 |
| Parties | Mabel FERGUSON v. Attorney General ASHCROFT, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, Ronald G. Thompson, and Tracy Ennen United States of America v. Mabel Ferguson. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Jean M. Faria, Federal Public Defenders Office for Middle & Western District, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff.
RULING & ORDER
Pending before the court are two consolidated actions brought by petitioner Mabel Ferguson against the United States and various of its agents in their official capacities (collectively referred to as the "Government"). The core of her complaint is that the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Prisons ("Bureau") have violated her federal constitutional and statutory rights by changing their interpretation of the Bureau's discretion to place certain classes of convicts directly into community confinement centers. The Bureau has regarded itself as having that discretion for decades and, in fact, exercised it in Ms. Ferguson's favor in August of 2002. The Department of Justice has since reconsidered the relevant statutory language. It now thinks the Bureau's earlier acts of discretion were "unlawful." Based on this opinion, the Bureau has informed the federal courts that it will no longer exercise its former discretion. More importantly, for Ms. Ferguson, the Bureau has informed her that she will be transferred from a community confinement center to a federal prison camp. It is this transfer that Mabel Ferguson seeks, in one way or another, to stop.
In her first action Ms. Ferguson requests that this court issue a preliminary injunction against the Bureau, and its leadership in the persons of United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, Bureau Director Kathleen Hawk Sawyer,1 the Bureau's Regional Director for the South Central Region, Ronald G. Thompson, and Tracy Ennen, who is the Community Corrections Manager for the same region of the Bureau.2 The injunction Ms. Ferguson seeks would prevent the Bureau from transferring her from her current place of confinement to a federal prison camp in Bryan, Texas. In the alternative, Ms. Ferguson asks this court for a preliminary injunction so that she may seek at a later hearing to have the court vacate her prior sentence and sentence her to a shorter term that will allow her to remain at the community confinement center until her release.
Formally, this matter comes to the court on the following three motions: (1) a motion for an emergency stay which, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f),3 this court treated as two motions, one for a temporary restraining order and another to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255;4 (2) a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the manner of her incarceration; 5
and (3) a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 702, and 706 with jurisdiction predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331.6
The court issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") on January 28, 2003.7 By consent of the parties, the court extended the temporary restraining order until February 21, 2003.8 The court heard oral argument on that day. Based upon the arguments presented in the parties' briefs and at oral argument, the court determines that Ms. Ferguson has met her burden under the standard for preliminary injunctions on the APA and § 2241 claims. Additionally, by consent of the parties and representations made to the court by counsel for the Government, any issues regarding procedural defects or service were waived for the purposes of the preliminary injunction hearing so that all parties can get to the next step.9 Accordingly, the court hereby grants Ms. Ferguson's motion and enjoins the Government from transferring her from the Ecumenical House Community Corrections Center pending a final determination on the merits.
In late 2000, the United States Attorney's Office confronted Mabel Ferguson with charges of misappropriation of postal funds, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1711.10 She signed a waiver of her right to have the charge made by indictment before a Grand Jury and the Government instead charged her with misappropriation by information on January 8, 2001.11 The presentence investigation report, prepared on March 23, 2002, indicated that Ms. Ferguson has a criminal history category of I (the lowest level) and that her offense level was 13. This categorization placed her at the lowest level of Zone D of the Sentencing Guidelines Sentencing Table, subject to a term of imprisonment between twelve and eighteen months.
On March 28, 2002, Mabel Ferguson appeared before this court and entered a plea of guilty to the misappropriation charge.12 The court released Ms. Ferguson on her own recognizance until the sentencing hearing. On July 11, 2002, the court imposed a sentence of twelve months and one day imprisonment, three years of supervised release immediately following said term of imprisonment, restitution payable immediately in a lump sum to the United States Postal Service,13 and a mandatory $100 assessment.14 The court recommended that "the defendant serve her sentence at the Ecumenical House Community Corrections Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana"15 and ordered that she surrender herself "for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons" before 2:00 p.m. on August 12, 2002.16
The Bureau, acting pursuant to a statutory grant of authority, decided that it should follow this court's recommendation and ordered that Ms. Ferguson serve her term of imprisonment at the Ecumenical House. This designation allowed Ms. Ferguson to work as the daycare provider for her infant grandchild during the daytime, but required that she otherwise be confined to the community center.17 Ms. Ferguson surrendered herself at the appointed place and time on August 12, 2002, and began serving her sentence.
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice decided to reevaluate the very statutory grant of authority that the Bureau exercised in assigning Ms. Ferguson to the Ecumenical House. According to the Bureau at the time of Ms. Ferguson's sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) gave it the discretion to commit people convicted of Zone C and D felonies directly to CCCs even though the federal district courts do not have such discretion in imposing their sentences.18 The crucial passage appears in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), which is entitled "Place of imprisonment." That section provides:
The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau, whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or without the judicial district in which the person was convicted, that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable, considering—
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;
(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;
(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence—
(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or
(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28.19
According to the Bureau's understanding of that section from the time it became effective in 1987 until December of 2002, it gave the Bureau authority to "designate an offender directly to a community based facility to serve his or her sentence," though "ordinarily this is done only with the concurrence of the sentencing court."20 As these remarks make clear, the Bureau's policy was that its discretion under this statute is broader than the discretion of the district courts.
Indeed, it would have to be in order to commit a defendant like Ms. Ferguson, convicted of a Zone D felony, directly to a CCC. For the discretion of the district courts is constrained by statute to follow the Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission.21 That statute provides:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.
Guideline § 5Cl.l(f), in turn, provides that "[i]f the applicable guideline range is in Zone D of the Sentencing Table, the minimum term shall be satisfied by a sentence of imprisonment."22
Compare the applicable Guideline for a Zone C felony:
If the applicable guideline range is in Zone C of the Sentencing Table, the minimum term may be satisfied by—
(1) a sentence of imprisonment; or
(2) a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised release with a condition that substitutes community confinement or home detention according to the schedule in subsection (e), provided that at least one-half of the minimum term is satisfied by imprisonment.23
As this language is widely understood, the distinction it embodies between imprisonment and commitment to a CCC requires that district courts impose a sentence of imprisonment for at least half the minimum term of imprisonment of all Zone C felons.
Zone D felons who must be given a "sentence of imprisonment," with no provisions whatsoever made for terms of supervised release on condition of service in a CCC, cannot be committed directly to CCCs by the district courts either.24 Judges may, however, direct placement in...
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