Ferguson v. Waffle House, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 May 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 9:12–1740–SB.
• Citation: 18 F.Supp.3d 705
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Keith FERGUSON, Plaintiff, v. WAFFLE HOUSE, INC., Defendant.

18 F.Supp.3d 705

Keith FERGUSON, Plaintiff

v.WAFFLE HOUSE, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 9:12–1740–SB.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Beaufort Division.

Signed May 7, 2014.

Filed May 8, 2014.

Jennifer Munter Stark, Jennifer Munter Stark Law Office, Mt. Pleasant, SC, Ashley E. Ameika, Ameika Law LLC, North Charleston, SC, for Plaintiff.

Stephanie E. Lewis, Thomas Chase Samples, Jackson Lewis, Greenville, SC, for Defendant.

ORDER

SOL BLATT, JR., Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Keith Ferguson's (“the Plaintiff” or “Ferguson”) complaint, which alleges discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -e–17 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as a state law claim for breach of contract. On July 18, 2013, Defendant Waffle House, Inc. (“Waffle House”) filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C.

On January 15, 2014, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation (“R & R”), outlining the issues and recommending that the Court grant the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. On January 27, 2014, the Plaintiff filed objections to the R & R, and the Defendant filed a response to the Plaintiff's objections on February 13, 2014.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

I. The Magistrate Judge's R & R

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making the final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 269, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). The Court reviews de novo those portions of the R & R to which a specific objection is made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

II. Summary Judgment

To grant a motion for summary judgment, the Court must find that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The judge is not to weigh the evidence, but rather to determine if there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If no material factual disputes remain, then summary judgment should be granted against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party bears the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). All evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pittman v. Nelms, 87 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir.1996). Summary judgment is not “a disfavored procedural shortcut,” but an important mechanism for weeding out “claims and defenses [that] have no factual basis.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Summary judgment will be granted unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, no party has objected to the Magistrate Judge's statement of the facts. After review, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge's factual recitation accurately reflects the record, and the Court adopts this portion of the R & R. Stated briefly, the Plaintiff, an African–American, worked for Defendant Waffle House for several years in the early 1990's, before he went to college, and then again starting in September of 2010 and continuing off and on until September of 2011. In his complaint, he alleges that the Defendant discriminated against him and retaliated against him based on his race.

In a detailed, 35–page R & R, the Magistrate Judge thoroughly outlined each of the Plaintiff's claims and evaluated them pursuant to the applicable law. The Plaintiff filed largely non-specific objections to the R & R, essentially arguing that the Court should not grant summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on any of his claims.

Disparate Treatment and Hostile Work Environment¹

In the R & R, the Magistrate Judge first considered the Plaintiff's claim that he was discriminated against on account of his race in violation of Title VII, section 1981, and the South Carolina Human Affairs Law when he was subjected to discriminatory assignments and ultimately terminated. The Magistrate Judge outlined the law and determined that the evidence reflects no indication or inference of race discrimination related to the Plaintiffs transfer from the Savannah restaurant to the Point South restaurant, a transfer that actually amounted to a promotion, and a transfer that the Plaintiff admitted was not any form of discipline or demotion. As the Magistrate Judge noted, the evidence indicates that the Plaintiff was unhappy with his assignment to the Savannah restaurant because of the distance from his home (even though the Defendant offered the Plaintiff moving expenses that he chose not to use to relocate). Next, the Magistrate Judge determined that there is no evidence of disparate treatment at the Point South restaurant other than the Plaintiff's complaint that other African–Americans who worked at the restaurant treated him poorly. Next, the Magistrate Judge found no evidence of discrimination related to the Defendant's re-hiring of the Plaintiff in August 2011 at a salary of $35,000, and the Magistrate Judge also determined there was no evidence to support the Plaintiff's argument that his African–American boss terminated based on his race, when the evidence clearly shows that the Plaintiff engaged in insubordination by failing to report to his assigned restaurant.

With regard to the Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, the Magistrate Judge first outlined the law and then considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. The Magistrate Judge determined that there was no evidence, other than the Plaintiff's conclusory suppositions, that race had anything to do with the complained-of events. The Magistrate Judge determined that the incidents described by the Plaintiff, where his white supervisor gave him work or instructed him how to do it, do not by themselves constitute evidence to support a hostile work environment claim. Likewise, with respect to an incident involving another employee, the Magistrate Judge noted that it was the Plaintiff who allegedly harassed the other employee, not the other way around. Ultimately, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Plaintiff failed to submit evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact that any of the complained-of conduct was attributable to the Plaintiff's race.

In his objections to the Magistrate Judge's treatment of his disparate treatment and hostile work environment claims, the Plaintiff essentially reiterates his assertion that he was subjected to ongoing harassing conduct and unequal treatment while he worked for the Defendant. Importantly, however, the Plaintiff points to no specific evidence that the Magistrate Judge failed to consider or to any legal error in the Magistrate Judge's analysis. The only specific objection the Plaintiff makes is to the Magistrate Judge's reliance on cases that explain the difficulty in establishing discrimination when the allegedly discriminatory decision-maker is in the same protected class as the plaintiff.² The Plaintiff contends that: “[t]he social reality is that discrimination can occur within a gender, a race, and within religious and ethnic groups,” and “the Court should not presume a lack of discrimination between members of the same race.” (Entry 33 at 6.)

Here, the Court does not believe that the Magistrate Judge presumed a lack of discrimination based on the fact that the Plaintiffs claims stem (at least in part) from his treatment by members of his own race. Rather, the Court believes that this is simply one factor the Magistrate Judge considered, in conjunction with the record as a whole, in ultimately determining that the Plaintiff's conclusory allegations were insufficient to raise an inference of pretext or intentional race-based discrimination.

After review, the Court acknowledges that the fact that some of the individuals who allegedly discriminated against the Plaintiff are the same race as the Plaintiff is not a dispositive fact when determining whether discrimination occurred. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that it is a relevant consideration in light of all of the evidence, and when, as here, the record contains no evidence of intentional discrimination other than the Plaintiff's conclusory statements, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Plaintiff was a victim of disparate treatment.³ Likewise, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the Plaintiff's conclusory allegations do not establish that he was subject to a hostile work environment based on his race. See Trusty v. Maryland, 28 Fed.Appx. 327 (4th Cir.2002) (“Trusty's wholly conclusory allegations concerning an alleged hostile work environment are neither severe nor pervasive enough to support a viable claim.”); Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.2000) (concluding that personal disputes with a supervisor, without evidence of racial motivation, are insufficient to survive summary judgment, and noting that “legally sufficient evidence is required to transform an ordinary conflict ... into an actionable claim of discrimination”). The Plaintiffs objection is overruled.

Retaliation

In evaluating the Plaintiff's claim that the Defendant retaliated against him when it assigned him to particular restaurants and when it terminated his employment, the Magistrate Judge first outlined the...