Ferguson v. State
Citation | 78 P.3d 40,276 Kan. 428 |
Decision Date | 17 October 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 86,736[1],86,736[1] |
Parties | EILEEN FERGUSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Stephen M. Joseph, of Joseph & Hollander, P.A., of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.
Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
A jury convicted petitioner Eileen Ferguson of arson in 1998 in Reno County Case No. 97 CR 207, after a fire destroyed the restaurant she had purchased. Ferguson filed a direct appeal of her conviction alleging, among other claims of error, that the information was jurisdictionally defective in that it failed to specifically set forth all the required elements of the crime of arson. The Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction after it found, under a post-State v. Hall analysis (State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 793 P.2d 737 [1990]), that the information fairly advised Ferguson of the charges against her. (State v. Ferguson, No. 81,677, unpublished opinion filed March 17, 2000, rev. denied 269 Kan. 936 [2000]). After exhausting her avenues for direct appeal, Ferguson collaterally attacked her sentence in a motion to vacate on the ground that she was deprived of her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at trial. One of the deficiencies alleged by Ferguson was that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance when he failed to timely move to dismiss or to vacate judgment based on the jurisdictionally defective information. The district court denied her motion to vacate. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that trial counsel's non-strategic failure to file a motion for arrest of judgment under a facially defective complaint constituted ineffective assistance of counsel per se.
This court granted review of the State's petition and Ferguson's cross-petition for review. This case presents us with the paradoxical situation where, on direct appeal, an appellate court held that a jurisdictionally defective information did not prejudice the defendant, but on collateral attack, another panel of that court held that trial counsel's failure to move to vacate on the basis of the jurisdictionally defective information resulted in prejudice to the defendant.
The procedural background of this case began after a jury convicted Ferguson of the arson of her restaurant, Sampler's. Ferguson filed a direct appeal, challenging: (1) jurisdiction under a defective complaint; (2) jury instruction No. 6; (3) the trial court's admission of certain evidence; and (4) the adequacy of the evidence supporting the verdict. The Court of Appeals determined that the questioned jury instruction was not clearly erroneous, that any erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming nature of evidence of Ferguson's guilt, and that sufficient evidence supported the jury verdict. In answer to Ferguson's allegation on direct appeal that the complaint was jurisdictionally defective in that it failed to state that her acts were done "knowingly" and "by means of fire or explosive," required elements of arson under K.S.A. 21-3718(a)(2), the Court of Appeals wrote:
In Ferguson's direct appeal, the Court of Appeals applied the post-Hall analysis and concluded that a fair reading of the information fairly advised Ferguson of the charges against her. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeals affirmed Ferguson's conviction. This court denied further review on June 13, 2000.
On June 19, 2000, Ferguson filed a motion in the district court to vacate her sentence pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507, claiming she had been deprived of her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at trial. The district court summarized Ferguson's claims in regard to trial counsel's deficiencies as:
The district court denied her motion to vacate after conducting an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Ferguson offered the testimony of five witnesses in support of her contention that she had been denied effective assistance of counsel during her trial. Those witnesses were (1) Jack Focht, an attorney; (2) Francis Meisenheimer, Ferguson's trial attorney; (3) Dr. John D. De Haan, expert criminalist in the field of arson investigation; (4) John Evans, Ferguson's public accountant; and (5) David Mitchell, certified public accountant.
At the evidentiary hearing, Jack Focht, a practicing attorney for over 40 years, testified that Meisenheimer did not render reasonably competent representation when he failed to file a motion to arrest judgment. In Focht's opinion, Meisenheimer's failure to file a motion to arrest judgment based on the defective information resulted in prejudice to Ferguson on appeal. Focht stated that, had Meisenheimer filed such a motion, "she would not be seated here today as a convicted person, but would be free."
Meisenheimer testified that he recognized prior to the trial that both the complaint and information "omitted the language regarding `by means of fire or explosive.'" He stated it was his intent to raise the matter in a motion for dismissal or judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the trial. Meisenheimer did not raise the issue at the conclusion of trial and did not file a motion to arrest judgment...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Scott, No. 83,801.
...21 P.3d 964 (2001); see State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 764-65, 793 P.2d 737 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan. 428, 78 P.3d 40 (2003). When a defendant files a motion for arrest of judgment based on a defective information, the pre-Hall standard applies. Ha......
-
State v. Reyna, No. 100,000 (Kan. 6/4/2010)
....... 5. When a defendant files a motion for arrest of judgment based on a defective information, the pre- Hall standard applies. State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 764-65, 793 P.2d 737 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan. 428, 78 P.3d 40 (2003). Under this standard, an information which omits one or more of the essential elements of the crime it attempts to charge is jurisdictionally and fatally defective, and a conviction based on such an information must be reversed. . 6. Under ......
-
State v. Dunn
......For the first time on appeal, he urges us to abandon the analytical structure erected by State v. Hall , 246 Kan. 728, 760–61, 764–65, 793 P.2d 737 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Ferguson v. State , 276 Kan. 428, 78 P.3d 40 (2003), and argues that the charging document's failure to allege all of the elements of the crime of forgery deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Dunn also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on his stalking conviction. On the way to ......
-
State Of Kan. v. Reyna, 100
...... 5. When a defendant files a motion for arrest of judgment based on a defective information, the pre-. Hall standard applies. . State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 764-65, 793 P.2d 737 (1990), . overruled in part on other grounds . Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan. 428, 78 P.3d 40 (2003). Under this standard, an information which omits one or more of the essential elements of the crime it attempts to charge is jurisdictionally and fatally defective, and a conviction based on such an information must be reversed. 6. Under ......
-
Appellate Decisions
...sufficiency but whether Harris' opportunity for a hearing under the pre-Hall standard was squandered. Following Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan. 428 (2003), the common-sense rule applies and record shows Harris suffered no prejudice. STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp 21-5408, -5408(a), -5408(a)(2), -54......